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The basic theme of this thesis is to find the basis of the institution
of property and the varying forms that it has taken during the course of
development. The institution of property has as its main function
fulfilment of needs of individuals. In the course of development the
needs of individuals came to be fulfilled in different ways ignoring the
main idea of the institution of property as a means to the satisfaction
of needs of individuals. With the social and economic changes the idea
of exchange value was introduced into the institution of property. With
this development the human labour power, acts and activities which could
produce products for the market economy, came themselves to be
regarded as an object of property. The idea of exchange value,
especially in this sense, was a new importation into the institution of
property, having little relation to the basic idea of property. Thus the
idea of ownership as a category in social and economic order for the
satisfaction of needs of individuals gave place to such social and legal
categories as •contract' regarded as an incorporeal object functioning
for the satisfaction of human needs not through the institution of property
but through categories having no connection with the basic idea of the
institution of property. Similarly the concept of the corporation as a
form of ownership, further obscured the idea of control as an essence
of ownership. Thus the forms of ownership which developed in the
course of evolution of the institution of property lost contact with the
basic idea of the institution of property - the satisfaction of needs of
each individual. The institution of property came to be justified by
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reference to these juristic fictions rather than to the idea of satisfaction
of needs of individuals. The author is arguing for the restoration of
an understanding of the institution of property in terms of its proper
function in satisfying needs of individuals.
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This thesis attempts to present a view of the basis and nature
of the legal institution of property. It advocates that the basis of the
institution of property is found in the idea that some sense of 'control
over things' has grown up with the idea of fulfilment of individual needs.
This view is argued herein as the justification of the institution of
property.
Man's immediate concern for his survival and to get provision for
his living brings him in contact with whatever material he can appropriate
from nature for his living. And herein one finds the germ of the
institution of property. The appropriation of things to secure one's
needs is the basis of property as an institution. With social and cultural
changes, with new discoveries and inventions, the needs of individuals
change as do the resources available to meet such needs. Such
changes also produce changes in men's conception of property. But it
will be argued that such new conceptions of property always reflect
conceptions of the needs of men in given forms of society. Thus what¬
ever other connotations are attached to the institution of property, it is
in all circumstances concerned with the satisfaction of individual needs.
The principal task of this thesis is to show the continuity of this function
of the institution of property. It will be argued that any justification
of property depends on successful fulfilment of this function for each
individual, and that wherever legal systems diverge from that, the
forms of property which they provide are unjustified. Wherever due to
political, social, or economic reasons the institution of property has
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been diverged from its task of enabling each individual to acquire the
means of fulfilling his needs, the institution of property has ceased to
fulfil its proper function.
The thesis falls into three main parts: the analytical, the historical,
and the philosophical.
The analytical part deals with the structural analysis of property.
The legal order defines and institutes the idea of ownership; basic to
that is the idea of giving to an individual exclusive control over some
'thing'. The most basic aspect of that idea is the protection of an
individual's personal control of some 'thing' which he holds for his
personal use. A a circumstances change, to meet new needs, the legal
order extends its scope without changing its form - that is the form of
ascribing to individuals control of things. Such a legal analysis creates
a basis for understanding the new social, political, and economic
conditions. Thus, in seeking to understand the institution of property,
setting aside all these variations in terms of social, political, or
economic considerations, which allow an individual a bundle of interests
over an object, our primary concern is why an institution of property gives
control over objects to individuals? What is set forth in this thesis is
advocating the idea that all the diverse forms of ownership are only the
modifications of the basic idea of serving needs of each individual.
Thus when under a given legal system the institution of property does
not fulfil this function of fulfilling needs of each individual, something
is misread in the institution of property. This social, political, and
economic point of view of the institution of property and the legal control
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it embodies over things, takes priority over whatever connotations
are attached to the institution of property. If we understand by the
institution of property an agency which provides the control over things
for the satisfaction of needs of individuals, it has a necessary existence
in all societies. The mode of operation of the institution of property
may be different in different societies, but theoretically the idea of
fulfilling needs of individuals, though sometimes ignored, can never be
denied since it is the basis of the institution of property.
The historical aspect of the institution of property clearly
demonstrates that the idea of control over things embodies the idea of
fulfilment of needs of individuals. Whatever vague ideas we have of the
early institution of property, whatever scanty evidences we find of the
early institution of property, and whatever disputes exist regarding the
nature of the early forms of property, the origin of the institution of
property demonstrates the idea of its existence for the fulfilment of
needs of individuals. When after long struggle, turmoil, the institution
of property established itself, that is, came to be understood as we
understand it now, a criterion was developed to distinguish between
property and non-property. The criterion developed was that of the
monetary insignia - any thing that can be converted in terms of money
was regarded as property. This development, however, ignored the
subjective satisfaction that an individual gets in his possession of 'things'.
Since an individual finds satisfaction in appropriating things, he regards
them as a part of his self. In primitive times the idea of property in
songs and dances refers to this subjective element expressed in the
institution of property. And if one looks into the idea of property as
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based on the idea of liberty, as Kant and Hegel believe, and the modern
idea that private property is a guarantee of liberty, what is evident is
not the insignia of monetary value but the subjective element found in the
institution of property. Thus it is not essential that thoughts and ideas
must have objective expression in terms of money; it is not the case that
there is no other way to know their objective reality. The action of
'passing off' is now recognised as proprietary on the basis of not any
exchange value in terms of money, but on the basis of subjective element
involved as an expression of the self. The monetary criterion excludes
the significance of finer values of life from the domain of the institution
of property and fails to recognise that subjective values are as much
necessary for human living as external things.
As a result of the idea of exchange value, all means by which a
man can earn his provisions came to be regarded property or a part
of the institution of property. This created a confusion between the
means and the ends. Asa result of this, new norms were introduced
into the institution of property having no relation to the basic idea of the
institution of property, though led to the development of the conception
of property but at the same time made the institution of property alien
to its own basic function. With this development there came a big gap
between the idea of property as a means of fulfilling needs of individuals
and property as a control over things.
Both philosophers and economists in the 18th and the early 19th
centuries tried to justify the institution of property in terms of exchange
values. The labour capacity and liberty in the sense of contract were
regarded as proprietary rights, since a man can sell his labour for
money. This confusion between property and the means to earn property
deprived majority of people of their right of property in the basic
sence of the term - of providing subsistence. The labourer's capacity
to labour and his freedom to enter into contract turned from property to
poverty. And in the arguments of classical liberalism the idea of
property to satisfy needs of individuals was eclipsed by their introduction
of new types of property. These thoughts in political circles led to the
justification of capitalism rather than the justification of the institution
of property.
But whatever be their arguments, the late 19th and the beginning
of the 20th centuries saw a movement towards the reversion of the
institution of property to its real basis - the satisfaction of needs of
individuals. The question of human subsistence is making its mark
as a fundamental right on future developments, related either directly
or indirectly, to the institution of property. The socialist literature
again and again refers to this theory of human subsistence. The imposi¬
tion of duties on the property-holders so as to prevent the abuse of the
right of property points to the growing recognition of the functional
aspect of the institution of property - fulfilment of needs of individuals.
Again we find the traces of fulfilling needs of individuals in modern
legislation like compulsory education schemes, housing schemes,
labour laws, etc. Wherever human life is affected because of economic
conditions, it is an aspect of the institution of property. No economic




STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY AND
PELATED PROBLEMS
Structural Analysis of Property
There never has existed and it is quite safe to say, that there
win never exist, a society, however savage, that will not recognise
certain order in the social, legal or in any other rudimentary form.
Cairns states:
Order is a necessary condition of human social life
and it impossible to imagine a society in which order of
some sort does not exist.
V. e may not find the legal order we have today, yet the order suited to
the mode of life of the society at a particular time, would always be
there. Any type of order, however feeble it may be, if it functions, and
suits and satisfies the needs of a society, will be viable and capable of
evolution. Bentham stresses the existence of an order as the basis of
the institution of property. He states:
The savage who has killed a deer may hope to keep it
for himself, so long as his cave is undiscovered; so long
as he watches to defend it, and is stronger than his rival;
but that is all. How miserable and precarious is such a
possession'. If we suppose the least agreement among
savages to respect the acquisitions of each other, we see the
introduction of a principle to which no name can be given but
that of law. A feeble and momentary expectation may result
from time to time fron circumstances purely physical; but
a strong and permanent expectation can result only from law.
That which, in the natural state, was an almost invisible
thread, in the social state becomes a cable.""
1. Cairns, H., The Theory of Legal Science, Chapel Hill 1941, p. 15.
2. Bentham;, J., Theory of Legislation, London 1871, p. 113.
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The recognition of ownership implies the existence of a social order,
however small or feebly organised.
Whatever theory of evolution we advance for the development
of civilisation, we find men at all times and in all circumstances, living
in society, regulating their conduct and transacting their affairs accord¬
ing to recognised standards, though at times some are rebellious
against others. It is to this established oi'der that the individual
conforms in society. As Troller says:
One may submit to it knowingly or unconsciously;
one may accept it or take.^an active part in its evolution;
but one cannot escape it.
Social order is the pre-condition of any society. Legal order
represents an aspect of this order. Legal order regulates the conduct
of men in relation to one another according to recognised standards,
both as individuals and as members of the group. The subject matter
of legal order is, thus, the relationship between human beings. It is
not the expression of all desires and volitional acts that forms a part
of legal order, but only or mainly those acts which affect the conduct
of other individuals. This order may be supposed to serve the values
of the existing society and to change with the change of circumstances.
The object of legal order is to ensure social order and, therefore, it
has to regulate the relations between men, and not their conscience
regulation of which is the function of moral order. Troller states:
As an order it must be capable of allowing the will of
the individual to take effect according to his particular
personality and the kind of community in which he lives.
It must also prescribe to what extent he must follow the
3. Troller, A., The Law and Order, Leyden 1969, p. 12.
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will of other individuals or other groups or ^is own group.
It is this order which I call the legal order.
In this order of social relations we find the basis of different
types of institutions. Property is one such institution. But the mode
is identically the same in case of family, crime, marriage, etc. All
institutions imply relations between individuals; the problem is how to
differentiate the institution of property from other institutions. The
institution of property, in addition to regulating the relation between
individuals, ascertains their relation with reference to objects as well.
The immediate purpose of ownership is to determine the relation between
individuals in respect of the use of things. Cairns structuralises the
property relation as follows;
The property relation is triadic; A owgs B against C,
where C represents all other individuals .. .
The institution of property implies the existence oi ordered*1
relations which means the existence of norms to regulate human
activities. The existence of normative order is an essential element
for the existence of any institution. Norms are rules of conduct which
prescribe behaviour patterns of individuals towards one another.
Ownership is established principally by norms of prohibition which
regulate human conduct towards things. For example, A's right of
property depends fundamentally on a prohibition imposing a duty on
others not to interfere with A's use of the object of property. From the
4. Ibid, p. 12.
5. Cairns, H. Law and the Social Sciences, London 1935, p. 59.
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stand point of the non-owner this means that the infringement of
another's right is to be avoided not simply because of his physical
force but because of the existence and recognition of the relevant norms.
Mead, however, stresses the psychological element in the formation
of norms - each man appealing to nis right would arouse in another
6
consciousness of the attitude of others.
In this setting of the social order a legal right of ownership
carries with it a legally supported right to use a definite thing for more
or less definite purposes and for definite or indefinite time. The mean¬
ing of this right, is that al1 other persons are forbidden to interfere
with the owner in the exercise of his right in respect of the thing owned,
up to the point at which the limits of that right are prescribed by law.
Once the right of property is vested in a person in respect of a thing,
duty is imposed on others not to interfere with the owner's use of the
thing. The right of A with regard to land (for example) is, thus at
the most primitive level analysed in terms of legal relations between
A, and an indefinite number of persons, who are excluded from the use
of the land by the norm which imposes a duty on them not to interfere
with A in his use of the land.
In this sense, the right of property is a personal right. It is a
notion that is entirely produced by the regulation of inter-personal
relations between persons with respect to things. It is a subjective
right. The legal system creates subjective rights to regulate inter¬
personal relations. Turner refers to these relations when he states:
6. Mead, G.il., Mind, oelf and Society, London 1934, pp. 161-62.
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The law of ownership is not a set of rules fixing what
I may or may not do to a thing but a set of rules fixing what
other people may or may not prevent m e from doing to the
thing, and wj^at I may or may not prevent them from doing
to the thing.
It is obvious, thus, when law creates relations between a person and
other persons with respect to things, and vests the right in one or more
to the exclusion of others from the use or the disposal of a thing, the
right is the right of ownership.
Thus, the series oi elements into which the right of property
may be arranged includes the following:
1) The existence oi normative order which recognises the
institution of ownership;
2) the object of property;
3) the person in whom the ownership is vested;
4) the persons on whom the duty of non-interference
is imposed.
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Holland analyses right into four elements:
1) The Person entitled;
2) The Object;
3) The Act or Forbearance;
4) The Person obliged.
Hence property is an appropriation of an object by the individual and
the acceptance of this appropriation on the part of the rest of the society.
By this acceptance society thereby creates a right in the individual and
imposes on itself an obligation to let the individual enjoy his appropriation.
7. Turner, J.W.C., "Some Reflections on Ownership in English
Law", 19 Can. B.R. 1941, p. 343.
8. Holland, T.E., Jurisprudence, London 1900, p. 86.
Vliller, VY ,G., Lectures on the Philosophy of Law, London 1884,
p. 126.
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A similar view is expressed by Green when he stated:
This is the recognition by others of a man's appropria¬
tion as something which they will treat as his, not theirs,
and the guarante^ to him of his appropriation by means of
that recognition.
Ownership is, thus, a certain kind of position which the owner
enjoys in the control or use of a thing to the exclusion of others. It is
guaranteed in the right to exclusive use of a thing. For example, my
property in my house, is not the house, but the right I have in respect
of my house. Again my right of easement to cross over another's
land is property, but if every one had the same title to cross that land,
the right would not be one of property. The thing to which every¬
body has an access to use at the same time or at different times does
not constitute anyone's property. Property pre-supposes a realm of
private freedom. Without freedom to bar one man from certain
activities or to allow another to engage in that activity, there can be
no ownership. Similarly if all activities are either permitted or
prohibited by general laws, there is no property. For example, if
there is a piece oi land which by general law is provided for everybody's
use it is not private property of anybody. Neither is there property
with reference to things which cannot be used or possessed like distant
stars, nor with reference to things which may be used freely by everyone,
such as the high seas. Thus in ownership it is not only the use or
possession of a thing that is involved; but it is exclusiveness of use or passesdbn
which is the crux of ownersnip. Ownership is sometimes defined as
9. Green, T.H., Lectures on the Principles oi Political Obligation,
London 1895, p. 214.
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the right of use. But this is to misread the fact of ownership. The
right of use may be necessary to, but is not a sufficient criterion of,
ownership. Ownership is a right fostered and protected by law for the
exclusive use, enjoyment and disposal of a thing. Exclusion is the life
10
essence of property. Holland makes a similar remark when he slates:
The essence of all such rights lies not so much in
the enjoyment of the thing, as in the legal power of e^lud-
ing others from interfering with the enjoyment of it.
Similarly Ely states:
The right of property^ an exclusive right, . ..
that is, it excludes others.
It has been argued above that the kernel of ownership is found
in the right to exclusive use of a thing. The right is established when
a given legal system institutes the complex right - duty relation in
respect of a thing which results in the capacity of individuals to have
legally exclusive control of a thing for a certain more or less definite
purpose and for a definite or indefinite time. This involves postulating
the existence of rules whereby the right of ownership is "set up, or we
might say 'instituted', by the performance of some act or the occurrence
.. 13
of some event . Such events and occurrences the law treats as
10. Bowen, E., "The Concept of Private Property", Cor. L.Q. 1925, p. 42.
Cohen, F.S. "Dialogue on Private Property", Rutgers L.R., 1954,
p. 370.
11. Holland, T.E., ■ urisprudence, London 1900, p. 179.
12. Ely, R.T., Property and Contract in their relations to the Distribu¬
tion of Vv ealth, London lyl4, p. 136. (Hereinafter this book is cited
as Property and Contract).
Sethna, M.J., Jurisprudence, Bombay 1973, p. 440.
Hobhouse, T. L., "The Historical Evolution of Property in Fact
and in Idea", in Property, Its Duties and Rights, London 1913, p. 6.
(Hereinafter this book is cited as Property.)
13. MacCormick, D.N., "Law as Institutional Fact , 90 L.Q.R., p. 106.
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operative to establish the institution of ownership or rather, to vest in
some individual 'ownership' of some identifiable 'thing'.
The existence of a normative order is essential for establishing
the institution of property. It is only when such a frame-work of norms
exists that the institution of property comes into existence in a fully
developed form. Thus to say that a given legal system has an institu¬
tion of property is to accept that it has such a frame-work of norms.
The exact description in time, nature, and extent o: a right carries with
it a description of the m ode in which it is terminated, because it is
terminated only because by its very nature and limits, it cannot go on
for ever. As Professor VlacCormick, while explaining the structure
of institutions remarks:
They are set up, or as we might say 'instituted'
by the performance of some act or the occurrence of some
event and they continue in ^istence until the moment of
some further act or event.
In the final setting up of the institution of property, the sub-division
15
of legal rules can, thus, be analysed as follows:
1) Institutive rules;
2) Consequential rules;
3) Tern inative rules.
The point that is generally stressed is regarding the variation
in legal consequences of ownership in different 1egai systems. For
example, in one legal system alienation is aPowed, whereas in others
14. Ibid, p. 106.
15. Ibid, pp. 106-107.
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it is restricted or not allowed at all. These variations in legal
consequences are the resu1fr of differences of social systems in which
legal systems are to operate andwhose values and ends they are to
further and maintain. Since all. laws are conditioned by social circum¬
stances and legal systems represent one of the aspects of social systems,
the content of legal systems varies according to the differences between
different social systems. The centre of gravity of the legal systems
lies in the social systems in which they operate. Thus the legal conse¬
quences that follow in a given legal system from given legal institutions
are not necessarily the same in all the legal systems. It is the absence
or presence of different legal norms that differentiates the legal
institutions of different legal systems which maintain different types
of values towards which the legal norms are directed. For example,
differences in property norms represent different values operative in
Russia and China as against those operative in France and Germany.
The difference lies in the legal norms that establish the institution of
property and the ends or values towards which the legal norms are
directed. And ends or vaTues to be maintained or achieved in various
societies vary according to the political and economic needs of the
society. Thus differences in social structures will make the differ¬
entials in legal consequences co-existent with the social variations
without necessarily presenting any apparent or real contradictions.
Thus the variations in the intensity and extenaivity of the legal conse¬
quences of ownership from society to society do not represent the
absence or presence of the institution of property but the presence of
a more liberal or a more restricted conception of ownership.
It has been stated above that the kernel of ownership resides
in right to exclusive use of a thing; this can be termed 'the primary
element of ownership'. If a legal system is to maintain an institution
of property, the right of individual person^ to exclusive use of specific
tilings for a more or less specific purpose, and for definite or
indefinite time must be secured as one of the legal consequences of
'ownership'. If a legal system abolishes all the legal consequences
of ownership except right to exclusive use of a thing, it still has an
institution of property. But if it abolishes the right to exclusive use
of a thing (or class o, things), it abolishes the institution of property
itself in respect of that thing (or class of things). But there are
certain legal consequences which are not the same in all legal systems
but vary from system to system as a result of different values to be
pursued and furthered by the legal systems. Such legal consequences
can be termed 'secondary legal consequences'. For example, certain
legal systems allow alienation in all forms, whereas others allow it
only in certain restricted forms. Similarly the number and nature of
objects of ownership vary from system to system . Thus in contemporary
Russia, land and other means of production are withdrawn from
personal ownership, while in India and United Kingdom there is no
such general restriction.
Referring to these two elements of ownership, Professor Zitting
states:
The content of ownership, in the general sense,
consists of elements lying on different levels. The
owner's right refers, on the one hand, to the use of an
object, and, on the other hand, to his legal competence
to transfer ownership.
Thus one can state that the primary element of ownership is the general
rule of ownership whereby legal analysis defines ownership; the
secondary elements indicate the functional role that is ascribed to
ownership. Without distinguishing the primary and secondary legal
consequences of ownership one cannot establish a generally applicable
meaning of ownership. Unless such a generally applicable meaning
of ownership is established, comparison of different forms of owner¬
ship in different societies is impossible.
In the present day industrial, commercial, and trading societies,
the analysis of the concept of property is taken in the broadest sense
to include both primary and secondary legal consequences. It is at
this point we can shift the focus of our attention from the purely
primitive meaning of property that refers only to the right to exclusive
use of a thing to the fully developed lega1 system that refers both to
primary and secondary elements of ownership as constituting the
institution of property and enables one to understand and articulate
more clearly the point made by those who regard ownership as a bundle
of rights.
Legal Concept of Property whether a Single Right or a Bundle
of Fights.
A sharp dispute exists as to the contents of ownership. The
Roman law distinguished three rights as component parts of ownership:
16. Zitting, S., " " n attempt to Analyse the Owner's legal Position'1,
Scandinavian Studies in Law, 1959, p. 229.
ius utendi, ius fruendi, and ius abutendi. The Romans distinguished
them as products of analysis, they did not favour their separation in
practice except in relation to a limited class of jura in re aliena. These
component parts are functional or administrative units rather than
having separate existence. But this characteristic of the concept of
ownership is often misconstrued. Instead of taking this deductive
approach, the concept is inductively construed as an aggregate or
bundle of these rights. The component parts described above neither
constitute ownership nor give rise to ownership but are in the nature of
proprietary rights which can be granted by the owner to others by virtue
of the fact that he is owner. Anyone having an interest less than owner¬
ship should not be considered as an owner of property but as having
proprietary rights - rights which the owner grants to others without
losing his general right of ownership.
Pollock says "what we call the law of property is, in the first
place, the systematic expression of the degrees and forms of control,
17
use, and enjoyment, that are recognised and protected by law".
Similarly Blackstone enumerates three rights of property - right of
18
free use, enjoyment and disposal of acquisitions. Pound, however
19
further dissects the right of ownership into six sub-rights. Kruse
makes his own assessment and expresses the opinion that "the right of
property is a definite set of powers", and calls this set of powers, "the
17. Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, London 1929, p. 172.
18. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. I, London
1830, p. 138. (Hereinafter this book is cited as Commentaries.)
19. Pound, R., "Legal Rights", Int. J.E. vol. 26, 1916, p. 101.
a) ius possidendi; b) ius utendi; c) ius fruendi; d) ius abutendi;
e) ius disponendi; f) ius prohibendi.
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normal conception of the right of property". But of all such rights,
there is only one which seems fundamental to the idea of ownership, the
single right of exclusion. One has property in the car one drives; one's
property is not the car, but the right one has in it - the exclusive use of
it. Exclusion is the life essence of property. Rights mentioned by the
above authors are pertinent but to come directly to the point, it seems
that the idea of exclusion is the differentia, all other rights though not
21 22
essential, are important. The variability of rights from place to
place and from time to time which go to make the so called bundle of
rights, is in itself a sufficient proof that their enumeration depends on
23
social and economic situations. Ownership as an insitution can be
destroyed not by destroying or varying these rights, as enumerated
above, but by one and only one method and that is of abrogating the
right of exclusion. The rights in the bundle are only the functional and
administrative adjuncts of the right of exclusion. The rights in the legal
20. Kruse, V., The Rights of Property, vol. i, pp. 107-108.
a) The power internally to dispose actually of and exploit the
object or good;
b) A power to alienate, pledge, or otherwise by declaration of will
to dispose of the good, to contract rights in it of the most varied
nature;
c) Power to use the good in question together with the owner's other
goods as a basis of credit for his entire business and all obligations
arising herefrom;
d) Hereditary succession.
21. Boweq E., "The Concept of Private Property", 11 Cornell Law
Quarterly, pp. 41-42.
22. Pollock holds that the list of property rights is not exhaustive "possibly
it may turn out to cover more, if we give the widest acceptable sense
to the word Property; but it is this at the very least", op.cit. p. 172.
23. Philbrick, F.S., ''Changing Conceptions of Property in Law", U.
Penn. L.R., 1938. pp. 691-92.
Hallowell, "The Nature and Function of Property as a Social
Institution", J.JQ.P.S. vol.i, 1943, p. 123.
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system are not individually necessary, and if a particular legal system
does not admit them, it does not mean that it does not know ownership.
But if a particular legal system does not admit of the right of exclusion,
one can conclude that that system does not recognise ownership. Thus
ownership hinges on the 'right of exclusion'.
Under common law systems, the concept of real property is
24
based on the relation between a tenant and his land-lord. One could
not ignore this relation. Though the common law notion of property
based on the idea of relation, to my mind, can yield a satisfactory and
workable account of the concept of ownership, yet it is a cuase of
confusion that English law looks at ownership by breaking it up into
fragments. English law starts with the component parts and brings
them together in a way which misreads the right of property as a
collection of fragments. This involves ignoring the basic truth that
25
the fragments are derivative and not separate and independent elements
of ownership. The resulting fragments of the right of property are
themselves sometimes classed as constituting property rather than
24. Dr. Kahn-Freund states:
The living law of this country /EnglandJ knows
nothing of an abstract definition of property in terms of
a relation between persona and res.
Introduction to Renner, K., The Institutions of Private Law and
their Social Functions, London 1949, p. 18.
25. Separate here means the existence of a right apart from the legal
right of ownership, that is, existence without the cooperation of
the legal right of the owner.
Independent means when derivation from the legal right of property
does not affect the legal right of the owner of the burdened property.
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classed as proprietary rights. Fragments create different degrees
of ownership and these degrees of ownership considered together give
the notion of a bundle of rights. Professor Honore says that "it is
27
fashionable to speak of ownership as if it were just a bundle of rights".
And Professor Rudzinski concludes that the idea of bundle of rights
constituting ownership "suggests that the rights included in ownership
are somehow accumulated and added one to another in a haphazard
.,28
manner like sticks in a bundle or coins in a purse.
Lawson concludes: "Roman law thinks of ownership as a single
whole which can to some extent be split up. English law starts with the
29
component parts and brings some or all of them together."
So the concept of ownership as a bundle of rights is based on
the fallacious notions discussed above which the writers commit in
framing a concept of ownership both out of Roman law and English
common law. It is this fragmentation of ownership or rather the constant
26. The distinction between property and proprietary rights is basic
to the understanding of the nature of property. Property is
exclusive independent right but proprietary rights though
exclusive are yet derivative from the former.
Lawson realises these difficulties and remarks, "One of the
greatest difficulties encountered by students of property law
comes from the English habit of splitting what may in a general
way be called ownership into its component parts and making of
each of them an abstract entity which, if not quite the same as a
thing, is not very different. "
Lawson, F.H., Introduction to the Law of Property, Oxford 1958, p. 59.
27. Honore, A.M., "Ownership" in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence,
Edited by A.G. Guest, London 1961, p. 113.
28. Rudzinski, A.W., "A Comparative Study of Polish Property Law",
in Polish Civil Law, vol.i, edited by D. Lasok, 1973, p. 57.
29. Lawson, op.cit., p. 9.
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occurrence of the fragments in varying contacts with each other, which
is the cause of the misconception of the bundle of rights as constituting
property.
Markby's remarks point to this conclusion:
If all the rights over a thing were centred in one person,
that person would be the owner of the thing: and ownership
would express the condition of such a person in regard to
that thing. But the innumerable rights over a thing thus
centred in the owner are not conceived as separately exist¬
ing ... all the various rights which an owner has over a
thing are cc^ceived as merged in one general right of
ownership.
And Markby further remarks:
Ownership ... is conceived as a single right, and not as
an aggregate of rights. To use a homely illustration, it is
no more conceived as an aggregate of distinct rights than a
bucket of water is conceived as an aggregate of separate
drops. Yet, as we may take a drop or several drops from
the bucket, so we may detach a right or several rights from
ownership.
The distribution of rights detached from ownership which
we actually find in use is very extensive ... yet jip one of
these persons would be considered as the owner.
The very use of the word 'property' itself leads me to believe
that it is a single right. Second, the origin of the concept of property,
when the modern economic and administrative techniques were not known,
points to the idea of ownership as a unitary concept. As Amos points
out:
The difficulty of nomenclature is really brought about by
the fact that, with respect to large classes of things, as land,
houses, farming stock, plant for manufactures, negotiable
instruments, and furniture, a distribution of the rights included
in ownership is far more common than unity of ownership. In
30. Markby, W., Elements of Law, London 1889, p. 154.
31. Ibid, pp. 155-56.
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primitive society, unity of ownership is for all things almost
the only form of ownership known ... Thus, in order to ensure
precision of meaning, either a new term must be substitute}
for the term owner, or a new meaning put upon this term.
Third, as seen in the analytical structure of ownership, the concept
itself reveals its single character in its central element, the 'right of
exclusion'.
If we take property as a bundle of rights, rather than a single
right, the following two possibilities are to be considered:
1. Either the rights constituting the bundle are independent
of each other, or
2. They are dependent:
a. either closely related to each other, or
b. relative to something.
1. If rights over things are independent of each other, we have
to face the following dilemma. If ownership consists of a bundle of
rights, let us suppose the bundle consists of six rights. (Even if we
take property to comprise an infinite number of independent rights,
since there can be an infinite mode of expressing property, the argument
I advance still holds good.) Suppose a man is an owner with all the six
rights. He alienates five of the rights from the bundle. Now six
people will be holding equal rights independently of each other. Nobody
has a claim to be called owner since each has a single right and not a
bundle - not even the original holder of ownership, since he is left with
a single right rather than a bundle of rights. There is no way to find
who is the owner. Such a position becomes sell-contradictory.
32. Amos, S., The Science of Law, London 1874, pp. 181-82.
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And if the legal system starts treating each as owner and
starts bestowing them with powers as wide as those of the original
owner with his bundle, the contents of each right will provide a new
starting point for investigation as a 'res' capable of separate ownership.
Therefore the proposition of a bundle of independent rights
constituting ownership is futile. The so called rights constituting the
bundle constitute the periphery of the structure of ownership, its outer
shell.
2. If the rights are closely dependent then their relation with
each other will be a dominant relation. In this case ownership becomes
a unitary and indivisible metaphysical entity in which all the rights are
submerged. The owner will only be a person who possesses all the
rights. A man cannot alienate any of his rights. He can divest him¬
self of the whole ownership, but he cannot transfer any single right.
Such a concept will lead to practical difficulties. No system or doctrine
can stand on its own feet unless it is built on man's basic needs and
purpose. There will be no lease, no mortgage, or no trust. This may
be illustrated diagrammatically.
relative to one right of ownership. Does it give some relief? At least
by this we can get rid of metaphysical indivisibility. And to reach an
end we have to postulate something to which all these rights are
related. Though this postulate is an abstraction, "it is to this that
we always revert when we are trying to form a conception of ownership.'
It is this ultimate core to which all the rights are related. The bundle
of rights depend on this core. This idea can be represented by a
sketch as below: ,£\
Ownership is conceived as a single right and not as a bundle of rights.
The rights which are drawn from this core right vary from system to
system, the variations being explicable in terms of the various socio¬
economic conditions within which a legal system functions. That is
why the rights drawn from the core right are found variable in different
cultural contexts and appear in different combinations and with various
restrictions when we move from one society to another. This is the
view that Markby takes:
The innumerable rights over a thing thus centred in
the owner are not conceived as separately existing. The
owner of land has not one right to walk upon it, and another
right to till it; the owner of a piece of furniture has not one
right to repair it, and another right to sell it: all the
various rights which an owner has over a thinj^are conceived
as merged in one general right of ownership.
33. Markby, W., op.cit., p. 155.
34. Markby, op.cit., p. 154.
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It would not be strange to find a piece of land over which A
has a right to till, B has a grazing right, C to take water from the
spring, and D to hold it for security. No one of these would be
considered as an owner. Since all these rights are derivative and
drawn from a single right of ownership, they can be termed as partial
rights of property. Sometimes these partial rights come to be treated
as being 'things' subject to ownership themselves as Lawson states:
The reason why the property lawyer turns all these
rights and interests into things, however abstract they
may be, is that since they have value, people are willing
to buy them; and any valuable asset which is the object
of commerce is properly treated as a thing, juj^t as ...
physical object such as a ship or a motor car.
In this conception of ownership there is a swarming of
distinctive rights. After all rights have been derived from ownership
though ownership is gradually reduced, the owner is still in a different
position than other persons. "However numerous and extensive may
be the detached rights, however insignificant may be the residue, it
is the holder of this residuary right whom we a'ways consider as the
3 6
owner". Markby further remarks:
So long as the rights I have mentioned are in the hands
of any other person they have a separate existence, but as
soon as they get back into the hands of the person from
whom they are derived, as soon as they are 'at home' as it
were, they lose their separate existence, and merge in the
general right of ownership. They may be aggj^n detached,
but by the detachment a new right is created.
35. Lawson, op.cit., p. 16.
Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, p. 133.
36. Markby, op.cit., p. 156.
37. Markby, op.cit., p. 156.
Here Markby may be right, but I essentially differ from him. The rights
38
which are in the hand of others are not independent rights because they
are limited and lacking the essential advantage which an owner would
have. For instance, a lease holder is the owner of the lease and not
of the land. Second, he cannot use his right as freely as an actual
owner. He cannot sub-lease for a period longer than his lease. So
it is wrong to speak oi derivative rights as independent or of separate
existence. To admit their separate existence is to accept the theory
of bundle of rights which I have already rejected along with Markby.
So by accepting their separate existence Markby is contradicting his
own theory. There is a difference of degree between property and
proprietary rights as already pointed out. The difference of degree is
infinitely varied and sufficient to account for all the apparent differences
between property and proprietary rights.
Ownership is a whole absorbing within itself all the diversities
A unity within diversity; on which all the subsidiary rights depend and
rely, but which is a legal right in itself.
'Property' whether relation between a person and a thing
or relation between a person and other persons
Analysis of the law of ownership has for its immediate object
to ascertain the dual aspect of the relation if any between the owner and
the thing and the relation if any between the owner and the third person.
Traditionally ownership has been defined in terms of the singular aspect
38. Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, p. 195.
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of the relation between the owner and the tiling. Biackstone refers to
ownership as a "sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
39
exercises over the external things of the world." Similarly Austin
40
says that property is "A right over a determinate thing". But the
relevant relation between a person and a thing is simply his physical
ability to use it. This relation can be called an extra-legal relation
41
and is clearly not in itself ownership. It is like the physical ability
mentioned by Bentham:
The savage who has killed a deer may hope to keep it
for himself, so long as his cave is undiscovered; so long ^
as he watches to defend it, and is stronger than his rivals.
Confusion of this physical relation with a legal relation can be traced
back to two reasons.
1) The Roman idea of near absolute concept of
property, such that the individual can do whatever he
likes with his object of property.
2) The confusion between 'property' as signifying
object of property and 'property' as signifying the right(s)
of property. Often in ordinary speech the meaning of
'property' is confined to the object of property.
The argument which will here be put is that property is essen¬
tially a relation between persons with respect to objects. Every one
has the physical ability to interfere in some degree with the owner's
39. Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. ii, pp. 1-2.
40. Austin, Jurisprudence, edited by Campbell, London 1873,
vol. n, p. 818.
41. Newark, F.H., "The Talcing of Property without Compensation",
N.I.L.Q., 1940, p. 172.
42. Bentham, J., Theory of Legislation, p. 113.
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use of an object, but only the law can confer the right so to interfere.
The relation between the owner and the third person depends on the
presence or absence of a legal right of the third person to interfere.
Thus, I own a dog. I can beat it, tie it up, starve it,
paint it green or do any other of the numberless things
within my physical ability. The Taw may forbid cruelty to
animals, but I can still do these things, for the law is
impotent to interfere with the purely physical relation between
my dcg and myself. Even if the law forbids cruelty on pain
of confiscation the situation is not altered. The power of law
is limited to the ability of its officers, and the ability of a
constable to take my dog from me is no greater than the
ability of any dog thief. The only effect of legislation
forbidding cruelty to animals or ordering confiscation of
them is an effect on the legal relation existir^ between third
persons and myself with regard to my dog."
And the point is that normally when one person is legal owner of an
object, no one else has a right to interfere with it or with his use of it.
The distinguishing character of property is not the relation
between the individual and the object, but the right of the individual to
exclude others from his physical relation with the object, or indeed
from the object itself. It is this right to exclude others which is funda¬
mental to the idea of ownership. As Cohen expresses it:
Whatever technical definition of property we may
prefer, we must recognise that a property right is a
relation not between an owner and a thing. A right is
always against one or more individuals. This becomes
unmistakably clear if we take specifically modern forms of
property such as franchises, patents, goodwill etc., which
constitute such a large part of the capitalised assets of our
industrial and commercial enterprises.
Amos makes a similar observation that
43. Newark, op.cit., p. 172.
44. Cohen, VI.R., Law and the Social Order, New York 1933, p. 45.
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A law of ownership has, for its imn.ediate object, to
ascertain the relations of persons towards^ch other in
respect of the possession or use of tilings.
So is the view of Holland when he expresses that
The essence of all such rights lies not so much in
the enjoyment of the thing, as in the legal power of excluding
others from interfering with the enjoyment of it ... The
relation is betw^n him and other people whom he excludes
from the thing.
When Bentham states that
The savage who has killed a deer may hope to keep it
for himself, so long as his cave is undiscovered; so long
as he watches to defend it, and is stronger than his rivals;
but that is all. How miserable and precarious is such a
possession. If we suppose the least agreement among
savages to respect the acquisitions of each other, we see
the introduction^! a principle to which no name can be given
but that of law;
his statement points to the existence of legal relations between persons.
Thus when Bentham states that "property and law are born together,
,48
and die together, he means that property is essentially a relation
created by law, and the relations which law can create are relations of
a particular kind between persons.
Kelson adopts the same view,
If the right is a legal right, it is necessarily a right
to somebody else's behavior, to behaviour to which the
other is legally obligated.
45. Amos, The Science of Law, p. 159.
Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law, London 1946, pp. 49-50.
Ely, R.T., Property and Contract, vol. i, p. 96.
46. Holland, op.cit., p. 179.
47. Bentham, op.cit. p. 113.
48. Ibid.
49. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, New York 1961, p. 75.
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Although Lawson states that ownership is a relation between
a person and a thing, the qualification which he adds is all important.
He states:
If I say that I own a specific motor-car, my statement
is complete; no other ascertained person need come into the
relation. Such a relation is a relation between a person
and a thing, and lawyers call it a real relation ...
In one sense, indeed, even real relations are relations
between persons. Real relations would be very imperfect
if they were not protected and guaranteed by law. The
statement that I own IRackacre - to use a name given by
lawyers to a typical, but fictitious piece of land - implies
that other persons must not do anything inconsistent with my
ownership, and also that I mgg bring an action against anyone
who is guilty of such an act.
Professor Honore, however, expresses the view:
When a person has a right to exclude others generally
from tangible property or from interfering with the exercise
of a right over tangible property he stands, legally, in a
special relation to property. It is entirely natural and un¬
objectionable to call his right a right to the thing or to the
use of a thing or over a thing. Yet we would not say a
person had a right to a thing unless he was protected by
claims excluding persons generally from interfering with it.
A right to a thing or its use or over a thing is protected by
claims against persons but is not to be identified with them.
When we think of the purpose for which the right is given,
we think of the holder's relation to the thing. When we
think of the mode of protection, we think of his?, gelations to
other persons. The two are complementary.
Professor Honore's idea of splitting ownership into a right over a thing
and the protection of a right by legal claims, which two are not to be
identified, is true. But the two are interchangeable in such a way
that their splitting is not possible. The 'protection of a right' is a
duty imposed on others but it is accompanied by the right of the duty
50. Lawson, F.H., The Law ol Property, Oxford 1958, pp. 1-2.
51. Honore, A.M. "Rights of Exclusion and Immunities against
Divesting', Tul.L.R., 1960, pp. 463-464.
holders to non-interference by the owner. Thus the owner has also a
duty not to illegally interfere with the right of others. This can be
illustrated as follows:
A's right of property corresponds to the duty of B, C, D ...
not to interfere with A's use of the property object. It is also true that
A's right is accompanied by a duty on his part not to use the property
contrary to law, or so as to interfere with the right of B, C, D ...
\
This duty on the part of A is a restriction on his conduct restraining
him from using his property in such a way ayto infringe the right of
B, C, D ... This restriction is not justified in terms of his relation
to the object as such, it is a restriction on his conduct in the use and
disposal of the object justified in terms of his relations with other people.
Since the owner's right is normally concomitant with such a duty, it
would be absurd to say that he derives either his right or his obligation
52
from the object.
Since according to Professor Honore a right over a thing and
the protection of a right are not identical, one must presume them to
be different, and hence separable. But as soon as one thinks of their
separation, the very concept of ownership falls assunder. Ownership
will then be that of a savage in Bentham's term. The raising o the
52. Kant says that there can be no relation between a person and
an object
Otherwise, I would have to think of a Right in a
Thing, as if the Thing had an Obligation towards me,
and as if the Right as against every Possessor of it had
to be derived from this Obligation in the Thing, which
is an absurd way of representing the subject.
Kant, The Philosophy of Right, Edinburgh 1887, p. 86.
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very question of identification is wrong. Things are said to be identical
or different only when there arises a question of comparison between
two things. In ownership it is not a question of comparison between a
right over a thing and a protection of a right. Nor is it right to say
that both are complementary; both are interchangeable terms and are to
be understood as such to the very idea of property.
In the case of ownership the right over a thing and its protection
by claims (duty) are interchangeable. Ownership is the consequence
of this rigja.t-duty relation in relation to a thing. Ownership is instituted
53
by law as a relation among persons" such that the so called owner in
law excludes others from certain activities with reference to the object
54
of property.
If we considered property solely as a relation between an
53. Kant holds the view that there can be no real relation between a
person and a thing because
A man entirely alone upon the earth could properly
neither have nor acquire any external thing as his own;
because between him as a Person and all external Things
as material objects, there could be no relations of Obliga¬
tion. There is therefore, literally, no direct Right in a
Thing, but only that Right is to be properly called 'real'
which belongs to anyone as constituted against a Person.
Ibid.
54. Turner, J.W.C., says ownership
Is a relation between people, between the owner and
the rest of the world.
.. . but what I do to the thing I own, in the exercise
of right of ownership, is a concrete visible matter easily
perceived. Hence the mistaken, but universal, notion
that ownership is some close relation between the owner
and the thing owned.
"Some Reflections on Ownership in English Law", Can. B.R.,
1941, pp. 342-343.
Cohen, F.S., "Dialogue on Private Property ', Rutgers Law Review
1954, p. 373.
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individual and an object, an analysis of the concept would give no indication
as to its social function. Although. concept functions in society, its
social function would be purely contingent. But no social institution,
such as property, can be understood except by understanding how it is
based on man's outlook on Ufe, its meaning and purpose.
The approach here advocated emphasises the regulating aspect
of the legal system in its treatment of ownership, and emphasises
55
relations between people as being the only significant legal relations.
Legal relations in our law exist only between persons.
There cannot be a lega], gelation between a person and a thing
or between two things.
How to find an owner when two or more people
have a right in rem over the res.
In various types of legal order, there can be a series, and
sometimes a long series, of persons who severally have rights over
the res. Thus it is not strange to find a piece of land over which A has
a right to till, B a right to walk, C a grazing right, and D a right to hold
it as a security for debt. Yet not one of these persons is considered
an owner. All these persons are using the same land. But what is
that which distinguishes the owner of a piece of land from A, B, C and D?
Not only is the person called owner when he has all the rights over a
thing, he may still be called an owner even though many of these rights
are held by other persons. They are, it is true, parts of a totality,
55. Corbin, A.L., "Jural Relations and their Classification", 30Y.L.J.,
1921, pp. 226-227.




segments stripped off from a core. This points to the conclusion that
while other segments may have no relation to each other, all must be
related to the core. The core is, therefore, not a mere disconnected
residue. It is the skeleton upon which the whole complex of fractions
or segments of property depends. It may remain insignificant, the
least valuable right of all, involving no right to benefit by the present
use or possession of the thing, but the whole complex hinges upon owner¬
ship as the core right. It is presupposed by the derivative rights. In
it reposes the individuality. There is, therefore, something special
about the core right which gives the owner some special advantage over
others. We need therefore to find the special characteristic of the
advantage which an owner enjoys over others with leaser interests.
Different writers advance different arguments to find the special
advantage or characteristic of the right which an owner enjoys over
others. Some of the criteria developed for the purpose are as follows.
Turner suggests that the special characteristic of the right of
an owner can be ascertained as follows:
If a man is to be owner of a thing he must have at least
one right in rem in respect of it which will still exist even
though all the other rights in rem in respect of it which are
vested in other people may perish. An owner must have
some advantage over all other people: and this enduring
characteristic of his right in rem is the essential advantage
which he must have: when the other rights in respect of that
thing have perished, no matter how, his will still remain
unaffected by their destruction. The utmost, then, that can
be said is that ownership is such right in respect of property
as law from time to time invests with the characteristic that
57. This point is more fully discussed under the heading of -
property as a single right or a bundle of rights.
30
it will endure after all o^er rights in respect of the same
property have perished.
He makes duration the criterion for judging owner from holder of other
lesser rights. He maintains that the right of the owner outstrips or
outlasts all other lesser rights which the owner grants to other persons.
But here it can be pointed out that the right of easement endures along
with the right of the owner. It is a transmissible and indeterminate
Markby suggests a new criterion to find an owner. He expresses
the view:
However numerous and extensive may be the detached
rights, however insignificant may be the residue, it is the
holder of tl^ residuary right whom we always consider as
the owner.
Salmond expressed a similar view when he stated:
In as much as the right of ownership is a right to the
aggregate of the uses of the thing, it follows that ownership
is necessarily permanent. No person having merely a
temporary right to the use of a thing can be the owner of
the thing, however general that right may be while it lasts.
He who comes after him is the owner; for it^s to him that
the residue of the uses of the thing pertains.
Similarly Pollock states:
the owner of a thing is not necessarily the person who
at a given time has the whole power of use and disposal;
very often there is no such person. We must look for the
person having the residue of all such power when we have
accounted for every detached and limited portion of it; and
he will be the owner if the immediate power of control
and use is elsewhere.
58. Turner, J.W.C., op.cit., p. 352.
59. Honore, A.M., "Ownership", in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence,
p. 126.
60. Markby, op.cit., p. 156.
61. Salmond, Jurisprudence, London 1947, p. 426.
62. Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, London 1929, p. 180.
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The special characteristic of the owner's right is that it is a residuary
right. Though an owner may 'detach' various rights over the res in
favour of others so that right is greatly reduced and may be less valuable
than the detached rights, none-the-less this residuary character of his
right, leaves him with the right of ownership. From this it follows
that the owner has no more than the reversioner's right and his right
63
is "the most ultimate right of possession and nothing else". If this
is so, then it may appear that the state, not the so-called owner, has
the ultimate residuary right and is thus 'owner' of everything. Thus
the whole property in legal systems would appear to be vested in the
state as the residuary to all property. The law of escheat also points
to this conclusion; when all interests of ownership terminate, the state
is the ultimate residuary. But to draw this conclusion would be wrong
because it depends on a confusion between (a) the residuary character
of the right of ownership, and (b) the ultimate destination of that right,
having that character, which ultimate destination is determined by the
law of succession. This enables us to answer a question raised by
Professor Honored
Can we then say that the 'owner' is the ultimate
residuary? When the sub-lessecte interest determines
the lessee acquires the corresponding rights; but when the
lessee's right determines the 'owner' acquires these rights.
Hence the 'owner' appears to be identified as the ultimate
residuary. The difficulty is that the series may be
continued, for on the determination of the 'owner's' interest
the state may acquire the corresponding rights; ig^the
state's interest ownership or a mere expectancy?
63. Kocoureic, Jural Relations, Indianapolis 1928, p. 328.
64. Honore, "Ownership", in Oxford Essays, p. 128.
Holland, however, does not give a clear indication regarding
the special advantage enjoyed by the owner as compared to the holder
of lesser interests, yet keeps himself vague and makes a cautious
approach towards the right of ownership. He states:
The right of ownership is, however, unlimited only in
comparison with other rights over objects ... It may ,..
continue to subsist although strippgg of almost every
attribute which makes it valuable.
To the various attributes of an owner adheres the right of disposition
which carries with it the right (privilege) of alteration or destruction
and the right (power) of alienation though the latter is restricted in
certain cases. In its legal aspect it includes the right of possession
and vindication except when the former is expressly severed, as in the
66
case of lease, loan, or mortgage. Holland thus avoids the two
characteristics discussed above namely, duration and ultimate residuary
character. His observation that on the one hand the right of the owner
is unlimited only in comparison with the rights granted to others by the
owner, and on the other, the right of the owner is limited by the right
of the state and the individuals in general, leads one to conclude that
the characteristic or advantage enjoyed by the owner over rights granted
to others is to be found within the compass of owner's ability to show
67
his plenary control over the object, however tenuous it might be.
Such a control can only be shown if the owner has a right of vindication




Holland, Jurisprudence, London 1900, pp. 194-195.
Ibid, pp. 194-95.
Ibid, p. 194.
of lease and mortgage. When an owner has a legal right to claim the
leaser rights granted to others and his control over the res is plenary,
he is in an advantageous position as against the rest of the lesser right
holders. The legal right to vindicate is the special character of the
owner's right as compared with the lesser rights over the object. As
Noyea puts it:
It is possible to reduce this so-called "ownership" to
the right to vindicate the "ownership" (nuda proprietaa), so
that its only content is the right to claim itself ... It is
that legal relation with respect to objects to which, when
every constituent right is removed, something still remains.
The distinction between property and personal rights.
Since the whole conception of property depends on relations, the
question arises regarding the distinction between property and
69
personal relations. Ely uses the criterion of value - economic value
70
as the characteristic of property rights. Professor Commons also
71
identifies property with economic value. According to Saimond
property rights are those which have money value as opposed to
personal rights which have no money value. In the first place property
is not only an economic value, it has got an intrinsic value as well.
A heap of rubbish in my house is of no economic value to anyone. But
if anyone commits trespass, it is transgression of my property.
Similarly, my barren land may be an economic burden on me, still if
68. Noyes, C.R., The Institution of Property, London 1936, p. 298.
Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, pp. 182-183.
Kruse, The Right of Property, vol. i, p. 145.
69. Ely, R.T. Property and Contract, London 1914, vol. i, p. 132.
70. Commons, J.R., Legal Foundations of Capitalism, London 1968,
p. 16.
71. Saimond, Jurisprudence, London 1947, p. 257.
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any one trespasses, he is liable to me for that trespass. There can be
property which is valueless in economic terms. Second, there are
some personal relations which carry with them economic advantages,
for example, the services of a wife or wife's right to a matrimonial
home, are purely personal relations and in most legal systems carry
none of the attributes of property. Hence the criterion of money value
or economic value as a distinguishing mark between property and
72
personal rights is not a fair criterion. To define property in purely
economic terms is to ignore the sentimental or intrinsic aspect of
property. Property is a subjective matter in its inception. As Jones
73
expresses its "value may be sentimental as well as economic".
Another proposed criterion is that of transferability. This
criterion follows from economic value of property because value in
74
economics means exchange value. Tiie criterion of amenability which
is one of the important incidents oi property is particularly stressed,
sometimes even treated as an essential feature, in the present commer¬
cial structure of society. We may ask if it is a sufficient criterion for
distinguishing between property and personal rights. It is thought that
property rights can be transferred but personal rights cannot be trans¬
ferred. But there are certain rights which have been recognised as
proprietary rights although they cannot be alienated. For example,
72. For a more detailed analysis of property as an economic value or
money value, see chapter iii, where this criterion of property is
shown as unsuitable to the true and real conditions of life.
73. Jones, J.W., "Forms of Ownership", Tul. L.R., 1947, p. 93.
74. Noyes, op.cit., pp. 346 & 433.
Snyder, O.C., Preface to Jurisprudence, Indianapolis 1954, p. 765.
under Hindu law, a woman's estate was under severe restrictions as to
alienation. She was an owner in all respects but alienation. On her
death property reverts to reversioners. So if we apply the transfer¬
ability test certain property rights will be eliminated from the sphere
of ownership. "All sorts of limitations have been and are placed both
by law and by creators of property upon the privilege of alienation.
When none is permitted it is obvious that the property dies with tiie
75
person." At the same time there are certain personal rights which
are assignable. For example, rights under a contract of service in
f
the case of 'retain and transfer' system in English professional football.
(On the other hand, of course, some rights which are guaranteed
to the individual under law and which are purely personal, cannot be
divested even with the consent of the right holder. For example, the




Thus alienation is not an essential character of property,
albeit an important one. It does not serve as a universal guide in
deciding between property rights and personal rights. The question of
assignability depends on the state of law at any given time, and as such
is not inherent to property.
75. Noyes, op.cit., pp. 433-34.
76. Cf. Eastham v. Newcastle United F.C. /1964J Ch. 413.
77. Constitution of India, Art. 13.
Noyes, op.cit. p. 434.
78. Noyes, op.cit. pp. 346 & 434.
Snyder, O.C., op.cit., p. 765.
Kocourek, op.cit., p. 332.
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Another proposed criterion is that of survival. Salmond
states:
Even as the generality of ownership involves its
permanence, so its permanence involves the further
essential feature of inheritance. The only permanent
rights which can be owned by a mortal man are those which
can be handed down by him to his successors or representa¬
tives on his death. AH others are temporary, their
duration being necessarily limited to the lifetime of him in
whom they are vested. The right of ownership, therefore,
is essentially an inheritable right. It is capable of surviv¬
ing its owner for the time being. It belongs to the class of
rightsuwhich are divested by death but are not extinguished
by it.
It is thought that personal rights come to an end with the death of the
person of inherence while the property rights survive the death of the
person of inherence. But a woman's estate (under Hindu law as
described above) which is her personal right comes to an end though
her right is a property right as well. Inheritable quality is an important
quality of the right of property but is not inherent in the nature of owner-
w 80ship.
Professor Honore states this position by taking examples of
license and easement. He states:
The owner has no power to divest himself of the duty to
allow the licensee to go on the land (unless there is a term
of the license to that effect). Hence he has no power to
divest the licensee of his claim against himself (the licensor)
79. Salmond, op.cit., pp. 426-427.
Honore, "Bights of Exclusion and Immunities against Divesting",
TuI.L.B. 1960.
Noyes, op.cit., p. 434.
80. Pollock states that the
"Physical continuity is in no way essential to the identity
and singleness of the rights existing over material objects.
Physical discontinuity makes it, no doubt, easier to
separate those rights and form new combinations."
Op.cit., pp. 131-32.
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but he has power, by alienating the property, to divest the
licensee of his right to go on the adjoining land, since the
former licensee would then have nc^jlaim against the adjoin¬
ing landowner to secure this right.
His second example is of easement,of which he states:
In the case of the easement, the servient owner has a
power, by alienating the property, to divest himself of his
duty to the dominant owner, thereby divesting the dominant
owner's claim against the present servient owner but not his
right to go on the servient land, w^ch is now protected by a
new claim against the new owner.
In the case of a license the property right has come to an end by aliena¬
tion but in the case of an easement the property right continues. Still
we cannot say that the former is not a property right. Professor
Honor/ points out that on the basis of the survival test the distinction
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between property rights and personal rights cannot be maintained.
The owner's rights are, in general, immune from divesting without his
consent but are liable to be divested by some special forms of alienation.
For example, under the Hindu coparcenary system the manager, known
as Karta, can divest all coparceners by alienating coparcenary property
for legal necessity without the consent of other coparceners. Similarly
a bona fide purchaser for value of trust property acquires it free of the
trust provided he did not have notice of it, and this is a clear case of
the divesting of the beneficiary's interest in the equitable property
without his consent. The beneficiary can sue the trustee, but not the
bona fide purchaser for value, for breach of the trust.
81. Honored op.cit., Tul.L.R., 1960, p. 464.
82. Ibid.
83. Honored op.cit., Tul.L.R., 1960, p. 466.
Noyes, op.cit., p. 435.
The survival test is, thus, not adequate for distinguishing
between property rights and personal rights. Noyes, while commenting
on the survival test, states:
In reality the attribute of survival is one which attaches
to the object and not necessarily to the property. If the
object is consumed or destroyed the property disappears
with it. The test of survival of its object is a true test of
the persistence of property. But the test of survival of
particular interest is not a necessary attribute of property.
Holland says that "Proprietary rights are extensions of the
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power of a person over portions of the physical world . The right
over things depends on the appropriability of things, corporeal or
incorporeal. Thus property rights cover interests of whatever nature
over corporeal or incorporeal things. The criterion involving right
over things is pure and very simple to differentiate from personal rights
which do not involve things, but difficulties have appeared with the
86
introduction of contract in the sphere of property. Contract is a
personal relationship. But with the development of a complex industrial
and commercial structure of society, the liberty of contract involving
commercial and economic activities became property and, thus, gave
to personal relations the colour of property. The main task is thus to
make a distinction between contract as a personal right or liberty and
contract as a form of property. Contract is liberty, a personal right,
when it bears no relations to any specific object or group of objects.
34. Noyes, op.cit., p. 435.
85. Holland, Jurisprudence, London 1900, p. 178.
86. Pound, "Liberty of Contract", 18Ya!eL.R., 1909, p. 454.
The mere fact that it involves economic activities does not make it a
proprietary right unless that economic activity projects itself upon
some specific object or group of objects. For example, a wife's claim
for maintenance is not property and creates no interest in her husband's
property. But it creates an obligation on the husband. Similarly, the
services of a wife for her domestic activities are not property but are
purely personal to the husband. Such activities even in the form of a
contract are not property since they involve no specific interest in
objects. They are general attributes of all persons whereas proprietary
rights are particular attributes of individuals who have acquired some
right over certain objects from some source. Noyes commenting on
this distinction points out:
Thus personal rights are neither peculiar as to subject
(person of inherence) nor do they relate to a material object,
while property rights are always peculiar as to subject and
relate directly to specific mater^l objects or indirectly to
indeterminate material objects.
The mere fact that an activity or an action is economic in nature does
not make it property. To say that economic activity has always some
indefinite relation to corporeal or incorporeal objects is not true. It
is only when economic activity projects itself on objects that it relates
to the class of acts which are proprietary. For example, if a man
contracts to do labour for another and refuses to perform the contract,
the action is a breach of contract and not a proprietary action. But if
he performs the contract and does not get his wages, the action will be
proprietary rather than breach of contract. Thus the former activity
87. Noyes, op.cit., p. 436.
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remains personal liberty but the latter becomes proprietary because it
concerns the delivery of particular interest in a specific object. Thus
the former in their generalised form are not property rights but personal
rights and the latter property rights.
What is a Thing?
In the study of the institution of property concerned as it is with
things and their use, careful attention must be given to the notion of &
thing'. In this there are two difficulties which tend to increase one
another by their co-existence. One is that the concept of tilings at one
time covers only physical objects, but at another time covers also the
intangible subject matter of a right. The second difficulty is that,
since all concepts derive their meaning from their general usage this
very generality tends to impair their clearness and infect them with
obscurity and make them difficult to assimilate. This obscurity and
confusion is especially reflected in the word 'tiling'. Allen expressed
such views about the vagueness and obscurity regarding the word 'thing'
and stated:
Probably there is no word in the English language so
elastic and elusive as the word "thing'5. Its vagueness is
well shown by the fact that we have recourse to it as a pis
aller when we cannot discover any term which precisely
expresses what we wish to convey.
Similar views were expressed by Austin when he stated:
In drawing the line, by which Persons and Things are
separated from Events, I content myself with vague
expressions, and am far from aspiring to metaphysical
precision. If I attempt to describe the boundary with meta-
88. Allen, C.K., "Things", Cal. L.R., 1940. p. 421.
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physical precision, I should run into inquiries which my
limits imperiously forbid, and which were scarcely consistent
with the purpose of these discourses. If I endeavoured to
define exactly the meaning of 'permanent object', I should
enter upon the perplexing question of sameness or identity.
If I endeavoured to define exactly the meaning of 'sensible
object', I should enter upon the interminable question about
the difference between mind and matter, or percipient and
perceived. And, in either case, I should thrust a treatise
upon Intellectua^gPhilosophy into a series of discourses upon
Jurisprudence.
But these difficulties are quite misplaced, for the use of the word 'thing'
represents a perfectly sensible distinction in its general usage and its
technical usage in law. The distinction is to be better expressed and
indeed more fully elaborated.
The controversy around which this obscurity and confusion is
built up, is sometimes raised regarding the nature of a 'thing', the
object of right. It is sometimes used in the corporeal sense and some¬
times in the incorporeal sense. The question is how the same concept
can be used in both corporeal and incorporeal senses? It is certainly
inconvenient that by 'tiling' we should mean at one time a merely
physical object and at another time the intangible subject matter of some
right. The use of the term in this sense at once involves one in a
confusing and logically unsatisfactory identification of right with the
object of right since both right and the object of right are abstract.
Take the case of copyright - it is a right with respect to an incorporeal
object. But in what sense is it a thing? It exists entirely in the
abstract, a notion, something of a 'fiction' (in Bentham's sense of the
term). It has not and cannot have any bodily identity. And any concept
89. A.ustin, J., Lectures on Jurisprudence, vol.i, London 1873, p. 369.
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of that which has no bodily identity has been considered to serve little
purpose in juristic science. Amos states:
The very essence of a Thing, for legal purposes, is that
it belongs to the material Universe, that is, that it has a
body, or is corporeal. Hence, strictly speaking, an
Incorporeal Thing is a contradiction in terms . ..
If the word Thing is to be of any real service either in
Legal education or in the construction of a Legal System,
the use of it must be severely limited to objects belonging
to the material universe, capable of being apprehended by
the senses, and every other sentimental,analogical, gg meta¬
phorical abuse of the term must be rigidly excluded.
Similar views have been expressed by Austin and Salmond on the
incorporeal nature of things. Austin states:
In the English Law, we have this same jargon about
•incorporeal things ' ... rights of a certain species, or
rather of numerous and very different species, are absurdly
opposed to the things (strictly so called) which ag\p the
subjects or matter of rights of another species.
Again he states:
The distinction is utter'y useless; inasmuch as rights,
and duties, having n±^es of their own, need not be styled
•incorporeal things'.
Similarly Salmond states:
It is clear that if literally interpreted, this distinction
is illogical and absurd. We cannot treat in this way rights
and the objects of rights as two species of one genus. If we
use the term, in each case to mean a right, then the right of an
owner of land is just as incorporeal as is that of his tenant.
On the other hand, if the term is to be taken in each case to
mean the object of a right, then the object of t^g tenant's right
is just as corporeal as is that of his landlord.
90. Amos, S., A Systematic View of the Science of Jurisprudence,
London 1872, pp. 139-141.
91. Austin, op.cit., VoL I, p. 372.
92. Ibid, vol. ii, p. 804.
93. Salmond, Jurisprudence, London 1947, p. 273.
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The jurists are almost unanimous in their views that the
distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things is strictly and
logically untenable. Nevertheless it has come about, in the course of
the evolution of juridical ideas that certain rights in things and certain
things, which have their being in juristic contemplation, are classed as
94
incorporeal things. Salmond says that the only way out of the diffi¬
culty is to recognise that in legal terms the word 'thing' may be applied
not only to material objects but to every subject matter of a right
whether a material object or not. To be consistent with the evolution
of incorporeal things and the layman's appetite for tilings, the notion of
'things' was extended to express the nature of the subject matter of
corporeal and incorporeal rights in terms of 'things'. Amos remarks:
In order to satisfy the popular demand for logical
consistency, the supposition is favoured that some Thing
or other Owned must be at the bottom of both classes of
Rights. The Thing Owned not being visible, tangible,
audible, or apprehensible by any of the senses, that is,
not existing at all, is by a sort of j^rrorous honesty
denominated an incorporeal thing.
'Thing' is defined as that which is not a person, but which
possesses some degree of independence and some sort of title to exist
in its own right and not as a mere adjective. Chambers Dictionary
defines 'thing', as an entity of any kind ... that which is or may be
9 6
in any way an object of perception, knowledge, or thought.
94. Salmond, op.cit., p. 273.
95. Amos, S., A Systematic View of the Science of Jurisprudence,
p. 141.
Keesling, F.M., ''Conflicting Conceptions of Ownership in Taxation",
44 Cal.L.F., 1956, p. 875.
96. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, edition 1973, Edinburgh, p. 1402.
Thia is a very broad definition which covers both corporeal and
97 98
incorporeal things. But many jurists like Austin, Salkoski, etc.
99
take the view that things are corporeal, while others like Salmond,
100
Hohfeld, etc. would question this. If things are to exist, then
where and how? It is with this inquiry that the present section is
concerned.
A very comm on object of legal right originated in corporeal
things. But the category of things uas been greatly extended and has
become exceedingly conceptual istic and complex. Not all the develop¬
ments are consistent either with the original ideas or with one another.
Nevertheless there is no need to discard the original time-honoured and
widespread concept of things which identifies it with corporeal things.
But the new conceptuadstic development is to be explained to find its
way in consonance with the old theory. If we consider that things exist
in situations where there is nothing present, then it would be necessary
to revise our notion of things. But this is a very rare and perhaps non¬
existent phenomenon. In all cases things exist, but how and where, is
for us to search. In numerous instances where things are involved,
something is there to characterise their existence. We have to find
this characteristic to establish criteria of what counts as a 'tiling*.
97. Austin, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 368.
98. Salkowski, C., Institutes and History of Roman Private Law,
trans. E.E. Vhitfield, London 1886, p. 333.
99. Salmond, op.cit., p. 272.
100. Hohfeld, W. E., Fundamental Legal Conceptions, edited Cook, V .W.
London 1964, pp. 27-31.
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Starting with things as corporeal objects Austin states:
Things are such permanent pbjects, not being persons,
as are sensible or perceptible through the senses. Or
(changing the expression) thjg^s are such permanent external
objects as are not persons.
Similarly Holland following some German jurists defines 'things' thus;
'a locally limited portion of volitionless Nature': perhaps
better as 'a permanent external cause of sensations'.
The jurist need not go further than to lay down that a
physical thing is something which is perceptible by the
external organs of sense, ^d, is capable of being so
perceived again and again.
Things are volitionless for they cannot possess a will. These defini¬
tions recognise two elements, namely, physical existence and permanence.
The things must occupy space. A thing to have any existence in law must
possess some kind of continuing identity. As Salkowski states:
Thing in the juristic sense is, strictly, every portion
of external nature whi^j^limited in space, and subject to the
control of the person.
Such an idea is not in consonance with the juristic thought since
it ignores the idea of incorporeal things. Any one sided approach as
discussed above will create a vacuum between legal science and the
layman's approach to things. It will thwart the requirement that law
should bring together common sentiments existing in society and
juristic approaches to current social problems. We have to recognise
as things all those objects, material or not, which have been recognised




Austin, op.cit., Vo1. I, p. 368.
Holland, op.cit., p. 95.
Salkowski, C. , op.cit., p. 333.
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control over material objects is obviously valuable or advantageous.
The analogy is that of the advantages drawn from material objects, not
of the material objects themselves. It is these advantages which justify
the classification of all sources of such advantage as 'things'. For
example, copyrights, patents, etc. refer to something which can be
advantageous and used in a similar way as material objects, though in
the former cases there is no single specific material object involved.
They can be used, restricted and made exclusive in much the same
manner as in the case of physical things. Similarly in cases of claims
connected with bonds, promissory notes, shares in a company, or book
entries. As Allen says:
A thing is no less a thing in law merely because it is
intangible; nor does it pass into the category of the
"incorporeal" merely because it is intangible, for, as we
shall 3ee, incorporea1 things are not such as possess an
impalpable body, but as possess no body at all,
existing only in notion.
And Pollock states:
Hence it seems that in the case of incorporeal things
the advantage or "group of advantages" enjoyed or to be
enjoyed in fact is the true subject-matter of the right, and
corresponds to the tangible object which we call a t^tgijporeal
thing as distinct from the rights exercised over it.
Again in the class of incorporeal things are included certain rights
106
and duties. Under Roman law incorporeal things include inheritance,
a usufruct, etc. and rights and duties of whatever description though the
actual subject-matter may be corporeal. They were not prepared to
104. Allen, op.cit., p. 423.
105. Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, London 1929, pp. 134-135.
106. Gaius, 2.14.
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accept incorporeal things in the air, they had to be connected with
corporeal things. These rights and duties were treated as thfcigp in
much the same way as their economic importance. As Simpson states:
In the predominantly agricultural economy .. . land
and rights connected with land were equally important and
so were equally protected by real actions of one sort or
another. At this time the law of contract was rudimentary,
but many transactions which might have been regarded as
contractual were given legal effect by being treated, and
conceived of, as grants of property - of course a contract
can be thought oi as involving the grant pi choses in
action, though this is not the way in which the modern
lawyers do think about contract. Thus today if a farmer
wishes to pasture his animals upon another man's land he
will make a contract with him.
It was natural that these incorporeal rights, most of
which were closely connected with land, should be governed
by the same rules as land itself; it could hardly be otherwise.
So the jurists who had developed some law about these rights and duties
talked and thought of them as things rather than as rights and duties.
As Pollock states:
rights can be and are regarded in law as having distinct
and measurable values, and whatever has suc^h^aiue is a
thing, though not a bodily and sensible thing.
He further states:
Thus we have a large and most important class of
incorporeal things, and moreover things consisting in
obligation, which are not only alienable, but more fully
and freely alienable than almost every kind of corporeal ^ti
things, and so connected with particular corporeal things.
Blackstone explains this at considerable length and in a more lucid
way when he states:
107. Simpson, A.W. B., An Introduction to the History of the Land Law,
Oxford 1961, pp. 98-99.
108. Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, p. 133.
109. Ibid, p. 221.
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An incorporeal hereditament is a right issuing out of a
thing corporate (whether real or personal) or concerning, or
annexed to, or exercisable within, the same. It is not the
thing corporate itself, which may consist in lands, houses,
jewels, or the like; but something collateral thereto, as a
rent issuing out of those lands or houses, or an office relating
to those jewels. In short, as the logicians speak, corporeal
hereditaments are the substance, which may be always seen,
always handled: incorporeal hereditaments are but a sort of
accidents, which inhere in and are supported by that substance;
and may belong, or not belong to it, without any visible altera¬
tion therein. Their existence is merely in idea and abstracted
contemplation; though their effects and profits may be
frequently objects of our bodily senses. And indeed, if we
would fix a clear notion of an incorporeal hereditament, we
must be careful not to confound together the profits produced,
and the thing, or hereditament, which produces them. An
annuity, for instance, is an incorporeal hereditament: for
though the money, which is the fruit or product of this annuity,
is doubtless of a corporeal natire, yet the annuity itself, which
produces that money, is a thing invisible, has only a mental
existence, and cannot be delivered over from hand to hand.
So tithes, if we consider the produce of them, as the tenth
sheaf or tenth lamb, seem to be completely corporeal; yet
they are indeed incorporeal hereditament: for they being
merely a contingent springing right, collateral to or issuing
out of lands, can never be the object of sense: that casual
share of the annual increase is not, till severed, capable of
being shownjtpQthe eye, nor of being delivered into bodily
possession.
The rights are abstract things though the things obtained by the rights
may be corporeal, the obligation itself is incorporeal, it is recognised
that these things are things which can be transferred and enjoyed as any
other corporeal things. Simpson expresses such a view when he states:
It was recognised that they were a form of property which
could be transferred by grant, and of which the grantee, by
enjoyment, could indicate to the world the fact of his seisin,
just as the tenant of Biackacre could show his seisir^|<^ the
world by visibly enjoying the fruits of his property.
These rights and obligations are regarded as things because
110. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. II, pp. 20-21.
111. Simpson, A .V» .B., op.cit., p. 98.
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they are considered valuable and worthy of exchange and commerce as
112
corporeal things. Pollock puts the insignia of "elements of wealth",
"measurable values",**'* "the advantages or group of advantages",**^
on incorporeal things on the same level as we may put on corporeal
things. Similar views are expressed by Buckland when he states:
In the institutional scheme a res is an element in
wealth, an asset, an economic conception, essentially
different from the Austinian thing, a permanent exteji^qal
object of sensation, which is a physical conception.
It is, thus, not necessary that a thing is only that which has a physical
existence. The idea of "things" is to be apprehended notionally, and
for this notion to have some meaning in law it carries with it some value,
advantage, or economic importance. As Alien states:
It is a quantitative identification of the economic value
of a specific right. The value of the right may be, in
economic terms, small or even scarcely measurable; but
a value of some kind, it is believed, must be attributa^^
to it if it is to possess the character of a thing in law.
So what we have is a convenient metaphor whereby all legally
protected advantages which are interpersonally transferable in law
come to be included within the category of 'things'. The confusion
arises when one identifies the right with the subject-matter, the widest
power over the corporeal thing is so bound up with a piece of matter it
controls that it itself has sometimes been regarded as a piece of matter.
112. Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, p. 132.
113. Ibid, p. 133.
114. Ibid, p. 134.
115. Buckland, A Text Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinians,
Cambridge 1963, p. 182.
116. APen, C.K., "Things", Cal.L.R., 1940, p. 440.
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Allen expresses the subject-matter relation to that of rights both in the
case of corporeal and incorporeal things as follows:
By a corporeal thing we shall mean a right-object, or
interest, which is apprehended in concrete substance by the
senses. By an incorporeal thing we shall mean a right-
object, an interest - not the same thing as the right itself -
which does not thus embody itselfjip^physical substance, but
has to be apprehended notionally.
Smith warns against such a confusion and mistaken identity when he
states:
To obtain a correct notion of an incorporeal thing, we
must be careful not to confound together the profits produced
and the hereditament or thing which produces them - tjipg
benefits arising, and the right from which they arise.
The confusion between corporeal and incorporeal things arose due to
the origin of the idea and its evolution. In origin it must have been the
case that the only subject-matter of ownership was the class of or some
sub-class of corporeal things, but with later development other ideas
like bills, promissory notes, copyrights, etc. crept in.
From the above discussion, this I think sums up the nature of
things:
1) Any physical object which under a given legal system
is regarded as a possible subject-matter of rights duties,
is a corporeal thing.
2) Any interest, va^e, or advantage which the law
treats as having continuing existence and identity distinct
from that of any 'person', and as being the subject of rights
and duties, and which if interpersonaily transferable is
117. Ibid, p. 440.
118. Smith, J.W., A Compendium of the Law of Real and Personal
Property, London 1877, vol.i, p. 5.
deemed to preserve its identity despite such transfer,
is an incorporeal thing.
3) Any right or obligation considered valuable and
treated as being transferable between persons without loss
of its identity is an incorporeal thing.
The utility of extending a schema (the law of property) which was first
worked out for regulating the direct control of specific physical objects,
to cover such other advantages, is obvious. The flexibility derived
from extending the category of 'things' from the purely concrete to the
abstract enables the legal system to serve a wider range of social
political, and economic policies. Lawson makes a very cogent and
practical observation when he states:
The reason why the property lawyer turns ail these
rights and interests into things, however abstract they may
be, is that since they have value, people are willing to buy
them; and any valuable asset which is the object of commerce
is properly treated as a thing, just as much if it is an
abstraction such as a share in a company as if it is a physical
object such as a ship or a motor-car. The main reason why
far more attention is devoted to abstractions than to physical
objects is that, since they are creations of the human mind,
they can be made to conform to patterns consciously chosen
for their practical utility and capacity for combination with
each other. These patterns and combinations can be made
the objects of a calculus which is a fit subject of study by
lawyers. In comparison with them natural objects such as
land or animals ai^^oo individual to serve as mathematical
units of this kind.
Property as a socio-lega^ institution
Some would agree that the idea that the right exists absolutely
for the person entitled, is borne out by the institution of property - the
119. Lawson, F.H., Introduction to the Law of Property, Oxford 1958,
p. 16.
idea that the essence of property consists in the absolute control of the
owner and that any restriction is an encroachment upon it. This is due
to two reasons - the widespread uncertainty in both lay and legal thinking
as to legitimate extensions and limitations of property rights; and the
confusion between ownership and control. But no sounder and more
dramatic evidence of the relation of ownership to the general limitations
or restrictions can be found than in the planning laws of modern times.
It is these limitations that represent most vividly the true end evident
socio-legal structure of the institution of property. It is only by refer¬
ence to such limitations that the general nature of property rather than
the particular structural manifestations of property regulations, can be
understood.
The basic idea that for the sake of the social order there must
be some organised list of rights and of persons holding those rights
belies the absolute nature of property. For rights in the absolute sense
cannot exist without producing disorder and chaos in society. "A right
120
is meaningless unless there are potential challengers to that right."
This point is recognised in the contemporary legal thinking in the asser-
121
tion that legal or jural relations exist only between persons. In the
words of Poole:
No right can, in a society governed by the rule of law,
be absolute in the sense of being exercisable in total
disregard of the right of others, since the very existence
120. Moore, \\ ,E., 'The Emergence of New Property Conceptions in
America" J.L. Pol.S., 1943, p. 35.
121. Corbin, A.L., 'Jural Relations and their Classification",
30 Y.L.J. 1921, p. 226.
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of a legally recognised right depends upon its exercise
being consistent with other such rig^; if this were not so,
the rights would negate each other.
Moore states:
Property right is never limitless. This is implied in
the usual democratic formulations of the limits imposed by
the "equally legitimate rights of others", but is actually
inherent in the social character of the rights and the certainty
that the free exercise of at least some of the differential
powers conveyed by property rights would destroy the basis
of social order ... No property system grants limitless and
exclusive rights in valuable things, for to do so would be to
destroy the very bases of the ^0,9^ order which property
institutions serve to regulate.
Thus no right can be absolute in the individualistic sense, according to
which the right is so sacred that it overrides all other claims even the
124
right to life itself. There is not a single right which a man can
absolutely claim for himself. Even his own life is subject to social




existence is controlled by social and legal means. he idea of life
implies that one has it. It is not if one renounces it.
Property is in essence the exclusive control of a thing. Asa
matter of fact, absolute control of property is non-existent. Seagle
states:
In no legal system have rights of property been absolute.
122. Poole, E., English Property Law, London 1973, p. 5.
123. Moore, W.E., "The Emergence of New Property Conception in
America", J.L.Pol.S., 1943, p. 36.
124. No one is ever allowed to use his property as to cause injury to
others.
125. Abortion laws. Suicide laws, etc. illustrate this point.
126. Ihering, Law as a Means to an End, trans. Isaac Husik, N.Y.
1968, p. 406.
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There are always the rights of escheat and eminen^^amain,
and numerous restrictions on the use of property.
Similarly Ely states:
The right of property is an exclusive right, but it has
never been an absolute right. In so far as the right of
property existed it was an exclusive right, that is, it
excluded others; it was not a right withoui limitations
or qualifications.
Ihering stated in most lucid words:
It is therefore not true that property involves in its
"idea" the absolute power of disposition. Property in such a
form cannot tolerate and never has tolerated. The "idea ' of
property cannot contain an^j^Lng which is in contradiction
with the "idea" of society.
He further adds:
The only reason that the demands of society are not so
evident in property is the circumstance that the proprietor's
own interest determines him as a rule to use his property
in such a waywill further the interest of society along
with his own.
Where the owner's interest clashes with the society, the latter
predominates. The existence of a considerable degree of independence
on the part of the owner to regulate and conduct his own property, leads
to the mistaken idea of the absolute character of Property. The limita¬
tions on Property are social restrictions of inevitable necessity.
Property is a social institution. It springs out of the social
conditions of man. Nevertheless, the institution of property is not
consciously created from the first by sapient men in order to promote
127. Seagie, W., The History of Law, New York 1546, p. 51.
128. Ely, R.T., Property and Contract, London 1514, p. 136.
125. Ihering, Law as a Means to an End, p. 389.
130. Ibid, p. 386.
Cohen, R.C., Law and the Social Order, New York 1933, pp. 57-61.
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the ends of society. Nor, indeed, can the mere fiat of the lawgiver
attended by all the array of his legal techniques can it into being or even
largely promote its growth. In stating the conditions which shape
131
property laws some thinkers lay stress on the economic aspect, others
132
confine themselves to the legal aspect, and still others take as their
133
theme instincts common to the whole animal creation. Whatever be
the conditions for stating the institution of property, it is clear that the
institution has its basis in the great social structure. It is wrong to pin
134
the institution of property to any one aspect of Ufe. It is not an
individualistic institution because the term individualistic institution
itself is a self-contradiction. It is thought of as an individualistic
aspect of life for the reason already stated above. It is a case of
mistaken identity. McDonald, referring to the social aspect of property,
states:
The right of property is not a public function in the
sense that the proprietor is merely a manager in the
interest of society. Neither is there question of social,
versus individual rights. On the contrary ... it is mainly
social considerations which entail the necessity of private
appropriation and management of goods. The ever-present
individual right and ac|\^ntage must be made to harmonize
with social interests.
131. Dixon, R.A., Economic Institutions and Cultural Change, London
1941, pp. 33-34.
132. Bentham, Theory of Legislation, London 1871, p. 113.
133. Beaglehole, E., Property, A Study in Social Psychology, London 1931.
134. In property it is not only the legal or the economic aspect that is
always in question. The relation of property with such aspects
as its working with social classes, political organisations, etc.,
are also called in question.
135. McDonald, W.J., The Social Value of Property according to
St. Thomas .Acquinas, Washington D.C., 1939, p. 15.
Individual rights without social reservations would negate each other.
It is a term which must be considered in conjunction with, instead of
in isolation from, its operative field. It follows immediately that no
idea of property can ignore its social implications. It unfolds itself,
not in mute compliance with any immanent and incessant dialectic but
in accordance with the requirements and ideals of a changing social
order.
The institution of property involves the whole range of aspira¬
tions of human life, the ethical, intellectual, and physical constitution
of human nature. Any explanation which confines itself exclusively to
any one aspect of the human situation will certainly be misleading.
Here in the light of the above remarks I scrutinize the conception of
property as depending on the legal, economic, and instinctive nature of
man as a social being.
Property based on legal recognition
Let us consider Bentham's famous dictum:
Property and law are born together, and die together.
Before laws were made ther^^vas no property; take away
laws, and property ceases.
Bentham insists that any thing to constitute property must be recognised
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by law. Professor Geidart states:
Whether property as an institution could be conceived
as existing at all apart from law is a question hardly worth
considering at a time when the legal aspect bulks so largely
136. Bentham, Theory of Legislation, p. 113.
137. Ely, R.T., op.cit., p. 133.
Amos, S., The Science of Law, p. 160.
Miller, W.G., Lectures on Philosophy of Law, p. 126.
as it does in modern civiliz|^>n. Whatever else property
is, it is a legal conception.
Similarly Maclver states:
Property rights are legal rights ... They exist only
because government recognises and protects them. A
particular government may do little more than uphold an
already established system of rights, but in the longgg
perspective it is government that creates property.
In the context of these views we may agree that property can have no
existence unless recognised by law. But equally evident and practical
evidences have been found where property exists outside the ambit of
the formal legal systems of states, before coming to be recognised by
them. As in the case of Corporations in the United States, we find
that corporations were found in states where there was no corporation
Act. Walton Hamilton states:
Almost under our eyes a system of property is in the
making. It emerges as all such usages do out of a series
of expediencies. Cairns are asserted without the law or
even against its command. If for a time they endure
without serious challenge, they come to be accepted by the
parties immediate'y concerned and to be1 enforced by the
group's discipline. In due course, through one device or
another, they win the recognition of the state which puts
its own police power behind them. The institution comes
into being without the question of its establishment even
being formally raised. The latest among such works of
anonymop^jauthorship is the pattern of property rights in the
market.
Similarly Pollock cites instances where property existed prior to legal
recognition. He states:
138. Geldart, "Some aspects of Law of Property in England", in
Property, pp. 207-208.
139. Maclver, R. M. The Web of Government, New York 1947, p. 126.
140. Hamilton, W ., "Property Rights in the Market", J. L.Pol.S., 1943,
p. 10.
There may be "groups of advantages", to use
Sir T.E. Holland's happy term, which have an appreciable
value though the law does not recognise them. Imperfect
rights cfthe nature of copyright, for example, might exist
outside the law by usage and courtesy ... The goodwill of
a business, again, would still have a commercia1 value if it
were less efficiently protected by law than it is; and it would
probably by no means lose the whole of its value even if it
were not protected at all. The law began to pjglject it when
it became notoriously valuable and not before.
Property is, thus, not only a legal institution but a social
institution as well. Law not only creates property but also recognises
property already existing by courtesy and public opinion. Thus we can
conclude that for the institution of property the existence of an organic
society (in any form) is essential. Such a property may not be property
under the statute law but it is 'property' by virtue of other immanent
social norms which structure it as a social institution.
Social institutions are systems of relations which may be
crystallised in various patterns depending on the overall cultural patterns
and values of a particular society. They cannot be compressed into
cut and dried definitions. It is the social needs which breathe essential
life into legal institutions. To take one example of the institution of
marriage, one finds social needs and attitudes affecting the legal notion
of property, in a way that suits the external function of property to
serve social purposes but contradicts the internal structure of property.
In a family it is easy to decide who is the legal owner of family property
- one who purchased the things. But every member of the family
asserts, this is my bed, this is my radio, this is my pan in the kitchen.
141. Pollock, A first book of Jurisprudence, London 1929, p. 134.
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this is my toy. So every one asserts his right to one thing or the other,
though legally he may own nothing. Even a five year old child puts his
claim to a toy. If such a family becomes disintegrated by divorce, the
court of law finds it difficult to decide, ii it is to apply the legal notion
of property, who owns what. The adjudication in such a case is not a
legal but a socio-legal adjudication. The official of the court who
decides and attributes ownership goes into the social aspect of toe
understandings between the children and wife and husband rather than
sticking to the notion of legal ownership.
Another typical instance of the institution of property which
never occurred to the jurists nor has ever been brought to the courts
for adjudication, but is often contested within society by a section of
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its people is that of beggar's corner. Beggars standing on street
corners for begging sell their begging corners to other beggars. In
case of dispute they apply their own rules and regulations to which the
legal analysis of property is never applied, nor could it be thought
essentia1 to their profession. Beggars are invested with their corners,
cHp prices, continue a new craft. A novel article of property is thus
formed out of social patterns to which legal mandates are entirely
foreign. Such variables are of great importance to our understanding
of the structure and function of the institution of property. But the legal
notion of property fails to solve a1! these problems because there are
forms of behaviour pattern of which the analytical and logical forms
142. Other such instances are when robbers and killers sell their victims
to other members of their profession. They realise their sale
price while toe actual crime is committed by others.
cannot take account; then they must yield to oocial realities. Though
law takes account of both actual and potential purposes and motivation of
human behaviour yet the distribution of human purposes and motives is
too immense and full of contradictions for any legal concept to grasp it
fully.
For the legal notion of property is uot free from internal
strains and even contradictions. Some 'thing' recognised as property
for the purpose of one branch of law may be do lied that character for
the purposes of some other branch. Things may be assets for
creditors in equity without being property for such legal purposes as
taxation. Expectations for most purposes are not treated as property,
yet some may be provable claims against a bankrupt. Under the
Californian sales tax legislation, for example, a lease is not a sale and
the lessor is exempt from the tax, but if a lease is for a considerable
period (considerable period cannot be defined as it may differ under
different conditions) it is regarded as sale (which is against the very
structure of ownership - a lease of 200 years is a lease no matter how
tenuous the right of the fee simple owner) and the lessor is subject
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to sales tax. In fact, in social functions it is the ^egai title rather
than the exclusive right of ownership which is considered the main
attribute of owner shij . For example, the long since repealed English
Land Tax Act (1910) section 3, provides that an owner, in relation to
land, includes every person who jointly or severally, whether at law or
143. Hargreaves, A.D., "Modern Real Property ', 19 M.L.R., 1956, p. 17.
144. Keesling, F. M., "Conflicting Conceptions of Ownership in Taxation",
44 Cal. L.R. , 1956, pp. 866-372.
in equity, is entitled to the profits of the land, etc. Similarly in High
Way Act (1835), owner included a man in occupation, whether the actual
owner or only the occupant tenant. These are the questions of social
functioning of the analytical concept of property rather than of the
concept itself. Economic, social and similar interests are likewise,
from the legal point of view , alien ingredients. Thus the question of
legal recognition or legal condition of ownership does not embrace the
whole compass of social life.
Property based on economic conditions
Dixon regards the existence of economic surplus as a condition
of ownership. He states:
Far back in the dim recesses of prehistory, when the
individual was but an insignificant member of the hunting
pack the products of his feeble efforts - the crude imple¬
ments, the skins used as clothes, and the food gained in the
hunt - were not property ... roperty did not appear until
a definite surplus over subsistence arose. The economic
surplus was the phenomenon that gave rise ... to property.
But here Dixon seems to confuse between the right of property and the
object of property. Ta< scarcity of goods or surplus of goods is the
idea 01 wealth and not of ownership. Wealth is goods owned, but
property is a right. If wealth increases or decreases, it does not
affect property. For example, limitations on the right of property do
not increase or decrease wealth. Property is a social institution
which embraces the whole of human behaviour patterns. Its existence
does not depend on economic scarcity or surplus. In a society where
145. Dixon, R.A., Economic Institutions and Cultural Change, London
1941, pp. 33-34.
there is abundance of every thing for everyone, no clash in fulfilling
one's needs, the idea of ownership is still the basis of possession. Its
recognition is socially demanded for peace and the welfare of society.
For example, where everyone takes from the surplus for his needs,
he feels and seeks security in the possession and use of his acquisition
only if and only if his possession is accepted and respected by other
members of his society. His right to his possession is respected only
when the institution oi ownership is recognised in such a society. Thus
the institution of property is based not only on economic grounds but on
all those social needs which are the basis of human life and existence.
As Amos states:
It is not material wants, hopes, desires, and
tendencies alone to which ownership lends its aid as a potent
instrument of satisfaction and even development. The
moral aspirations and needs of individual man are scarcely
less signajl^ sustained and gratified by ownership than the
material.
In any society, whether there is surplus or scarcity of goods,
the institution of property depends on the recognition of the right of the
individual to the exclusive disposition of some goods. Any interference
with his property that he laboured to get out of available goods,
whether abundant or in short supply, would be a negation 01 the right
to participate in the surplus or scarcity of goods and therefore a threat
to the peace and security of the society. The reco ■;ration of the general
principles, establishing the exclusive use of an object, to which we call
ownership is thus an inevitable necessity of social life. Property is
146. Amos, S., The Science of Law, London 1874, p. 155.
\i '■
maintained and established as a social need for social purposes.
Instinctive basis of property
Most discussions of property, especially the idea that the
institution of property is a universal institution, has led some to include
in this study the behavioural aspects of ani nais as an evidence of the
existence of the institution of property among animals common with
human beings. This supposition of the universal character of the
institution of property, that no one has ever lived in any society and
under any circumstances so precariously that certain things necessary
for his living are not indisputably regarded his, has given rise to a
widespread ascription of the phenomenon to an innate instinctive tendency
147
of proprietorship. T.< tourneau gives a psychological explanation in
terms of animal propensities for food and dwelling and compares them
with human action in primitive societies. He interprets this phenomenon
as a direct result of a property instinct common to both man and
animals. Similarly Beaglehole states that animals possess property
no less than man. ie offers a psychological explanation whereby he
states that just as in the case of animals, for example, their dwelling
is an organic part of their nature, similarly in the case of human beings
"personal property is ... believed to be part of the self, somehow
148
attached, assimilated to or set apart for the self". ' A more recent
149
approach to the subject is made by Ardrey. His approach is
147. Letourneau, Property: its Origin and Development, London 1892,
pp. 1-21.
148. Beaglehole, E., Property a Study in Social Psychology, p. 134.
149. Ardrey, R., The Territorial Imperative, London 1969.
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comparable to that ol earlier writers. The basis of property is not to
be found in those drives and instinctive tendencies for food and dwelling,
but in those behaviour patterns which establish the institution of
property. As Leslie states:
Property has not its root in the love of possession.
All living beings like and desire certain things, and if nature
has armed them with any weapons are prone to use them in
order to get and keep what they want. What requires
explanation is not the want or desire of certain things on the
part of individuals, but the fact that other individuals, with
similar wants and desires, should leave them in undisturbed
possession, or allot to them a share, of such things. It is
the conduct of the community, not the inclination of individuals,
that needs investigation. The mere desire for particular
articles, so far from accounting for settled and peaceful
ownership, tends in the opposite direction, namely, to conflict
and the right ol the strongest. No small amount 01 error in
several departments of social philosophy, and especially in
political economy, has arisen from reasoning from the
desires of tl^^Lndividual, instead of from the history of the
community. '
The hypothesis advanced by Beaglehole and Ardrey to prove the
instinctive theory of property offers very tenuous relationship between
the phenomenon in animal and human groups. This is not to deny the
role of instincts in the origins of the institution of property but what is
contested is the foundations of property based on instinctive tendencies.
This mistaken extension of the idea of property to animals fails on two
grounds:
1) Animals are not conscious like human beings and
do not form a system of behaviour patterns and institutional
patterns that we could treat as the basis of any institution,
iociety xists only among human beings or sentient creatures.
Animals merely form an aggregation. Animal behaviour
150. Introduction to Lave!eye, E.D., Primitive Property, London 1078,
p. xi.
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is largely instinctive and thus fails to form behaviour
patterns which form the basis of law.
2) By attributing property to animals all developments
in the concept of property become obscure and inexplicable.
For example, copy right, corporations and capital formations.
If one stresses the specific use of things by the possessor,
whether in case of animals or human beings, the position that an inborn
property instinct must exist will inevitably be congenial. But when
certain specific use of a thing granted traditionally is withdrawn and a
new usage recommended, the absence of traditional usage among animals
will be an evidence of inflexibility of their behaviour. In this case,
the universal character of property as being common not only to men
but being shared by animals as well, will recede to the background.
As far as the range of this phenomenon in human societies is concerned,
this is so broad when contrasted with the restricted tendencies of
animals that for purposes of constructing a theory of property or any
other institution, the hypothesis advanced by Beagiehole and Ardrey is
of negligible value.
In the light of the above discussion, it is difficult to refer to any
point of time for the origin of ownership or to pinpoint a single source
as a basis of ownership. Such diverse factors in the concept of property
make it a problem not only for the lawyers but for all social disciplines.
As Professor Kargreaves states:
The problem of ownership remains but it is not a legal
problem; it is the concern of ... any and every specialist
who can contribute his grain to the common heap ... The
lawyer naturally has his contribution to make, but as the
problem is not fundamentally a legal problem the final
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solution does not lie with him. He is concerned with
ownership only so far as it produces consequences within
the sphere of his own special technique,151
The institution of property has grown and is growing within the
fields,and not the fences,of various social disciplines. It
cannot be put into a strait-jacket and confined within one
discipline. The study of the institution of property is a social
discipline and its legal aspect consists in recognition of the
II If
element of exclusion ,
tt it
The framework within which this exclusion operates
is constituted by a normative order in terras of which the three
key terms used - possession,ownership,and property - can now be
explained to conclude the foregoing argument. The use stipulated
for these terms is as under:
Possession signifies a state of facts in which a person
or a group of persons exercise actual control over things. It is
factual control over things. It is primarily of economic signifi¬
cance, in the sense that possession gives a person the opportunity
to use a thing to meet his needs. The idea of control over things
has grown up with this idea of personal use of things to
fulfil individual needs.
Ownership signifies a normative order in which an
individual as of right exercises exclusive control over something.
Ownership has,as its necessary consequence,right-duty relations
with respect to things,such as to protect the physical relation
which an individual establishes with the object through possession.
Ownership refers to a state of being an owner of something,that is,
having a right to exclusive possession of it, together with other
incidets which vary from system to system.
Again ownership signifies the legal (or other normative)
institutions in the sense of institutive rules,consequential rules
151. Hargreaves,A.D.,"Modern Heal Property",M.L.R.,1956,p. 1?«
152 f
and terminative rules in terras of which the right of
exclusive possession and other incidents can be framed and
ascribed to an individual or group of individuals.
The term property can be used in the following senses:
Someone can be said to have property or the right of
property in something. This is the samething as being an owner.
Property is also used in the institutional sense as in
i i
the phrase the institution of property • In this sense it is
identical with ownership in the institutional sense.
• i
Further, property may signify an object over which the
right of property or ownership is exercised. Anything which under
a given legal system can be owned is either an actual or a
potential object of property or ownership.
The different conceptions of property that prevail in
different legal systems can be explained in terras of types of
things over which ownership can be exercised. Furthermore the
different conceptions of property can be explained in terras of
varying incidents that follow from the control of things. Thus
the category of things and the nature of incidents that follow
from the exclusive control of things are necessary to the
understanding of any particular conception of property.
• t
The ambiguities in usage of the term ownership and
i •
property can be clarified by expanding the terms. Thus to
avoid ambiguity we may speaks
i t i »
1) Of the right of ownership or right of property
as signifying the owner's normative position.
. » t i
2) of the institution of ownership or the institution
i
of property as signifying the normative order which makes it
152. MacCorraick,D.N.,op. cit.fpp. 106-107.
t I
possible to have the right mentioned in (1),
. • i
3) of objects of property as signifying
i i
property in the third sense,property as something over
t i •




EARLY FORMS OF PROPERTY
The first chapter gave an abstract analysis of the
concept of property, showing that it is a concept which pre¬
supposes a certain generic framework of norms concerning rights,
• t
privileges,powers,and immunities in relation to the use of things •
The essential or defining element was found in norms conferring
rights to exclusive possession of things. Prom the point of view
of that analysis, it is clear that there may be many variations
in forms of property, because in different social and legal
systems, the content of the property norms may vary very greatly.
Different types of societies are characterised, among other things,
by differing conceptions of property - differing conceptions as to
the proper allocation of rights and powers etc. to property
owners,and indeed as to the duties and responsibilities attaching
to ownership. A highly differential feature of some societies
(which will be considered in this chapter) is that the right to
exclusive possession chairacteristic of ownership is a right
enjoyed by members of a group against outsiders, not by members
themselves} where this is the case, we may justifiably speak of
a system of communal rather than individual ownership. What
these very different conceptions have in common is that they are
all manifestations of the same concept abstractly analysed in
chapter one.
Abstract analysis is not, however, enough in itself
for the understanding of such an institution as property. The
norms which give the concept its meaning are legal and therefore
social norms - norms established in a society whether by custom
or by enactment. As social norms they must be understood
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within the setting and context of the societies which gave
them birth. In that sense and for that reason property must be
understood not simply as a formal legal concept, but as a
concrete social institution located within a system of legal-
cum-social norms whose observation serves some function or functions
within a society,
A principal objective of this thesis is to find the
basis on which the institution of property is established. Again
why should there be social allocation to individuals of rights in
relation to things? The question almost answers itself. Human
beings require access to the material things of the world around
them in order to survive. In this sense, it is needs of individuals
which are fundamental to the institution of property, A system of
property must be such that it affords to all members of a society
access to the means of subsistence. And this indeed the institu¬
tion of property illustrates and unfolds in its long history
through social turmoils and struggles, though with social develop¬
ments and different social philosophies, the legal order, by means
of a series of economic concepts, like contract, deviated from the
path of serving needs of each individual to advancing those of a
section of the society. But these changes no longer affect the
basic idea of ownership as fulfilling needs of individuals. These
developments have, however, taken the institution of property out
of the social and economic connections as a part of human personality
concerned with satisfaction of needs of each individual. Ownership
as an exclusive control over external objects is the basis of
economic activity in fulfilling needs of individuals. lit is the
process of economic utilisation of a thing that is important, and
this utilisation involves possession, on which the institution of
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property is based# Thus it is very clear that it is the
utility of things (and the legal relations respecting the things
are secondary) to fulfil needs of individuals which forms the
basis of the institution of property# And a legal order ignoring
the idea of fulfilling needs of each individual through the
institution of property does not represent the true purpose of the
institution of property as is found in the idea of possession as a
basis of ownership# The doctrine of ownership as an unlimited
control over things is a juristic fiction and is presented in
modern times as if it constituted the entire contents of the
concept of ownership.
'The early forms of the institution of property#
relating both to moveable and immoveable objects, show understanding
of the necessity of external objects for the satisfaction of needs
of individuals. In primitive times, one finds instances in the
cultural and social way of living in which the use of things is
related to the satisfaction of needs of all individuals. The
collectivist instances in owning means of production corroborate
the idea that no member of a group, or clan, or family may find
himself destitute, without the means to satisfy his needs. (The
very idea of external objects is imbued with the notion of their
function to satisfy human needs.) And the collective mode of
living and the collective use of things further suggests, first,
either the scarcity of things, such that separate individuals
cannot all secure sufficient for their needs, or second, (which is
almost the same thing) the need of collective effort to produce
enough for the living of each. This points to the fact that the
use of things in their early forms is related to the satisfaction
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of needs of each individual. And the idea of unlimited
control over objects unrelated to needs of an individual has not
yet been reached.
It has been objected that in fact property systems
have often concentrated control over things in the hands of a
relatively small section of a society, upon whom all the others
become dependent, This is obviously true, in different ways,
of both feudal and capitalist property systems. As against this
it can be replied: that in fact these systems have had to
develop subsidiary institutions who enable non-owners to have some
however precarious access to the things they need for survival?
but this is not the universal character of the institution of
property. It is a superficial characteristic of the institution
of property,a superficial property relation, which provides for
the needs of individuals not through the institution of property
but through other institutions, The legal form must exist in
some form before it can be increased in scope. Development of the
institution of property into a means of wealth for a few individuals
is the development of the legal form, totally lacking the substance
from which it arises. This is how one finds absurdities in
private property in modern times. The private property a3 we
will see further is produced not by the norms of the institution
of property but by private forcesin the shape of appropriation
by one person of the labour of others embodied in the labour
product. It has its roots in the public force as well in the
shape of laws protecting such appropriation and converting labour
power into a market commodity.
This latter argument is dependent on a historical view
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of the evolution of forms and conceptions of property. In
its earliest origin property served the function of securing to
all means sufficient to meet their needs. Hereinafter this will
t •
be called the economic function of property . If developments
arising from these earlier forms have diverted it partly from
that economic function, that is not necessarily to be accepted as
a satisfactory development, although this thesis must trace how
it happened.
The object of this chapter is,then, to examine so far as
possible the earlier forms of property of which we have any
evidence, with a view to sustaining the theory sketched above.
Since there is not enough direct evidence, one has to rely on
indirect evidences afforded by custom,usage,etc. As Maine says;
We take a number of contemporary facts,ideas,and
customs, and we infer the past form of those facts,
ideas, and customs not only from historical records of
that past form, but from examples of it which have not
yet died out of the world, and are still to be found in
it ... Direct observation comes thus to the aid of
historical enquiry, and historical enquiry to the help
of direct observation.1
Discussions of collective living and collective use
of things in various societies in different regions of the world
gives the view that the notion of control of things is associated
with the function of fulfilling needs of individuals in all
social systems? and also that all societies have passed through
more or less similar stages of social development. Modern
researches have reached the conclusion of relativity of
culturally constituted values and have shown the immense variabi¬
lity to be found in the specific cultural forms of different
human societies. At the same time, however, it has become
1. Maine, II.3. .Village Communities in the Fast and West, London 1881,
pp. 6-7.
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increasingly apparent that there are some basic similarities
in human culture the world over. Sir Henry Maine illustrates
this point by tracing the concept of village communities the world
2
over. Village communities such as existed in Russia have
also been found existing among nations most distinct from one
another - in Germany and ancient Italy, in Peru and China, in
Mexico and India, among the Scandinavians and Arabs with precisely
similar characteristics. When an institution is found among all
nations of the world, we can see in it a necessary phase of
social development and a kind of formal law"* presiding over the
evolution of forms of social and legal institutions.
Property in Moveable Things;
The earliest idea of property far back in the dim
recesses of history was intimately associated with the procurement
2. Maine, Gomraes, Laveleye, Letourneau, etc. believe that village
communities are as old as human race itself. 'Phey take it
as the basis of the institution of property. Geebohm, however,
expresses the view that village communities have arisen from
the influence of civilisation. Lewinski says that they are
formed with the increase of population.
3. In introduction to Laveleye, Primitive Property, London 1878,
p. xvi.
Westermarck,E., The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.
London 1908, vol. ii, p. 1.
«?
Hallowell, A.I., The Nature and Function of Property as
a Social Institution", J. L. Pol. S., 19^3, p» 116.
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of subsistence. Primitive man was satisfied by what he got
to eat. The bushman has no house and lays nothing for the future.
All his efforts and use of tools to procure subsistence were
his communal efforts as a member of the group, hut he was not
like one of the syphonophorae. The products of his hunt are
his, although distributed among all the members of his group so
that no member shall die of starvation. It is not difficult for
one to deduce the communal principles from such a situation but
the keen sense of possession developed with more foresight and
insight into situations, the idea of property from this mere
speck advanced, though it is right to argue that this definite
idea of property has not taken root until foresight begins. But
it is wrong to say that such important, though meagre, belongings
4
of bushraen were not his private property. As Professor Amos
states:
The fact or institution of ownership is such an
indispensable condition of any material or social
progress that, even throughout the period during which
the attention of lav/ is concentrated upon family
4. One of the chief difficulties in the study of history is the
tendency to judge early institutions by the standard of our
own. This tendency is indefinitely strengthened if we use
the same name for both the ancient and the modern institutions.
Thus lack of terminology is one of the grounds of confusion.
The purchase of a wife in primitive times is always compared
with modern commercial transactions which ignore the non¬
commercial spirit of the primitive people. As Firth says:
ouch exchange has primarily a social meaning
and not an economic meaning. Again economic values
do not stand isolated in their own field, but are
closely interwoven with the whole texture of society.
Firth,P., Primitive Polynesian Economy, London 1959* p. 9«
Gluckraan.M., Politics,Law and Ritual in 'ribal Society, Oxford
1965, pp! 42 & itf.
Diamond, i.S., Primitive Law Past and Present, London 1971,
p. 190. " —
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and village ownership,the ownership, on the part
of individual persons,of those things which are
needed for the sustenance of physical life, becomes
increasingly recognised as a possibility or
necessity.5
-Similarly Hobhouse states:
Among primitive peoples there is comparatively
little scope for the institution of private property.
... such peoples possess little which can be
appropriated, except their small personal belongings.
These, it would seem, belong to the individual from
the first.6
Mankind may be traced by a chain of necessary inferences
back to a time, when, ignorant of fire, without artificial
weapons, they depend like the wild animals upon the spontaneous
fruits of the earth. The objects of ownership would naturally
increase with the multiplication of those arts upon which the
means of subsistence depends. The earliest tools of production
namely rude weapons, stones, bones, etc. were the chief items of
property. A passion for their possession had scarcely been formed
in their minds. The idea concerning their value, their desira¬
bility and their inheritance was feeble. It is not an illustration
of sophistication but of primitive simplicity. The view that
ownership is an outgrowth of customary appropriation of such
things as rude weapon®, utensils, etc. by individuals is well
7
supported by the usage of all known primitive tribes. In all
5. Amos,S., The Science of Law, London 18?^, p. 151•
6. Hobhouse,L.T., Morals in Evolution A Study in Comparative Ethics,
London 1951»P« 313.
7. The owner•s weapons and other personal effects were buried in
his grave. Fustel, however, gives a religious explanation for
this usage along with the idea of personal property.
Fustel De Goulanges, The Ancient City, London 1916,pp. 17-18.
Diamond,op. cit., p. 190.
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communities the individual members exercise a more or less
unrestrained right of use and abuse over their weapons. To
a modern man this would count as property.^ But to a primitive
man whose usages and organisations are under review, he would
look upon this relation as property. This habit of looking at
his personal effects to have more intimate relation with the
personality of the possessor is more unbroken in a primitive man
9
than in civilised man. But for this there can be many explana-
10
tions and the religious and superstitious nature of man,
especially in primitive days, is regarded as the main factor
for explaining such tendencies. Seagle states that
it is true to say that the savage has a more
jealous regard for objects of personal use than a
civilised child has for its toys.11
8. Ownership in the modern legal and economic sense has not yet
developed. The concrete facts and conditions of use was
the notion accepted by the primitive society in case of
personal chattels. As Diamond states:
the right to possession of more things than
can be used is often not recognised.
Diamond,op. cit.,p. 188.
9, In modern times in the case of corporate ownership the idea
of personal control is altogether negatived.
10. Both Fustel and Hobhouse give religious explanations for this
intimate relation between man and his personal belongings.
Beaglehole,however, traces this relation to the instinctive
nature of man common with animals and tries to prove that
animals have as much sense of property as human beings. This
view of Beaglehole has already discussed in Chapter 1, pp.
55 & 63.
11. Seagle,W., 'The History of Law. New York 19^6, p. 51.
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This point of view in large measure shapes and colours
the early institution of property. Veblen compares this sense
of intimate relation with ownership and states;
Under the guidance of this habit of thought,
the relation of any individual to his personal
effects is conceived to be of a more intimate kind
than that of ownership simply. Ownership is too
external and colourless a term to describe the fact.
Thus such meagre belongings of the primitive people as would
under the nomenclature of a later day be classed as private
property are not thought by him as his property at all, they
pertain to his self. Diamond expresses the opinion that
it • t
primitive law has no such conception of ownership in a modern
technical sense ... It is better to speak of a thing as
it it ti
belonging to someone, or being his rather than as owned
"13
by him. Thus the idea of property in primitive times is
rudimentary indeed. But if it be called property at all, it
it it
12. Veblen,T. , The Beginning of Ownership , The American
Journal of Sociology, November 1898, p. 355#
Thurnwald,R., Economics in Primitive Communities, London
1932, p. 186.
Lafargue,P., The Evolution of Property. London 189^,
pp. 16-17.
Beagle,W., op. cit.,p. 260.
13. Diamond, op. cit.,pp. 188-189.
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is individual property, The earliest idea of property thus
was of chattels. This was the first main avenue leading
towards individualisation of property. Such objects as weapons,
tools, wearing apparels, etc. reflect both their economic
i i
function and their relation to the personality of the ov/ner
because of the superstitious beliefs and customs of the possessor.
The articles of purely personal use to some extent and in limited
15
numbers were thus allowed to the individual. Such objects
increased in number with the progress of skill and became more
and more secularised and began to be used as objects of
commerce.
The exclusive use of things allowed to an individual
for however a short period and however limited a category of
things, i3 ownership. Though at this primitive stage the idea
of such use of things was closely associated with an individual's
own personality, the things were truly considered a part of
his personality, yet because of this closer association which
we do not find in modern times, as in the case for example of
shares in a fund, we will be wrong if we deny that this stage
of human development has a form of ownership. Moreover true to
the convictions of a modern man, the peculiar character of
ownership referred above, is more apparent than real. In our
own society the ordinary commercial principles are supplemented
by transactions based upon kinship sentiments. In a civilised
I'f. Goldenweiser,A.A,, Early Civilization,An Introduction to
Anthropology. London 1921, p. 137•
15. Diamond,op. cit.,p. 188.
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16
society the rational motives are merely more overt.
Every society has its own norms and it is wrong to think that
jural postulates belong only at a particular stage of society.
She Indians living on the prairies had their own social order.
It is possible under their system, social or legal, that such
associations are considered vital to be an owner. Thus,however,
rudimentary or tenuous the idea of ownership may be, it is
wrong to think that there was no ownership among these primitive
17
people at any stage of development. Failure to recognise the
fact that in the course of its development every society has
devised a special mould in which to cast its traditions of
ownership, is one of the primary reasons for all these misunder¬
standings of the nature and significance of the primitive idea
of property. Understanding of the social matrix has remained
18
the chief point of writers of legal history. Firth keeping
this very cautiously in view as an important factor in
understanding the primitive institution of property states:
It must be realised in considering the problem
of the control of man over material goods that
such terms as property and 'ownership , which are
employed to indicate a certain set of relationships in
16. Firth,R., op. cit., p. 5.
Gluckraan,op. cit., p. 45.
17. Dr. Malinowski goes so far as to regard it a grave error to
use the word ownership with a definite connotation given to
it in our own society. Because the meaning we attach to it
is linked with highly developed economic and legal conditions.
He iafers that, therefore the term own, as we use it is
meaningless when applied to a native society.
Diamond, op. cit., pp. 188-189.
„ »»
18. Hobhouse,T.L., The Historical Evolution of Property,in
Fact and in Idea', pp. 3-5» in 1913 edition, Property.
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our own society,do not necessarily preserve the same
connotation when applied to a native community.
The essential factors in the situation - the
individual, the goods, and the other members of the
community - remain unchanged, but the set of concepts
by which these are related has been formed against
a different cultural background. Hence the impression
that is conveyed ... that an object is owned' by a
certain person may be entirely divorced from reality
through ... ignorance of all those rights and
qualifications which to the native form an integral
part of the situation.19
What I want to stress here, as a conclusion from the
discussion above, is that the use of things or the control of
things for personal use became the basis of the institution
of property in moveable things. The notion of possession as a
purely economic relation became the basis of ownership. Here
on® finds the function of exclusive control over things as basic
to the satisfaction of needs of individuals. This preliminary
stage of the institution of property one might call pre-property.
But whatever be the developments of the institution of property
from pre-property, the basic idea of ownership, which has its
basis in possession, will always stay in the satisfaction of needs
of individuals. Thus property grew up in law to meet economic
needs of each individual.
Property in Immoveable Things:
The idea developed in relation to moveable things,
that property is born out of individual's personal use of
19. Firth,R., Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori,
New York 1929, pp. 330-331.
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things to satisfy his needs, is even more evident in the case
of property in immoveable things, The satisfaction of needs
of individuals, at all times, is connected with the means of
production. To deprive a man of the means of production by
means of which he has to produce products for his living, is
tantamount to depriving him of his life. In primitive times
the appropriation and maintenance of property, necessary to
satisfy needs of each individual, took the shape of communal
property so that none is deprived of the means of subsistence.
The right to use as a consequence of ownership is conditional on
no one using more than he needs. The conception of ownership is
functional, the function of fulfilling needs of each individual.
In the case of immoveable property one finds the
existence of individual property co-existent with the communal
property which is in the form of a social trust, for the use
of all. One's right to collect wood does not conflict with the
other's right to collect berries from the same piece of common
property as per their needs. Thus the legitimate expectation
of each is co-existent with that of others. And in the case
where each one's claim conflicts with the others ( as each
wants to collect wood,) their claims will be met by sharing,
as we find that in some societies all do the cultivation and the
produce is shared by all. In cases where one does not use the
20
thing, as in the case of canoe or land in Helanesian culturej
20. Rivers,Social Organisation, London 1922*, pp. 106-107.
Firth,R., Primitive Polynesian Economy, London 1939*
pp. 2^3-252, pp. 26f-278.
Gluckman,M,, op. cit.,pp. 36 & 5^.
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others are free to use this without anyone's permission,
if it is lying idle. The purpose behind such an idea lies in
the use value of an object, and is based on an assumption that
its use by others is to satisfy their needs and things have a
purpose to fulfil which is proper to their nature. Thus so long
as one is using a thing, his ownership is exclusive but his
exclusive control is not unlimited in the sense that he has it
even when he does not personally use it. The exclusive control
which implies the control of a thing to satisfy his needs is not
inconsistent with possession of a thing, but is inconsistent when
possession, that is economic order, does not conform to the
t i
economic order of the thing. By economic order I mean an
ideal state of affairs in which each individual possesses for
use only what he needs, and needs for his use all that he
possess. 'Things are to satisfy needs of individuals and in this
lies their economic order. But when things do not conform to
this economic order of satisfaction of needs of each individual
who has possession of things, the possession of a thing becomes
inconsistent with their economic order. For example, when a man
has the possession of a thing but is barred from the use of it
or he has not the use of it for himself, his possession is
inconsistent with the economic order of the thing. The order of
ownership to conform to the economic order of things is to be
embodied in possession. This basic idea of the institution of
property is found in the origin of ownership. Economic systems
organise human efforts to transform natural resources to useable
goods and the legal order has to watch and protect that these
goods are distributed to meet needs of each individual who created
8k
them and for whom they are created. The institution of
ownership was founded on this basic idea. And it is clear
from the foregoing discussion relating to the existence of
property in land ( or in means of production) in various societies.
In primitive times relative equality of conditions led
to the relative equality of collective unity, an imperative
necessity. Human beings must exist in societies in order to
survive. All members of a clan lived near the subsistence level
and social classes or hierarchical differentiations, were absent.
iJqual liberty was the result of relative equality of conditions
because when aided and unvaried by external powers men are nearly
equal. Whatever be the differentiations which existed as a
result of the division of labour, they were purely functional in
the earliest societies. It is around these communes that the
whole concept of property evolved. The communal disposition of
the means of consumption first formed the basis of primitive
institutions more fundamentally than even the utilisation of the
means of production. She whale cast on the shore by the sea was
shared by the whole clan. A successful hunter must share the
spoil. The rules of distribution were varied and numerous. Under
the primitive culture the means of subsistence are habitually
consumed in common by the group and the manner in which such
goods are consumed is fixed by the custom and usage of the place.
Such practices and usages are not easily broken and with the
passage of time they become a part of the habit of life. They
survive as habits rather than creeds. This practice at the
same time was essential to the survival of the group. Such
practices also suggest an idea that the deputing of certain
85
persons for hunting is merely the division of labour.
Similarly other work was assigned to other members of the group.
The labour of each was shared by others. Thus the idea of
ownership of land does not arise except in the right to gather
its produce for consumption. The idea of private property lies
not only in holding the object of property, but having an exclusive
t •
use of it. But if one holds that which every one is free to
use, property evaporates. Thus an important question as to the
existence of private property turns out as Seagle states:
If a cultivator shares with other members of
the community, he may be said to hold the land for
the benefit of all. The important question is not
who occupies the soil but what is done with the
fruits of the soil.^"1
There is no question of individual right or ownership. The
question of ownership is not brought up by the fact that an
article has been produced or is at hand in finished form for
consumption. It is the whole group that consumes the article no
matter who produced it. Plato's ideal that friends have things in
common was the accepted standard. The clan disposes itself on the
land not with reference to ownership, but with regard to kinship,
Gven where the clai« to hunt in a particular place was recognised,
there was really involved no more than a division of labour. Its
stay in one place gives the idea of spatial consciousness, that is,
territorial claim, not the idea of property. The relation
between the community and the soil, among these nomads is, as the
German jurist Gierke points out, rather similar to the inter¬
national rights which a state has to its territory and to the right
21, Beagle,rf,, The History of Law« New York 19^-6, p. 56,
Gluckraan,M,, op, cit., p, 52.
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it has over a domain. The soil was sub-divided only for
the purpose of cultivation by its members. It is the work rather
than the soil that is allotted.
The most important question of property concerns what
in modern times is known the ownership of the means of production.
In primitive times when either there was no tillage or the
tillage was very simple and just sufficient for subsistence, it
was the chief and most valuable means of production. It was
held under communal ownership, since groups were having collective
means of subsistence. It is the collective utilisation of land
that proves the collectivism of primitive societies. As collective
labour was the only possible form of labour to satisfy human
needs< this dominant form of utilisation of land ruled the
relationship of production. Among hunters and food-gatherers,
who are the simplest of the primitive peoples, private property
in land is entirely unknown. The benefit of the entire community
either in the form of a clan or family is the goal. The land is
desired only because of the valuable products it yields, Humner
22, The primitive people, Sumner states, do not understand true
ownership of the soil. The land has for them no more value
than the air or the sea for us. This common property which
the horde is supposed to have in relation to the land
occupied or rather settled by its members, is in reality not
property but simply a common use of the soil. Nevertheless
this same vague form was the one out of which the more specific
types developed and, whatever it may be called, it is with this
un-individual appropriation of land that the evolution of
property in it begins,
duraner,W,G,, The Science of Society, vol, i, London 1927»
pp. 282-291.
Diamond, op. cit,, pp. 189-190,
23. Sumner, op, cit., pp. 283 & 287.
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remarks that to the hunter land laws are really game laws,
Because of the different characteristics between
moveable and immoveable property, the idea of individual
ownership in land was unknown to primitive peoples. Moveables
could be carried, held, and concealed but since land lacked these
characteristics, they could not have conceived it to be an object
of property. Land was available for use but not for individual
2k
possession. The Akikuyu trxbe in Africa found it difficult to
reconcile the idea of sale with their idea of land. The idea of
sale of land was so foreign to them that they could hardly conceive
what is meant when the idea of sale was opened to them. The idea
of possession of land found its way among primitive people only
when the idea emerged of a settled life in a fixed location. One
must not think that primitive people made a clear distinction
between moveable and immoveable; they simply did not have the
idea of immoveable and immoveable belonged to the period when
civilisation started taking birth.
So long as man lived by chase and the fruits of the
earth, he had no cause to think of appropriating land. But as
tillage developed and the cultivated land acquired importance, it
25
brought settled life in the community. Nevertheless, individual
appropriation of land was not thought of until dwellings and
crops had become permanent. Hunting grounds were held in common
by the tribes and no exclusive claim was made by individual
members. But the hunting ground was claimed by the whole tribe
2k» P>iver3, op. cit., pp. 109-110.
25. Forde,C.D., Habitat, Economy and Society, London 1957,
PP. 378-579.
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as their exclusive property as against any outsiders. Thus
it must not be supposed as no man's land. This is true tribal
property and is by no means an infrequent institution. Intruders
were fully punished by the tribe. This is clearly nothing like
27
individual ownership. Darwin found communal ownership over
28
hunting grounds.~ In Australia each individual was possessed of
29
a right to hunt within the group territory. 7 Exclusive control
in the sense of unlimited control was not thought necessary for
ownership. But exclusive control was the right of the individual
to own what he acquired for his subsistence from the common
property in which the exclusive right of each was co-existent.
The individual ownership was linked to the ownership of the group,
because the idea of ownership was linked with the idea of property
for the fulfilment of needs of each individual. It was assumed
that if one was no longer using the thing for the purpose of
fulfilling his needs, it was available for use to others.
The tribes who succeeded in taming large animals and
learnt the art of agriculture were fortunate in their possession
of animals and more or less settled life. Hie quantity of food
produced on the same space being larger, the social groups
became more numerous. A Masai shared pasturage with all the other
inhabitants of his district and when the grass was exhausted there
26. Ibid. p> 375.
27m Letourneau, Property, Its Origin and Development, London 1892,
p. 2km " " " """* ~
Lewinski states:
It is quite erroneous to speak of common
property. It is only by confusing the existence of
boundaries with the idea of property that this
mistake is possible.
Lewinski, The Origin of Property, London 1913, P« 7.
28. Letourneau, op. cit.,p. 25.
29. Ibid. p. 18.
89
30
was a general exodus. The Kafirs had no property in land,
31
but shared common pasturage. Similarly Hottentots practised
32
tribal communism with regard to grazing land. Throughout Africa
33
were found the survivals of old communal clan life. Primitive
communalism was general; there was frequently complete or nearly
complete coramunalism. The Eskimo clan owned its ice pack. The
Iroquois lived in long houses, so the liedskin of Mexico and Dyaks
of Borneo. In such comraunalist dwellings the provisions were
common.
In cultural sequence, the tenure of property becomes a
tenure by prowess. The habit of letting a strong man alone in
his possession easily develops. The recourse to might as a
definitive basis of property becomes more immediate and habitual.
There are always conventions, a certain understanding as ta what
are the legitimate conditions and circumstances which become the
facts of habitual acceptance. Seizure and forcible retention very
ft
shortly gain the legitimation of usage. The property the most
ir ti
lawful in the eyes of our ancestors, said Gaius, was that
ii-ZA. II H
which they had acquired in war. J The art of war, said Aristotle,
it 1135
is in a way,by nature the art of gaining property. Thus
ownership in land becomes approximate to the already well developed
forms of property in weapons, and other chattels. Although in
30. Lowie,K.H., Primitive Property, London 1953» p« 205.
31• Letourneau, op. cit., p. 88.
32. Lowie, op. cit., p. 205»
33« Lafargue,?., The Evolution of Property,London 189^, p. 19«
3^. Gaius *f.l6.
35* Aristotle, Politics, 1.8.
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origin the chiefs of the clans had the role only of commanding
the people of the clan, and this position vis a vis the clan was
that of reciprocal obligations, primarily of a ritual order,
this new tendency turned their position into that of the chief of
the land. Land came to belong not to the community but to the
chief, Veblen'^ describes this situation as a division of population
into two economic classes, one engaged in industrial employment
and the other engaged in non-industrial employment such as war.
With this change in life-style the objects of property
also changed from rudimentary objects to more valuable objects
such as cattle and slaves. With this high valuation of things,
private property increased its scope, Such a development is
found among many savage tribes. Among the Hottentots cattle is
the main moveable property and can be easily concentrated in a few
hands, and thus becomes a source of future prosperity for them.
There are thus both rich and poor in their tribes. The existence
and division of tribes into two economic classes led not to the
disappearance but to the deterioration of common property and
it
laid the basis and origin of separate property. Kinsfolk
willingly exchanged a girl for an ox or a cow. Wealthy Hottentots
were even prudent enough to buy little girls of six or seven, in
readiness to replace their v/ives on active service, and thus a
"37
source of wealth. These symbols acquired economic aspects
similar to the character of money. This,however, presupposes a
certain individualisation of property. The status of women was
it it 1
36, Veblen,T,, The Beginning of Ownership, The American
Journal of Sociology, 1898, p. 361,
37, Letourneau, op, cit,, pp. 79-80.
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thus equal to chattels. This is an example of an idea of
private property at an early stage of human development. The
rudimentary stages of private property followed the primitive
coamunalism and preceded patriarchal property. Second, the system
of exchange, the basis of private property ( capital development),
was developed.
These circumstances act as selective process which
pushes a few individuals into the leading positions. This gave
7O
rise to aristocracy among the Kafirs. The society on the Gaboon
has all its aristocratic accumulations and its social elect, which
lives nobly, does nothing, and is well fed. Among th* American
it
Indians may be seen a similar transition. Thus king Kamrasi ...
unhesitatingly took the goods of any subject to bestow them on his
1139
favourites. Those closest to the supreme head became nobles.
Similarly the king of Bantam ... when a man dies appropriated
not only his fortune, but his wife and children whom he reduced to
"40
slavery. There was no other road to property than appropriating
to one's own use the value produced by the exertions of others.
But this practice of accumulating goods by the individual could
not have come into vogue to the extent of establishing a new
institution without the disintegration of the old communistic
habit of communes, and the usurpation of obligatory authority by
the chief of the clan. In fact one must suppose the chief's
power to have varied from that of a representative figure-head
to that of an administrator with restricted powers. This
38. Ibid. p. 88.
Gluckman,M,, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
39. Letourneau, op. cit.,p. 93.
kO. Ibid. p. 111.
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appropriation implies that individual property in chattels
was fully established because communal property cannot be the
subject of appropriation.
In the pastoral stage a fortunate individual may
accumulate flocks and herds, while other members of the group
are impoverished through drought or pest. Under the pastoral
system the notion of property in the soil begins to spring up.
A tribe or clan settled at one place, though for a short duration,
began to feel the identity of the place. But the idea that a
single individual could claim a portion of the soil as exclusively
his own never occured to anyone. The reason may be that the idea
of collective living during the previous stages was so effective
that common hunting grounds were converted into common cultivation
Gradually a portion of the soil was put under
cultivation and an agricultural system was established. The
territory which the tribe occupied remained its undivided property
Ownership was always in some kindred group rather than in
individuals} spoken of as the property of various clans. The
Aztecs of Mexico had held land in common. Among the Iroquois,
the land was the property of the tribe. Rivers's account of the
people of the Island of Ambrim indicates that the nature of
ownership of land was collective and states:
A man might clear a piece of ground entirely
by his own labour, and might plant and tend it without
help from anyone, but any member of his vantinbul
could nevertheless help himself to any of its produce
^1, Lafargue,P., The Evolution of Property. London 189^, p. ^9#
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without asking leave or informing the
cultivator#^
The size of the group, and its nature may vary. It may or may not
be a closely related body of blood relationship, but this was
collectivism on a more permanent and settled basis quite unlike
the modern corporation. All members of the tribe exercise identical
rights upon land. It can be assumed and suggested as the first
historical form of land ownership. The soil remained a collective
property of the clan with a temporary right of occupation.^
Agriculture being in the rudimentary stage, modern techniques
for development of production not being known, the re-allotment
kk
of pieces of land to the groups remained a constant practice.
The land tilled once was to lie fallow the following year
because its fertility deteriorated. But the fact to be noted
which is important from our legal point of view is that it gives
the idea that property in the modern technical sense was not
5
yet developed. As Pollock and Maitland state that in co-ownership,
the land is owned by individuals, their possession is certainly
not the same sort of individual ownership as that which is not
in co-ownership.
!»
Fustel takes the view that since villages are small
and it is only in small groups property was held in common, it
^2. Rivers,op. cit., p. 106.
^3. Lafargue, op. cit., p. 55
kk. Ibid. p. 51.
^5. Pollock and Maitland. distory of the English Law,Cambridge
1898, vol. ii, p. 2<+3.
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does not #h6w that all land was common. If only land
in the village was common, land outside the village like forests,
meadows, and pasture land would render all subsequent evolution
47
in the landed property unintelligible. Second, because
population was in general less than at the present day, it was
not uncommon for the village to be small. In some cases the
settlement might consist of one family with all agnates and
48
cognates, including strangers in the family. In such a case
the land owning corporation and the commune coincide and there
was accordingly collectivism within the settlement of the
village, The same is shown by some investigations among such
people as the North-eastern Algonkian Indians and the Veddas of
Ceylon. .raong the veddas each little group has his own ground,
and within it each individual has been given an individual share
as his own which is his for life and descends to his heirs. It
can be alienated with the consent of the whole group. Again,
alienation was based on the ground of similar needs of others and
it was not alienation in the modern sense of lease or mortgage.
Alienation for the fulfilment of needs consists in returning
property to a condition where it again become available for
others. It was put at the disposal of the community whereby it
can be effectively used by others, Thus what we call collective
ownership is still a dominant fact but still with certain
reservations and qualifications private property is recognised.
46. Fustel, The Origin of Property in Land,London 1891, p. 122.
47. If all property is the result of labour, then property in
the forests, meadows, etc. to which individual has not done
any labour will remain outside individual ownership. This
would leave the ownership of these unexplained.
48. Lewie, Primitive Society, London 1953, p. 196.
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In Javanese Dessa private property co-exists along with
collective property, it is represented by family d'wellings with
La
its surrounding orchards. 7 Certainly collectivism need not be
universal. But even where tribal communism did not prevail,
there is at least some form of collective control on individual
property, on its use and alienation. There is at least some form
of collective ownership in the form of a small group such as
the family. Even in the case of collective ownership within such
small groups there remain traces of a collective ownership of
larger groups. As Rivers conclude;
Behind the definite regulations concerning
ownership by these smaller groups there is often the
tradition of ownership by the clan, and it seems
probable that there was at one tine common ownership
by the clan or moiety which has been replaced, at any
rate in practice, by ownership in which the common
rights rest on kinship.50
It is admitted by the individual theorists like Fustel that
individual property in the Roman sense of dominium was not in
existence in primitive times. Bo even if there are some scattered
evidences of individual ownership existing, it does not upset the
widely found evidence of collective holding. At the most it can
be argued that collective prop»rty in land was the rule, but
particular instances of individual ownership did exist. Thus
both collective property and individual property in some form can
51
co-exist. Thus we can argue with Fustel that family ownership
is not agrarian communism, yet it is certainly more like it than
like private property. For example, under the Hindu coparcenary
^9. Letourneau, op. cit., p. 117.
50. Rivers, op. cit., p. 11^.
51. Fustel, The Origin of Property in Land, London 1891, P» 122.
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system the chief or the head is merely the administrator
of the family property, but not the owner of it. lie probably
only acts in this respect as the representative of the members of
the coparcenary.
The theory that private property in land is preceded by
a system of cultivation in common does not confine itself to the
idea that there is no such thing as private property in land
among mankind when in a primitive stage. Some argue that the law
of property does not correspond to any branch of primitive law,
indeed, the whole outlook of one who attempts to set forth the
primitive law of property is necessarily the outlook of mature
52
law. fhere was no concept of property in the primitive stage
when people were living in communes. She idea of communal
ownership is of late growth and is an extension of the idea of
individual ownership. Communal ownership is a quasi-ownership,
and is,therefore,a derivative concept. It cannot have preceded
the concept of individual ownership of which it is a counterfeit.
Co these theorists argue that as regards this common stock no
concept of property either communal or individual, applies in the
53
primitive community. It is obvious that when men were still in
the hunting and pastoral stage, it had not yet occured them to
take for each a share of the land, rfhen a system of cultivation
occurred to them, they still continue to till the soil in common,
but one thing of which these people were very careful was to
protect their common possession of land from intrusion by outsiders,
52. Diamond, op. cit., pp. 188-189.
53. Malinowski,B., Crime and Custom in Savage Society, London
1926, pp. 17-21.
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which gave thera some sense of property. It never occurred
to these men who ploughed, sowed, reaped, and planted to
appropriate to themselves the soil upon which they worked. They
took the soil as belonging to the whole community. So the
5k
theorists who speak of private property in land as preceding
communal property are applying the \ristotalian metaphysics that
55
the general resides in the particular. Under the guise of
metaphysics they ignore social and cultural realities of primitive
people, second, they confuse the modern concept of property with
the primitive concept. Some even go to the length for proving
their individualistic concept that this communal arrangement is
to be interpreted in the same light as a system of controlled and
56
communal living during war. 'They confuse the special conditions
during war with the normal way of life of the primitive people.
The primitive way of communal living is a state of permanent
emergency. It is this state of permanent emergency that may
be considered the possible proof that in actual living conditions
in primitive times communal ownership precedes private property.
Some even go to the extent of proving that private property
precedes communal property by discovering the existence of property
outside hitman species as among the ants, in that an ant hoards
provisions and stores thera in his particular space. But if we
5k, Lowie,R.Il.t Primitive Society, London 1953» P» 222.
55. These theorists argue that private property is the general
notion and communal property is the special type of
ownership. Thus private property precedes communal property.
56. Lowie, op. cit., p. 207.
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accept the explanation, future developments of property
such as capital gain from capital hoards would be unintelligible
since the ant does not make profit out of his or her hoard.
It was the people that at first were the sole owner of the entire
territory either cultivating it in common or making a fresh
division of it every year. It was only later that the right of
property, which was at first attached to the whole community, came
to be associated with the tribe, family, and the individual.
All land in the beginning was common land, say Maurer and Violett
etc. Maine expresses this common sentiment that in primitive
ti
society the life of each citizen is not regarded as limited
by birth and death; it is but a continuation of the existence
of his forefathers, and it will be prolonged in the existence
"57
of his descendants. In such a society the separate existence
of the individual and thus of individual rights is not possible.
The rights of independent existence and of separate property
are a much later development. These developments are the
results, not of family regulations at home, but of the extensions
of the authorities established to settle the frictions within
the group, and thus extension of the civil laws. As Maine
states:
The agents of legal change, iletion, Equity,
and Legislation, are brought in turn to bear on the
primeval institutions, and at every point of the
progress, a greater number of personal rights and
a larger amount of property are removed from the
domestic forum to the cognizance of the public
tribunals.58
57. Maine, Ancient Law, London 1880, p. 258.
58. Ibid. p. 16?.
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Movement towards "Disintegration of Common Property
and the Rise of Private Property:
Despite the fact that the institution of property in
all these primitive forms of life was associated with the
economic needs of individuals through their communal way of living,
tendencies appeared whereby the individual desire for independence
and private control developed# The communal way of living took
different ways to meet the economic needs of individuals - but
one thing that remained common in all these communal ways of
living was the overall supremacy of the clan or group or family
over the means of production in their distribution to their
members and strict supervision through their customs over the
members of the group against introduction of outsiders or
making any alienation in opposition to the group's over all
control of the means of production.
It is this feature of exclusion of outsiders which
t »
justifies us in speaking of systems of communal property . As
we saw earlier the right to possess exclusively of others is
t i » t
the essential feature of ownership or property . In any case
in which the right of exclusion is exercised as against
outsiders to a group, but not by members ag, inst each other, we
may say that here there is communal ownership of communal
property. But there may be many forms of communal property,
because there have been many different forms of communal living#
In some societies widespread sharing of the produce
is the rule. No one owns food absolutely because ether members
of the group have claim in the whole produce of the group, as
100
50
in the case with Lozi institution of Kufunda. Co is the
case with other articles of every day use such as canoes. Thus
in this case it can be concluded that it is not so much a case
of defining exclusive rights of persons over things as a case
of obligations owed between persons in respect of things. Juch a
communal way of living is thus to be found in rights of
consumption irrespective of the formal control over the means of
production. In such an economic system the large accumulation
of goods is neither possible nor desirable. The question that
arises is not wuo owns the means of production but what is done
with the produce. In such a way of life the division of labour
is the main aspect of communal life since each one is sharing
in the produce of others. Such an economic system is termed [asj
corporate or communal where the interest of one member does not
clash with other members.
Another communal way of life is apparent where the
means of production is held by the whole group, clan, or family,
but their cultivation depends on each member of the group, none
normally sharing his produce with others. A case in point is
that of hunting grounds where the whole territory is held by the
group but each is free to hunt without let or hindrance by others.
Another is where the land is given to each member of the group
only for a period of cultivation, after which the land reverts to
59. Gluckman, op. cit., p.
It
Allott,A.N., Family Property in Vest Africa: Its Juristic
Jiasis, Control and enjoyment'', in Family Law in Asia and
Africa, edited by Anderson,J.N.D., London 196^1 P* 127
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the clan for a fresh distribution in the next season. This
is the case in Iboland, where there is a seasonal allocation of
community controlled land to individual members.^0 The right of
all the members of the community to a share of land sufficient
for living is considered an essential attribute of being a
member of the group. The whole land vests in the chief of the
tribe. He grants primary rights to small groups or families
within the group. These holders of secondary rights are free to
use land for their own needs but have no right to alienate to
outsiders. In ;ertain groups succession is allowed within the
family but if the family becomes extinct or leaves the group land
reverts to the group. Again when fertility of land comes to
an end after a certain period, the members of the group were
given another piece of land to cultivate. Such a system of land
tenure gives the family control over the land for a period and
for a specific purpose. An individual member of the group cannot
simply assert this control for himself alone but only on behalf
of the family, .aid the family again except as a secondary
holder cannot speak of unlimited exclusive control in the sense
of Soman dominium. Thus the use of land as a unit of production
in tribal societies, if not communism pure and simple, cannot
» t
either be termed individualism . It is more akin to communism
than to individualism. As Gluckraan states:
Clearly land, as it is ultimately cultivated, is
worked by individuals with secure and protected
rights, but [an] representatives of their family, of
their village.
60. Allott, op. cit., p. 126.
61. Gluckman, op. cit., p. *f1.
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The interests discussed above are termed as
communal where the over all dominion vests in the group, clan,
tribe, or family. The ultimate control and allotment of land
for the purpose of maintaining the members of the group provides
the subsistence basis of the institution of property. Each
member by virtue of being a member of the group has a right to
subsistence and hence to the means of production was the idea
found in the evolution of property.
But what is this tenure of Land? What is this economic
system when an individual cannot do as he pleases to do with his
land? He cannot sell, mortgage, lease etc. without the prior
permission of the group. He cannot even bring an outsider on
the land. This is clearly a communal system with an idea based
on the right of subsistence for each member of the group. Each
family has its lot which is the property not simply of a man but
of the whole family whose different members must one after
another, be born and die there. Allott describing the Akan
property system states:
There is a sense in which it is appropriate to
call the holding by the family members a joint holding,
in that there is a single inseparable title to the
family's property, and there automatically accrues to
the survivors the right of any member who dies. But
as new members of the family are born, so they are
automatically added to the list of those who share in
property, as joint controllers and users in common.
The relation was not between man and soil but between
all the members of the family and the land. This can scarcely
be a regime of private property. When the stress of maintaining
62. Allott, op. cit., p.
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equality is 30 much that each ruler distributes the land again
and again, the liberty of private property in land can scarcely
be 3aid to exist# The members were given the right to enjoy,
subject to general interests and, therefore, to the constant
intervention of the laws of redistribution. Again a Lozi tribe
in Africa insists that if some one leaves the village, he
loses his right in the land. But so long as some one is in a
village his being a member of the village obliges the chief to
give him land for cultivation. This clearly brings out that the
superior right to control the land does not vest in an individual
but in the community, village, tribe, clan, or family. The idea
of private property in the sense of complete control whereby an
individual got the right of use and abuse has not yet developed.
3uch independent owners and ownership were non-existent in the
primitive mode of living. Corporate ownership was the main
type of ownership with different types of distribution and
obligations within that system. Within this corporate system no
one system of distribution can be laid down. Individual
ownership, where an individual is the holder of the exclusive
right of use and abuse, is a later development, and started with
the breaking up of corporate unity. With the development of
technology, the incidents of right over land varied and there
came into existence the idea of holding private property in
land which an individual can cultivate by himself. Rights of
this kind can vary with the methods of exploiting the land.
There was a time in history when the idea that the
63. Herskovits,M.J., Sconomic Anthropology, New York i960,
PP. 9-11.
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institution of property was to serve needs of each individual
was almost accepted. The group or clan was the answer to this
idea in the social context, and its legal manifestation was the
notion of collective ownership# With social changes and
developments of the means of production, when it became possible
that a less amount of labour can produce more and, thus, can
maintain some members of the group without doing any productive
work connected with the necessities of life, the system of
division of labour which was previously purely functional became
64
a permanent hierarchical system. The privilege of the head
of the group turned into his right and he came to associate
himself not only as a symbol of the group but as a proprietor
and ruler of the group. His proprietorship, though subject to
many customary restrictions, paved the way for the establishment
of private property. And as time passed by, he made himself the
sole arbiter in dealing with all social, economic, and legal
matters, Thus there started an era of new property rights and a
new life for the institution of property where the idea of fulfilling
the economic needs of each individual got a back seat and there
came into existence a system of private property where social
and political power came to be associated with economic power.
Again, with this change, there came an idea of dominance of one
group by another as a source of social and economic power.
The land was not originally, in the eaxlieat forms of
social organisation, subject to private property. When outward
64. The Indian caste system is a case in view where the formal
division of labour in primitive times, now became a hereditary
system. It shows how the formal divisions became rigid
realities with the passage of time.
Gluckman,op. cit., pp. 36-40, 59-63.
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conflicts and social dissensions between groups take place,
the victorious chiefs assume control of property and the
vanquished people are deprived of their goods and became slaves
or are slaughtered. Tribes, thus, must form a formidable unity
under the direction of the chief. The tendency that appeared,
which shaped the future course in landed property, was that land
came to be regarded as belonging not to the community but to the
chief. His privilege as nominal head changed to that of
administrative power as the distributor of individual rights to
the use of land. The chief who assumed the control of the
property sowed the seed not for the immediate growth of private
property but for the decline of the communal property, do among
the agricultural people the origin of private property can be
conjectured as an internal outgrowth of common property or family
property. The latter yielded in different ways to qualified
forms of private property, temporary, as a usufruct or life
interest, but subject to control of the group under the chief
as the main distributor of these rights. This precarious
establishment of individual property is theoretically of great
importance. First, it suggests the course of future development;
second, it suggests the idea and may give rise to the desire for
individual property.
With the introduction of agriculture, common landed
property became individual property, but only temporary property,
for the space of a life time, at the most. There was only a
usufruct, the dominium, the eminent domain, continued to belong
to the tribe. This change in the mode of enjoyment was the
necessary consequence of transition from the pastoral to the
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agricultural system. It is a characteristic of private
property that as far as the right of transfer is concerned
ownership is almost absolute. Land is not a mobile value. It
was held within the group and it descends to its members although
there may be certain preferential rights. As Manu says:
the right of pronouncing the prayers belongs to the
son who came into the world first. He ought therefore
to have all.°5
66
Free alienation was, thus, not allowed. It was almost unknown.
The right of pre-emption was recognised, and that pre-supposes
sale. But what is this right of sale which could not be exercised
without the consent of the clan of which one is a member? If the
clan does not give consent, one cannot dispose of the land. But
at least the idea of alienation entered the sphere of collective
property and set the direction for development of a system of
completely private property in the modern sense of the term. Even
hereditary rights are not property rights in the modern sense
since the hereditary course of descent is pre-ordained within
certain lines, and cannot be changed. The owner cannot change
the course of succession, it is automatic. Again what is this
private property in land when a native of New Guinea is free to
plant a tree on another As land without restrictions and is called
the owner of the tree?
In the remote Aryan times the Hindu joint family was
the social unit^ comprising several generations, with common
worship, common dwelling, and a common purse. Fustel is wrong
65. Manu IXl 105-107.
66. Fustel, however, gives religious reasons for non-alienation.
he says that it was due to family hearth that alienation was
not allowed, because religious sentiments would not allow
the disintegration of family property.
Ancient City, p. 83.
67. Kig Veda x,85.
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when he says that this is the result of religious influence
onlyj the family is an economic association necessitated by the
material cultural conditions. The economic solidarity of several
generations created by social conditions, united the family in a
house community. Originally among Hindus the community of property
was complete. As to land, after the passing of the early village
community, there remained a collective family property within the
family. The joint family by constant accretion became so numerous
that the land could not support it, and separation automatically
took place. Again, the liberty of their women folk indicates a
change from joint family to individual establishment and thus of
separate property. Private property started taking a toll on the
63
joint family. Gluckman cites the example of a small Polynesian
island of Tikopia where due to the rise in population beyond the
means of the land there came dismemberment of the group. The old
and the infant died, or in extreme circumstances the chiefs might
compel some commeners to put out into a sea whose nearest
neighbouring island lay seventy miles away.
England, always supposed to have been from the days of
Norman conquest subject to the feudal system, was shown to contain
69
traces of collective ownership and common cultivation. The
Scottish chiefs who in the early days had only the management of
the communal land later on became the owner of the communal land.
In the course of time the power and lands of the chiefs became
68. Gluckraan, op. cit., p. 55»
69. in the Domesday survey there aire evidences of village
communities, though scanty. This led many historians like
Ashley,W.J., to doubt the general theory of village
community in England.
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hereditary. In the Highlands of Scotland, the chiefs of the
clans sometimes distributed foods to the heads of the families,
70
their subordinates.' Of all the European races, the Kelts
i»
preserved for the longest time the clan system. The Irish Sept
of the Brehon Laws live under the same roof and community of
property. The tribe of the Brehon tracts is a corporate, organic,
"71
self-sustaining unit. The tribe sustains itself. A portion of
the tribal domain, probably the arable and choice pasture lands,
has been allotted to separate households of tribesmen. 'They hold
their allotments subject to the controlling right of the entire
brotherhood. The primary and fundamental rule is that they keep
ii
their shares of tribe land intact. Every tribesman is able to
keep his tribal land} he is not to sell it or alienate it or
"72
conceal it, or give it to pay for crimes or contract. Jimilar
instances of joint ownership are found in Slavic and .Russian
communities.
Erom the evidence found by archeologists and from old
legends, it is established that in Egypt before Sesostris the
land was held in common. Besostris was the first who allotted
the land amongst all the Egyptians basing his whole fiscal system
on this distribution of land. The pyramids of Egypt depicting
the king at the apex, warriors, and priests in the middle and,
at the base the servile mass, represents the social structure
where the king is the absolute master of his subject. The division
of Egyptian soil into three portions, one for the priests, the
second for the royalty, and third for warriors, introduces
70. Maine, Ancient Law, pp. 268-269.
71. Maine, Early History of Institutions.London 1880, p. 107.
72. Ibid. p. 108,
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strictly hereditary sub-castes. There could be no real
private property in such a civilisation where property in land
is mummified. In such a mummified organisation of society the
life of a shoe maker is compared to the ' health of a dying fish."
A similar division of land was found in Peru into three carts,
f?
one for the sun - that is, public worship and the priesthood} the
second for the Inca and his huge family} the third for the people.
The land given to the public was tilled in common and produce
divided according to the needs. Again in Mexico similar division
of the soil prevailed - the survival of the ancient communal
system was marked in the management and woship of the folkland.
11
No Aztec owned a foot of land which he could call his own, with
"75
power to sell and convey to whomsoever he pleased.
In Hussia, the village community system known as Mir
was the survival of the communal system. Each of the Slav
villages is a collective unit occupying a fixed territory and they
all come from one clan. In primitive times the land was tilled in
common, the harvest being afterwards shared among the families.
'The survival in Switzerland of something resembling the German
Mark described by Oeasar, and of similar practices in Scandinavia
and in the Orkney Islands give evidence of a general prevalence
of forms of property that must be called family estates rather
than private property. The system of periodic allotments of land
is incompatible with the characteristic of private property. Go
too, the restrictions put on the land allotted to remain within
the community, the reversion of the land to the original domain,
73. Letourneau, op, cit., p. 146.
74. Ibid. p. 136.
75* Morgan,L.H., Ancient Society, London 1877, p. 203.
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incompatible with the nature of private property. There is
no place for absentee ownership. The social solidarity and the
respect for communal living are not the result of mere gregarious
instinct but at the bottom lies the corresponding mode of life
led for a length of time and leaving at the end deep traces on the
mental habits of a race, Fustel remarks that rent paid to the
Mir is a sign of private ownership of the Hir, But his conclusion
is dubious. The use of the word rent interpreted in modern times
gives the impression of private property but lack of terminology
to express the primitive idea led to this conclusion. These
rents are not rents in the modern sense but a type of village
communal ftmd for running social, religious, and other managerial
works of the community in the village. These rents were paid
by all the people in the village in one form or the other. Similar
rents were paid by Swiss Allmenden to defray public expenses.
Similar communal arrangements were found in the Javanese
Dessa and the Abyssinian family estate. The Dessa is based on the
principle of common property in the soil. The collectively owned
soil was parcelled out under the direction of the village council.
The crops are the property of the family collectively. The crops
once harvested in, the land allotted to different families became
common property again. Thus it was only usufruct that was granted
in allotted plots and not ownership. The allotment gradually
became a life interest and thus reached the door steps of private
property. In Abyssinia the urge for family estate is so great
that if there is any catastrophic event which uproots the whole
76. Fustel, The Origin of Property in Land, p. 110.
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organisation, and if the members vanish, their children
patiently await the opportunity to regain possession of the
ancient family estate, When they are fortunate enough to succeed,
the old arrangement is at once re-established.
This survey of various nations leads to the conclusion
that the origin and growth of the institution of property has
carried with it similar ideas and spirit in its development -
sometimes representing through the tribe, clan, group, or family.
Communal property seems to be an almost universal precursor of
private property. The early forms of property arc thus natural in
the sense of being the natural product of the early state of social
life, fha forms natural in the present state of society are those
which are in conformity with the development of human society and
civilisation expressing the social and economic structures of
77
the present day.
77. Some writers like Austin speak of mature systems of law thereby
implying that primitive systems were not mature. The very use
of the word mature to describe a system is misleading. In
the first place it is very difficult to draw a line between
mature and immature systems, because no system is stable, it
is always in process of growth. One cannot say that whatever
Benthara wrote was immature, it would be a paradoxical dismissal
of him, since now there is an improvement over his thought.
Bentham's writings and his thoughts were considered mature in
his period. Thoughts and ideas are always in the process of
development. To judge the past with the present standards is
a fallacy. If we continue this way of thought the present will
blame the past, and future will blame the present. It may be
true that future is the criticism of the past in the same sense
as a good man is the criticism of the bad man. The emphasis of
the future on certain aspects and values is not arbitrary, but
is itself an interpretation, and his answers are to be'discounted,
his questions are nonetheless evidence as to the assumptions of
the period in which they were asked. Bo to say that Bentham*s
ideas are immature is'to say mankind is still to wait for an
ideal utilitarian.
Every system is mature in its own time. If a
particular system is sufficient to fulfil the needs of the
society at a particular period, it is a mature system. The
development of the system does not represent the maturity of
that system but only the capacity to meet the new social needs
which were not there before the development.
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The monarchic tribes in their initial developments
have not yet lost their tribal equality. During the republican
stage social solidarity and common property existed as a condition
of social existence, and secondly, no values were developed which
could be accumulated with a sense of exchange. As soon as the
sense of exchange developed, the old republican solidarity and
equality vanished, there were divisions into rich and poor. Power
came to be closely connected with wealth and servile classes came
into existence.
During the pastoral stage when animals were being
domesticated, their value was regarded as so great that they were
being preferred to human beings. The only exchangeable things
were at first children and women. Slavery was not unknown in
earlier phases of human society. The importance of an enemy was
realised in terms of food value. But with the development of
pastoral stages into agriculture, the economic value of slaves
was recognised. The captives of war were not killed any more,
78
but instead made to work for their captors. The slave trade
became a lucrative business though cannibalism under another
79
guise continued as among the Mexicans. The agricultural
operations became more extensive and fresh capital (slaves)
capable of accumulation and negotiation was the result.
Henceforward richness and poverty came to be associated with the
number of women, children, and slaves. This social hierarchy
became a solid basis, and individual^ started feeling the
78, Thurnwald,8., Economics in Primitive Communities, London
1932, pp. 19^-TW.
79. letourneau, op. cit., p. 128.
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luxury of idleness. Chiefs and nobles came at the apex
of society with idle habits and idle wealth. Landed property
still remained an eminent domain of the community but nobles
began to assert their voice and their presence came to be felt
in the community. The privileges they enjoyed tended to become
their rights. As Lowie states:
By usurpation of prerogatives not originally
vested in him he was able to make special levies and
even to obscure the original form of tenure to the
extent of figuring as an overlord to whom the tenants
were personally subject."®
The lords, thus, made themselves associated only with rites and
rituals rather than with the production of everyday necessities.^
The nobles who were at first the elected members of the community,
turned this system into an hereditary system.
STistel traces the origin and development of property
to religious influences. Not only the institution of property,
he traces the origin of other institutions like village communities
to religious influence. But this contention cannot wholly be
accepted. Religion has played a role but it cannot be accepted
as the sole factor in creating any institution much less the
institution of property. Property arises from an agglomeration
of social and economic causes. Village communities to which an
earlier origin of property in land is traced, are not the result
AO
of religious factors but of economic and social factors as well.J
80. Lowie, Primitive Society, p. 215»
81. Hunt,S.K., Property and Prophets,the Kvolution of Iconomic
Institutions ami' Ideologies, London 1975. P. *<•.
82. If we accept village communities as a result of religious
influence, its further developments when slaves and
strangers were included because of their economic importance
cannot be explained by religion.
11^
Religion in neither wholly responsible for the earliest
nor for the later developments. The religious ideas were, however,
influential in creating monarchic societies along with other
economic and social factors. The same ideas,however, are
responsible for creating an urge and unsatiable desire for private
property. As Manu says:
The world being without a king, was overwhelmed
with fear. The Lord created a king, formed of particles
drawn from the very essence of the eternal particles
of the substance of Indra,"^
He further states:
.Whatever exists in the universe, is all in effect,
though not in form, the wealth of the Brahmen, since
the Brahmen is entitled to it all by his primogeniture
and eminence of birth,
Such religious importance given to the nobles took away the
domain from the community and gave it to the nobles. Likewise
Mohammedan law and its spread by the force of sword altered
views concerning property; the earth is the Lord's and He giveth
85
it as an inheritance to such of his servants as pleaseth Him,
So Mohammed, himself, in his capacity of God's envoy divided
land and gave title deeds to the lands, thus breaking the closely
knit community system of the Arabs based on collectivism,
86
Similarly the establishment of the Hebrew monarchy broke the
power of the family heads and glorified the kings. This loosened
83, Manu vii, 3-5*
Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, Cambridge 1958,
Hunt,E.K., op, cit., pp. 36-37,
8*f. Manu 1.100.
85, Letourneau, op. cit., p. 200.
86. Ibid. pp. 211-212.
Lee,G.C., Historical Jurisprudence, London 1900, p. lO^f.
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the grip of the family bond. Through the rapacity of
kings and the plunder of neighbours, through the practice of
subsequent debts and interests on loans learnt through contact
with Babylonian laws, the institution of private property
was developed. Slaves became numerous and were classified into
87
various categories. This was private property.
The superior role and position of the chiefs and their
close associates made them nobles within their circle. Though
the property still remained a domain of the clan, yet their
greed and neglect of paternal duties established their
individual desire for private property. Thus the satisfaction
of the needs of all through the common stock changed its
function through the greed of a few into the satisfaction of
the desires of a few. As Schlatter expressed it:
Into this ideal arrangement came avarice;
'
craving to sequestrate and appropriate something
to itself, it succeeded only in making everything
somebody else's and reduced itself froip the
immeasurable to the inconsiderable. Avarice
dissolved the partnership and impoverished even
those whom it made richest, for in their desire
for personal possessions they forfeited universal
possession.""
»»
Personal advantages outweighed social obligations. Individual
desire is given freedom under the continuance of the same
87. Ibid. p. 209,
88, Schlatter,R., Private Property,London 1951$ P« 26.
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unifying forces that produced the larger social units of which
"89
these persons became the autocrats. Such ideas imply that
private property is not natural, and is the result of usurpation
of privileges, which the chiefs enjoy because of their superior
capacities and roles within their communities, under the guise
of maintaining law and order.
After the period of communal living in tribes, the
Maxican social structure passed into a society of master and
slaves, and, thus, the idea of rich and poor associated with
1 »
the number of hands one possessed, The head was an elected
member of the clan. The monarchy though elective, became
absolute. The king claimed eminent domain to himself. The
feudal system established itself as a common phase of social
H
structure. The house of Tsin (25*t- B.C.) instituted private
property ••• there were rich men, who began to monopolise land
"90
and farm it out. The old Brehon law destroyed the family
communal living of early Ireland by rendering the chief's
91
share hereditary. Thus it was that, the right of private
property was usurped by the chiefs, which eroded away the
early system of communal living and in the end created a real
proletariat. The fact of their political power became associated
with their economic power instead of their ritual role within
the community. The chiefs attached servile men to themselves,
by loaning them part of their herds, leasing land to them and
89, Underwood,J,H,, The Distribution of Ownership,New York 1907,
P« 32,
90, Letourneau, op, cit., p, 160.
91, It is how privileges turned into rights.
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when with the increasing of population, the land became
valuable due to its scarcity, he also took from them whatever
small tract of land was left with them. Such transformation of
communal property into private domains became a common phase in
social evolution; it may not be a necessary phase. Though all
restrictions introduced in the times of communal living still
existed, yet inroads on the concept of communal living by
allowing alienation, no matter under whatever conditions, paved
92
the way for the growth of private property. In theory
private property was not recognised but in practice private
property flourished.
Originally the head of the group or family did not have
an unfettered power of alienation; for that consent of the
group was necessary. But by a process of gradual change dominium
became more or less private property in our sense, that is, a
right obtainable by other individuals than those entitled to the
headship of a family or group by birth. Under Hindu law sons
were being allowed to keep their property as separate property
which they acquired by chance without the help of family property.
This was a serious blow to the right of property which was earlier
vested in the person of the head. The movement towards individual¬
ism became more decided when the right of property was granted
to women.^ Once these sweeping reforms were introduced the
way was open for a gradual move from collective ownership to
Q if.
individual ownership. Fustel remarks it is the decay of the
common hearth, that is, of the ancient family based religion that
„ n
92. Derrett,J.D.M., Family arrangements in developing countries ,
in Family Law in Asia and Africa, edited by Anderson,J.N.D.,
London 1968, pp. 156-181.
93. Ibid. p. 163.
9^. Fustel, Ancient City, pp. 76-110.
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aided in the establishment of private property,
With the disintegration of the household and the
increase in private property, the class hierarchy came into
existence. As Underwood states:
With liberty to own land privately, liberty to
own men privately also increased. Everywhere men were
changed from individuals in the household of the
patriarch to items in his inventory of live stock. As
the personality of the few was elevated, the personality
of the many was depressed,95
A class society arose consisting of rich merchants and substantial
land owners. With these developments the passion for usury became
a general rule. The sanctity of ownership was defiled by money
and trade, and, as Aristotle writes, by the unnatural gain
from money rather than service. Whatever be the distinctions that
came into existence between different types of properties, there
was definitely a movement towards emancipation and practical
abolition of the communal system. Private property was firmly
established and recognised and freed itself from the clutches of
primitive property. But in the primitive systems of property,
since the property system was corporate and since this provided
security to the individual, subsistence was the basis of the
institution of property carried out through the corporate unit.
In modern times the need for such a system is felt, but it is the
drawback of the present existing institution of property that it
has failed to meet the subsistence needs of the majority of
people, which have instead of long ages come to be fulfilled
I !
,
through the establishment of welfare states ( through such
institutions as social security, old age pensions, etc.) These
95, Underwood, op, cit,, p, 36.
96, Ari3totle, Politics, book 1,10,
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measures though partially adequate but have atomized society#
The origin of property is always a debatable question
due to the difficulties of obtaining reliable information. It
will remain warmly discussed and obscure, open for further
research, (hie can only support, criticise, and analyse the
material forms of property, but its legal form is far from clear
and is only a later development. A man's ownership was not often
symbolised, as at present, in other than material possessions in
most cases. The show of some kind of visible symbol was necessary.
97
Maine ,however, traces the idea of corporate unity to the
village community. When the village community, clan or family
provided the only economic and social security, there is little
or no private property of any sort, the ownership of corporate
privilege can, however, be appreciated and recognised as
ownership of family assets and land. When this corporate unit
narrowed down, the idea of corporate privilege still alive, took
a different turn. The individual as a unit came to acquire the
idea of his personal ownership of property. The only feature
that made this earlier idea distinct from the later idea of
ownership, is the collective ownership of the group, and, second,
the visible separation of the earlier idea of material possession.
With the development of the idea of ownership, the idea of
joint obligation was replaced by the idea of individual obligation
seen as a means to greater social efficiency. Man is a social
creature, but the institutions through which his sociability
could express itself have been weakened or even destroyed.
Thus the two institutions viz, communal autonomy and communal
97. Maine, Ancient Law, p. 183.
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property on which the primitive concept of property was
based, reflecting the idea that the institution of property is
to fulfil needs of each individual, had given way to individual
property.
With the changing economic and social conditions, the
notion of property had changed. The only thing that remained
constant is the concept itself. It looks, therefore, as though
the institution of property, in some form or another, was so far
essential to all kinds of human society. It may be regarded as
a part of the make up of the universal human social order. The
forms of property in which it expresses itself vary considerably
with time and place, as it is stated;
The institution of property and the accompanying
philosophical and protojuridical .justifications have
changed and will go on changing to meet the demand of
an ever changing society and its culture. Static
models of culture are useful but unrealistic analytical
tools. Concepts of property are subject to the
endless erosion of time.9°
Institutions are always of variable growth, the static element
is the notion of the institution itself, their diverse forms,
conditions, and modifications are always susceptible to
unforeseen changes.
Many jurists like Locke believe that property had its
origin in occupation. In the beginning all things in the world
were res nullius, that is, without an owner. The first occupier
got the best title and is thus an owner. So plausible indeed
is the idea that one is entitled to take possession of what one
discovers, that it has been suggested that the practice is in
98. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol. 12, p. 592.
Hearn, W.E., The ryan Household, London 1879, p. '+11.
Maine, Ancient Law, p. 264.
Laveleye, Primitive Property, London 1878, p. 338.
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accord with a fundamental human instinct. This view is
supported by the fact that occupation is one of the methods by
which primitive people acquired property. But if things were
res nullius, why was the first man who acquired property
disturbed? Why did the weak come to seek protection of the
strong? It was because such occupations were not recognised to
constitute property. If this were so, nothing was res nullius.
The restrictions we find in primitive societies on sale of
property, whether moveable or immoveable, point to the conclusion
that mere occupation of res nullius was not recognised and,
therefore, nothing was res nullius. The theory of occupation
put forward by Roman jurists on the basis of natural law
contradicts their own practice. Romans did not allow the occupation
of enemy land by individuals. Enemy land becomes the property of
the state rather than of an individual or even of an individual
army. Again the reforms of Servius, Constantine, and laws of
Lucian for redistribution of property in order to avoid popular
upheavals was much against the spirit of the theory of occupation.
Even in case of moveables, it was the law that made them res
nullius, they were not considered res nullius in themselves.
99. Locke regards labour the basis of property. 'The occupation
of anything with which man mixes his labour becomes his.
Locke's theory, thus, is the same as occupation. Not all
land has passed through the stage of individual ownership.
Forests and meadows are the instances to which man has not
mixed his labour. On Locke's theory of labour their
ownership cannot be explained.
100. Maine, Ancient Lav/, p. 268.
Laveleye, Primitive Property, p. 5^.
Kant, Philosophy of Law, translated by hastie,W.,Edinburgh
1887, ch. 1.
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The victors captured moveables and kept them as their prize
according to the established practices and rules. Referring to
the idea of res nullius Hunter states:
The suggestion that ownership arose when men
began to respect the rights of the first occupier of
what had previously been appropriated by no one is
curiously the reverse of the truth.
It was the social order that gave recognition to any occupation
to constitute property. Before this occupation and without this
recognition there was no property. For the establishment of an
institution its recognition, the existence of some sort of social
order from which normative values and standards follow, is a
necessary condition. Even if we suppose that the whole world
was res nullius, it can only be if some social order so recognises.
A first finder is an owner only if it is so determined by the
social order. Even in the case of wild game an individual
becomes owner only if the social order so determines it. No
man's land recognised in modern times between two countries
does become so only when a state or two states make an agreement
to it. If therefore one of the states occupies that no-man's
land, she does not become an owner thereof. So there is no
res nullius in nature. Things are made res nullius by law.
All the natural goods available to a society are perceived from
the very beginning as belonging to the whole society, no matter
v/hatever be the form of society, and whatever be the nature of
property. Bentham rightly argued that property and law are born




together and die together.
It has been found from the foregoing analysis
that property could be held in different ways. But one constant
theme that is generally found in all this confused mass of
differing details is the desire to secure to everyone
subsistence; this, I submit, is the primitive basis of property,
and that of those limitations on the acquisition of property
which are aimed at maintaining social stability, This role of
property struggling to stabilise the social order is visible
throughout the history of the origin of property. Despite all
the fluidity and variations in the nature of property, despite
variations in the intensity and extensivity of the right of
property, and despite variations in techniques used to maintain
property, that it should function as a stabilising force in society
was the paramount goal of different thinkers through different
philosophies everywhere. In different societies conceptions of
property have varied according to the political and economic
structure of the society. One cannot expect the same conception
of property to be held in different societies. But what is clear
is that in all types of societies the superior power of the
community always stands over the rights of individuals. In all
systems and in all forms of social orders, society in any form
102. Benthara,J., The Theory of Legislation,London 1871, p. 113.
There is a general disagreement as to what Bentham meant
by law. To Bentham law was practically what we call social
order. For he says:
If we suppose the least agreement among
savages to respect the acquisitions of each other,
we see the introduction of a principle to which no
name can be given but that of law.
Thus Bentham's legal theory of property interpreted as
representing law as social order supports the view that
rights are recognised as a condition of social order.
Without this social order there is no property.
12^
whether as a group, clan, etc. has always stood between man and
complete control over his possessions. Varying degrees of
totality of possession are reflected in the evolution of property.
The aspect that is clear in the evolution of property is that the
institution of property grew up to answer economic needs of
individuals, though in the later developments economic needs are
answered by the institution of property in multiple ways, setting
aside its basic function of directly satisfying immediate needs
of each individual. Fichte keeping in mind the purpose of the
institution of property is to guarantee the use of things so that
a man may be able to live. To secure this end of the institution
of property, he states:
from the moment that any one suffers distress,
that part of the property of each citizen, which is
necessary to remove that distress, no longer belongs
to them, but in law and justice belongs to the
suffering individual ... and this contribution to the
distressed is as much condition of all civil rights
as the contribution for common protection.1^
The stability of social order does not lie in the security of
maintaining free market forces, but as Fichte insists in maintaining
the institution of property on basis that it serves needs of
each individual, so that there is no poor man.
We have spoken of property satisfying the subsistence
needs of individuals; such needs include the physical and econtoaic,
> t
but go beyond those levels. It is not only in modern admass
societies that people car obtain a sense of their identity in
physical belongings, as a sort of external expression of the
self. To achieve such a sense of identity and of one's self is,
103. Fichte,J.G., The Science of Rights, translated by Kroeger,A.E.,
Philadelphia 1969, p.293„
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in ray submission, not the least important of the needs which
a property system has to meet. In this sense, property has an
t i
essential subjective element. There is ample evidence of this
104
even in the most primitive systems.
In relation to moveable things, in which individual
ownership develops earlier, we saw, for example, the owner's
weapons and other personal effects are buried in his grave. They
are buried because it is believed that they form a part of his
personality. This habit of looking at his personal effects reflects
the idea that ownership goes beyond the economic and physical
needs of the individual. Thus it is not that external things
just exist as external objects of sensation but they are valued
because they can be a means of externalising and concretising the
self. External objects are part of the surroundings of the
self without which the existence of the self, as of society, becomes
difficult. When we are dealing with these facts by institutionali¬
sing them, our institutions can work properly only if we find our
intrinsic values for self satisfaction expressed through them.
We do not base our institutions upon deductions which have no
connection with our conduct but on principles upon which depend
the regulation and stability of our selves.
Even in the case of the communal property systems which
in various forms characterise primitive forms of property in
105
immoveables, a similar subjective element is observed. Gluckman
states that a bushman who has cleared a garden finds himself not
only in possession of it but believes that there is some close
10^. Thurnwald,!?., op. cit., p. 186.
105. Gluckman, op. cit., p. 53.
126
connection of an almost magical nature betv/een him and the
patch of land. Such a close connection is more evident in the
'I 06
case of incorporeal things such as songs. The sense of family-
identity located in family property has been stressed before in
107
case of family property in Abyssinia. Even in contemporary
Scotland the continued ( and wholly anachronistic) association of
• 1
clans with their ancestral lands ( evidenced by the widespread
sale of clan maps) represents an interesting survival of this view.
To ignore the subjective element of the institution of
property and to accept an unanalysed view of ownership solely
in terms of marketable values is to miss a vital part of the
institution of property. All those values which are for the
satisfaction of the self as an individual or as a member of the
community and which can find expression in the external v/orld
are part of the institution of property. Even in a commercial
economy, when a man is selling his business it is not only for
physical assets but also for the subjective value - the good¬
will - that he gets paid. This subjective element is an important
element in all types of ownership. Its significance will be
further considered in the next chapter.
r
106. Lowie,R.H», Incorporeal property in Primitive Jociety ,
37 Y.L.J., p. 551.
107• Letourneau, op. cit., p. 156.
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CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF
PROPERTY AND RELATED PROBLEMS
The institution of property has both psychological and physical
connotations. An individual's control over things both expresses his
subjective self and is objectively a means of satisfying his needs. For
example, in the earlier stages of the evolution of the institution of
property the belongings of an individual are buried or burnt along with
his dead body, aince his things express and reflect his personality.
Ownership reflects personality, the subjective element, which is more
intimate than the mere control over external objects. With social
changes such practices as the burning or burying of a dead man's belong¬
ings are still observed as symbolic gestures, but because of the economic
value of the objects the things are not actually destroyed. With the
development of social restraints on economic resources, such elements
of the institution of property, still exist in abstract values though con¬
crete examples of actual destruction of a dead man's things are rare.
In the course of development of the institution of property from
corporeal to incorporeal property, the subjective element of the institu¬
tion of property is to a greater extent ignored. The external physical
objects out of which the institution of property emerged to fulfil needs
of individuals (both subjective and objective) start engulfing the acts and
activities of individuals by giving these acts and activities solely
economic contents like external physical objects though
separate and independent of them. The external physical
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objects which are given economic contents (monetary values) became
so dominant as to leave little room for human aspirations expressed
■j.
through the institution of property. Such developments set aside the
subjective element found in the institution of property and leave social
problems unsolved where human beings attach immense value to things
irrespective of their economic contents, or where certain things are so
valuable to human existence that they are as important for human exist¬
ence as any economic object. Thus in seeking solutions to the problems
arising out of present day complexities of social life through the institu¬
tion of property difficulties arise if we are considering rights to which
monetary value cannot be ascribed. The significance of private property
is most commonly seen in terms of an impersonal inventory of purely
economic value (monetary value), not in terms of an expression of
personality.
Modern legal practice largely ignores the subjective element
of the institution of property and rights of property are envisaged in
monetary terms. This serves important purposes in industrial and
commercial civilisation,but the satisfaction of the spiritual self through
the institution of property is left behind. Modern thought has drifted
away from the subjective nature of the institution of property. Property
rights have been interpreted solely in monetary terms. New notions
of purely personal characteristics, such as ideas, are emerging but can
only with difficulty, if at all, be recognised as property interests due to
the application of orthodox and traditional criteria. It is not to be
understood that pecuniary considerations are not required or are not
essential. The strong personal elements in the institution of property
1
find their expression in the external circumstances through economic
values. But in the case where things do not admit of economic value,
as one's skill at playing hockey, * the monetary criterion as an insignia
of ownership fails to recognise it as a property right. Things are
property before they acquire any economic value and not vice versa.
Thus there is a need and a plausible case for revision of the traditional
and orthodox criterion of monetary value as an insignia of the objects of
2
property.
The institution of property grew up to answer needs of individuals.
In the course of development, financial arrangements became substituted
to meet needs of individuals. But it is wrong to regard financial
arrangements as an insignia in deciding which rights are property rights.
These financial arrangements, however, over-shadowed the subjective
element of the institution of property, and the monetary aspect, in
modern times, became the dominant aspect of the rights of property.
This is how the subjective element in the development of the institution
of property has been lost.
Institutions arise and develop not on the basis of rational planning
but in response to social needs and changes. The laying down of rules
will not establish the desired results since they are always modified by
circumstances. The true order of their evolution is that under certain
1. Rowe v. Hewitt, (1906), 12 0.L.R. 13
Quoted in Robinette, J.J., "Protection of Property Interests in
Equity", Can.B.R., 1932, p. 174.
2. Note thaton p. 40, the notion of 'value' was seen to be essential
to the definition at least of 'incorporeal things', but 'value'
was taken there as expressing more than merely monetary
value.
circumstances and accidentally favourable conditions, a certain type of
practice is introduced which is an exception to the current usage. Its
influence spreads gradually by a mere chance of its being comfortable
and acceptable. A rapidly operating association of ideas makes the
practice at once familiar and chevished, and this leads to the establish¬
ment and recognition of institutions. Amos, while writing about the
growth of institutions, states:
After a time, and at repeated irtervals, a disruption
of the practice is attempted from one quarter or another,
and with more or fewer circumstances of violence. The
thought and feeling of the community are roused to conscious
activity. The fact of the prevalence of the practice, the
true nature of it, and the extent of it are submitted to
examination. For the first time, also, the ethical or
material value of the practice, and the true modes of testing
that value, are also called in question. All these critical
processes are, indeed, very gradual ones; and while they
are, at first, accompanied by the most hesitating and almost
awestruck reluctance, they continue to be executed with
increasing vigor and self-confidence throughout the whole life
of the nation, till the nature, limits, and value of the moral
idea or institutign are finally limned out in the clearest
possible shape.
In this way institutions evolve and their process of growth, rather than
creation, out of the social philosophies and needs of the time produces a
body of principles to regulate their further evolution. They, thus,
assume much of the character of true laws. History does not wait for
human planning but adopts its own course through the social strata. This
is what one finds in the development of the institution of property. It
developed not as a system legal or customary but out of a hotch potch
of social needs, expressing physical, intellectual, and ethical needs of
society, the absence of which would be incompatible with the development
3. Amos, S., The Science of Law, London 1874, p. 153.
of the institution of property. No sounder evidence can be given of this
evolutionary process of the institution of property than by Professor
4
Hamilton. These are the illuminating examples of the spontaneous
and natural evolution of legal rules out of life itself without any outside
intervention. Such developments are the natural and necessary require¬
ments of life itself.
If one takes an objective view of the facts, it appears that the
growth of institutions and their changing and differentiating forms are
the outcome of needs and conditions of the time in their entirety.
Theorisation into doctrines is a result of later rationalisations. State
control steps in to guide and support by its power. As Noyes states:
Organisation is always a result of the necessity for it,
and its forms develop out of past habit, modified by the
reaction of different types of human nature and capacities
among therqaelves and to circumstances, and by changing
conditions.
But one who studies the growth and development of the institutions often
ignores the rudimentary conditions of their rise and development and
lays stress on the various sets of rules and on the firmness of their
protection. This amounts to misrepresentation in the formulation of
basic theories of institutions. Holmes explains and analyses how the
new rules come into existence completely ignoring their source and
cause of origin. He states:
4. Hamilton, W., "Property Rights in the Market", J.L.Pol.S.,
1943, p. 10.
Pollock, F., A First Book of Jurisprudence, London 1929, p. 134.
5. Noyes, C.R ., The Institution of Property, London 1936, p. 416.
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A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar
to the study of history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or
needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula.
In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity
disppears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave
rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds
set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for.
Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to
explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of
things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons
which have been found for it, and enters on a new career.
The old form receives a new content, and in time even the Q
form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.
Such ignorance of the cause, source and necessity of rules causes
misrepresentation in the explanation of supposedly new rules. To
ignore the old forms and think of them as a deliberate creation is, thus,
to misread the facts. One should know the genealogy of the rules to
have a proper understanding ox them. The ignorance of social origins
in the case of institution of property is the cause of much confusion in
the present notion of property, though at present general opinion regards
the institution of property as having reached its zenith.
The grouping of persons established on patches of land was the
first indication of their sense of security which was the precursor of
the institution of property. Property grew out oi this human desire
for security which persists even today. This is the first metazoic
social fact. The institution created for social security 'fundamentally
political, domestic, and economic' resulted as a 'system of control'
over objects and men. So in the beginning social control, though it
may vary much in its force and firmness in different times and different
conditions, includes both human beings and external objects. We find
6. Holmes, O.W., The Common Law, Boston 1945, p. 5.
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many examples to substantiate social control over men and objects alike
from sociological and anthropological studies, and an outstanding
example is slavery. But in the course of history social control over
men and objects became separated under different names: domestic,
political, and economic control. It is the latter with which I am concerned
in this chapter.
Any discussion of or reference to the institution of property
immediately takes one's mind to the remarks of Blackstone:
In the beginning of the world, we are informed by holy
write, the all-bountiful Creator gave to man 'dominion over
all the earth; and over the fish of the sea, and over the
fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth on
the earth'. This is the only true and solid foundation of
man's dominion over external things, whatever airy meta¬
physical notions n ay have^been or started by fanciful
writers upon this subject.
W ithout giving particular credit to Biackstone's theological premises,
we may follow him in the assertion that the institution of property in
all its perfection is from the beginning a control of things. It is a
system of control over external objects. Even at present to a layman
his belongings are his property, the belongings of which he has a visual
and effective control. And whatever be the nature of control and
things, in modern times, it is only a revised and modified version of
the original pattern. With certain reservations, in modern juristic
g
writings, it is acknowledged that exclusive control over external
7. Blackstone, Commentaries, London 1830, pp. 2-3.
8. Salmond states:
In the narrowest use of the term, it includes nothing
more than corporeal property - that is to say, the right
of ownership in a material object, or that object itself.
Jurisprudence, London 1947, p. 424. (See over)
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physical objects constitutes ownership. After excluding human beings
(slaves) from direct control, control confined to external objects became
property. In modern times both the concept of control and objects of
9
property have undergone tremendous changes. These changes go along
the social and economic changes. Legal recognition of incorporeal
things like promissory notes is one among the new developments in the
institution of property which stemmed from rapidly growing industrial
and commercial developments. One can only guess as to new develop¬
ments or as to any end of these property productions. Intellectual
production changes the character of material production. New kinds
of non-material property are continually developing and are constantly
being extended to cover more and more grounds. Only a century ago
all these non-material rights were, generally speaking, oi insignificant
8. (Continued from previous page) Keesling states:
The simple idea of property and ownership which
originated in physical possession of object and things
have been greatly extended and have become exceedingly
conceptualistic and complex. Not a1! the developments
are consistent either with the original ideas or with
one another. Nevertheless, there is no necessity of
discarding the time-honored and widespread usage of the
term "property" which identifies it with objects and
things which can be used and possessed more or less
exclusively. AHhough it is someti mes convenient to
refer to rights, powers and interests as property, and
although this usage facilitates the obtaining of answers
which it is believed are correct, there are compelling
reasons which can be urged in support of the first
usage and against the second ... It is claimed by
Hohfeld that the first usage is loose and ambiguous
and that the second usage is more discriminating and
accurate. Actually, the reverse is true.
"Conflicting Conceptions of ownership in Taxation", Cal.L.R.
1956, pp. 874-877.
9. PhilbricK, F.S., "Changing Conceptions of Property in Law",
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1938, pp. 691-694.
practical importance, but in modern times no exhaustive enumeration
10
of these rights can be given. The present conception of property is
far removed from its prototype as is the constitution of the modern
family from its prototype.
In the early groupings control includes both human beings and
external physical objects; its subsequent separation into control over
human beings and control over externa'' physical objects narrowed down
the field of control so as to constitute control over things as property.
Thus the single form of organisation and homogeneous control became
diversified. This long history of the institution of property from its
simplest mode in primitive times, though vague, has become in modern
times a highly complex structure though in many ways extremely precise
and easy to understand. But the modern institution of property has
become a make-shift arrangement for practical purposes and lost its
grandeur to fulfill the needs of the individual both economic and non-
economic, material and spiritual. As Amos states:
It is not material wants, hopes, desires, and
tendencies alone to which ownership lends its aid as a
potent instrument of satisfaction and even development.
The moral aspirations and needs of individual man are
scarcely less signally sustained and gratified by owner¬
ship than the material. And this gives rise to yet a third aspect
in which the fact ownership and laws admit of
being presented.
This error of ignoring the subjective side of the institution of property
is due to the fact that the research into the true nature and extent of the
10. Kruse, V., The Right of Property, translated by Federspiel, P.T.,
Vol. I, London 1939, p. 75.
11. Amos, The Science of Law, p. 155.
Kruse, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 75.
right of property has been neglected. The increasing number of juristic
12
writings and lawsuits concerning these questions are steadily growing.
1 6
The rise, development, and recognition of the monetary criterion
as a basis of ownership through courts and juristic writings
The law, of course, cannot prevail if it stands alone. It is
obeyed if it goes along with the practice of society. It is avoided when
the conditions of life impel the actions of men in the opposite direction.
During the long course of the development of the institution of property,
the practice of society turned against treating men and external objects
alike as objects of proprietary control. Successive changes and develop¬
ments in social needs and practices impelled the separation of control
over men and over external objects. With this break-through the control
over external objects established itself as an independent institution of
property separate from other forms of control such as domestic control.
The accumulation of external objects for immediate and later use as the
product and reward of individual's labour is the result of this break¬
through which sets up the institution of property as an independent
institution. It is control over external physical objects in this sense
that constitutes property. This sense of contro1 of something controlled,
something taken or held for one's own use, is the chief incident of
ownership. Originally appUed to physical objects, the term was
broadened and enlarged to include the idea of property in incorporeal
objects. Ownership thus came to consist in control over both corporeal
12. Dennis Lloyd, "The Recognition of New Rights", C.L.P., 1961,
p. 39.
Turner, A. E., The Law of Trade Secrets, London 1962, pp. 382-386.
and incorporeal objects. Incorporeal objects are relational processes
which exist as objects of property as though they were entirely separate
and independent of corporeal objects. They are adjuncts to property
in corporeal objects, for in aF cases they involve property in corporeal
objects in their exercise. The only identification mark common to both
corporeal and incorporeal objects of property is their economic value;
even material objects have come to be treated as property principally
13
on the ground that (and to the extent that) they have economic value.
Incorporeal rights have only an approximation to ownership, for there
is not any general power of use and enjoyment, only the receipt of
profits as in some cases increased by the particular advantage of
exclusion of competition. A patentee has not any right to do what he
could not have done without a patent, but the right to prevent other
people from competing with him in the manufacture and sale of his
invention. Whether the law shall confer such monopolies on authors
and inventors, to what extent in point of duration and otherwise, and
subject to what conditions, is a question of expediency on which little,
13. Law son says:
For over against physical objects such as cattle,
motor-cars, ships, houses, and plots of land the law
sets abstract things which cannot be perceived by the
senses but only received by the mind. Some of those
which are mo3t readily apprehended are debts, shares
in companies, and industrial property such as patents
or copyright. All that can profitably be said of such
abstract things for the time being is that, like physical
objects, they are objects of value, for which men will
give money .. . The best way to see what property
means for practical purposes is to ask what a man of
substance might leave at his death for his executors to
pay death-duties on.
Introduction to the Law of Property, Oxford 1958, pp. 5-15.
if any, Tight seems to be thrown by the institution of ownership in
corporeal things notwithstanding that the analogy has been dwelt upon
14
as a valid one. Property, -thus, has become intangible and incorporeal
.
both in the 'sense of control', and the >ob iect to be controlled'.
In the English and related legal systems the fact whose influence
upon the conception of property has been enormous in its generous
recognition of incorporeal thingsas objects of property i3 equity.
In modern times the total value under our law of proprietary rights in
incorporeal things is enormously greater than the value of corporeal
things. The modern incorporeal property includes copyright,
promissory notes, bills of exchange, shares in companies, etc. The
development of incorporeal things as objects of property owes much
to equity.
In the earliest emergence and development of equity as a full-
fledged system of jurisprudence, the institution of property occupied
14. Pollock, F., A First Book of Jurisprudence, p. 203.
15. Lowie, R.H., however, states that even the primitive people
have such recognition of incorporeal things as songs, ninths,
dances, the right to use certain incantations or make use of
certain sacred vessels and other rights of similar character,
as objects of property.
"Incorporeal Property in Primitive Society ', 37 Y.L.J, p. 551.
16. Another factor in the development of incorporeal things as
objects of property is found in the medieval laws covering
all. instances of apportioned use of property. This apportioned
use as property is the direct result of social and economic
conditions of those times. Agricultural economy of those
days and the political set up, land the chief wealth of society
was apportioned on the basis of use and enjoyment. This use
and enjoyment became proprietary rights and, thus, created a
chain of incorporeal objects as objects of property.
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one of the most'important places in the social life of the community,
17
being much more important than the personal or political rights.
Consequently, equity, in suppling the deficiencies or lack of remedies
in the common law courts, found itself engaged with matters of owner¬
ship. This might be one of the reasons why courts of equity normally
18
interfere only where there is proprietary interest. Equity relief by
way of injunction has commonly been refused in other cases on the
ground that equity only interferes for the protection of property
19
interests. The equity judges reacted against this self-imposed
limitation by evolving a pecuniary criterion, the economic value of an
interest, to extend equitable relMto such interests as seemed to them
worthy of protection. As Scott suggests:
In the back of the minds of the equity judges considera¬
tions of economic expediency have had force. If the
doctrines based on conscience had not been commercially
expedient, they could not well have survived.
In this way there developed a category of rights enforceable in equity
which because of their pecuniary value were assimilated to property
rights in common law. For example, it came to be considered a
17. William Q. DE Funiak, "Equitable Protection of Personal or
Individual Rights", Kentucky Law Journal 1947, p. 7.
18. Later developments of courts of equity clearly show that
equitable relief was being granted in cases other than property
interests.
William Q.DE Funiak, op.cit. p. 11.
Pound, "Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to
Personality", Harv. L.R., 1916, p. 840.
19. Robinette, J.J., "Protection of Property Interest in Equity ,
Can.B.R., 1932, p. 172.
Bispham, G.T., Principles of Equity, New York 1922, p. 465.
Cross and Hall, The English Legal System, London 1964, pp. 133-134.
20. Scott, A.W ., "The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust",
Col.L.R., 1917, p. 280.
violation of the right of property if one party to a transaction uses his
right to the disadvantage of the other party. Limitations on the behaviour
of others to protect a man's property right became property. This led
to the development of the conception of property in cases where physical
objects were not directly involved as the immediate object of property
but equity developed its own concept of ownership to cover interests
other than those previously considered proprietary.
A fundamental principle in equity is that whenever one person
(A) has conducted himself so as to arouse certain reasonable expecta¬
tions in another person (B), then if B alters his position in reliance on
such reasonable expectation in a way which will be detrimental to his
interest if the expectation is not fulfilled, A may be required at B's
insistence to do whatever is required to fulfil that expectation. But the
interest of B which is to be protected is regarded by equity courts as
worthy of protection only if it is economic interest. The rigiis which
emerge from such protection are characterised by some expectation of
pecuniary loss or profit. What is relevant is not the existence of some
corporeal object but some conception of the mind to which is attached
pecuniary value. Thus the process of this development marks the
translation of the concept of property from that of exclusionary right
over physical things to that of the protection of rights which have
economic value. Personal duties or obligations involving these expecta-
21
tions were termed property. The conception of property developed
by equity courts was fully incorporeal. As Commons states:
21. Scott, A.W., Law of Trust, vol. ii, Boston 1956, p. 10.
Property has become intangible and incorporeal;
liberty has become intangible property; duties are
incorporeal property; each is the expected beneficial
behavior of others in dealing with self, and the present ^
value to self of that expected behavior is capital or asset.
In cases where courts see no right which is violated, they refuse
to grant relief. This is a general principle since by granting relief
courts will create new rights for the future. But equity courts did not
set much store by this principle and tried to advance remedies in
personal matters on the basis of expectations. They took moral or
ethical rights, arising from activities, involving expectations of profit
or loss, and transformed them into legal obligations of ownership.
Trust is one of the examples through which we can trace and formulate
a general theory of ownership applied by equity judges to substitute
proprietary interests for personal obligations. How did this new
concept of property become workable in the practical aspect of life?
This development through the equity judges provided a new basis for
the development of the Anglo American lawyers' conception of property.
In the beginning trust was considered a personal relation between
the trustee and the beneficiary, the beneficiary's interest was no more
than a claim against the trustee. The reason being that the origin of
uses is based on the avoidance of feudal burdens which were personal
obligations by the tenant to his landlord. This personal character of
the relationship of lord to tenant was transplanted into the relation
between trustee and beneficiary (though the feudal obligations were not
wholly found in the case of trust, only the personal character was there).
22. Commons, J.R., Legal Foundations of Capitalism, London 1968, p.
The equity judges transformed this personal relation by imposing duties
on the holder of the legal title. This created a proprietary interest
of the beneficiary in the trust property. By creating an encumbrance
the trustee's personal duty became corresponding to his right to use
property only for the benefit of the beneficiary. The interest of the
23
beneficiary thus became a property interest.
Because of the confidence placed in the trustee by the feoffer,
the trustee is bound as a matter of conscience to perform the duties
which he has undertaken. The equity judges are compelling the trustee
under the pain of conscience to do what is entrusted on him rather than
deciding what sort of an interest the beneficiary might have. The
reasons for doing so were the exigencies of the situation which required
them to proceed on the theory that they were simply compelling a person
to do what conscience demanded. In this way equity was giving the
beneficiary all that was his interest under the guise of a burden of
conscience. Personal relations were transformed into property
relations and thus there evolved a new system of property. The primitive
notion of property as an exclusive holding of things for one's use was
being replaced by the control of behaviour of other persons where it led
to economic advantages or pecuniary considerations. Personal relations
with pecuniary considerations gained the status of property relations.
23. Scott states that in the beginning the relief to the beneficiary
in the case of sale of his interest by the trustee is based on the
ground of interference with the personal relation between the
trustee and the beneficiary rather than on the recognition of the
proprietary interest of the beneficiary.
The Law of Trust, vol. ii, p. 962.
Maitland, Selected Essays, London 1936, p. 166.
For example, the fiduciary relations between persons leading to economic
advantages became property relations, their protection, their imple¬
mentation, etc. became proprietary rights as in the case of trust. In
the context of a money economy the personal relations of master and
servant were replaced by property relations because services could be
converted into money price. Thus it is the control over the behaviour
of others due to its pecuniary value that made it a property relation.
The value does not reside in things but in the expected transactions
relating to things. This whole range of what Commons calls 'behaviour-
istic values' distinguished from physical things were converted into
24
property.
An essential step in the development was the process whereby
the interest of the beneficiary came to extend against others generally.
His interest came to be protected not only against the trustee but against
others who were restrained from interfering with his interest even when
his interest was in the hands of the trustee. Any interference by a
person who has notice of the trust is remediable at the instance of the
beneficiary against any such third party as well as the trustee. An
interference by a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of his
interest in the trust property cuts off his interest in trust property; but
that merely means the extinction of his real right in trust property and
not that he did not originally have an interest against others in general.
The incidents of legal ownership have been fully recognised in the case
of the beneficiary's interest. The rights exist prior to their breach
24. Commons, op.cit., p. 235.
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and we cannot argue that they exist only when their breach occurs. So
it is said that the beneficiary had right against the transferee who took
with notice or without notice but had no right against a bona fide
purchaser; he still had a right in rem in the sense of right available
against others generally. If a person does not have a right in rem
unless he can enforce it against aP persons and under alt circumstances,
then even the legal owner of property may not have rights in rem as in
certain cases his right is not availab'e at certain times against certain
persons. Aa Honore explains:
A right may be such that it is immune from divesting
in general, but is liable to be divested by some special
form of alienation. An equitable "interest" in the capital
of a trust is liable to be divested upon alienation of the
trust assets to a bona fide purchaser for value...
The owner's rights are, in general, immune from
divesting without his consent. Certainly most systems of
law acknowledge some exceptions to this principle. Some¬
times sale in market overt, or sale by a factor or sale by
a bailee divests ownership. Immunity remains the general
rule, but it is substantially an immunity against divesting
by purported alienation of the property, while the immunity
of holders of lesser intejjgsts ia an immunity against divest¬
ing by actual alienation.
There are thus degrees of immunity against involuntary divesting of
rights over the res. And Professor Honore, keeping in view these
degrees of immunity, says that one can speak of 'weak" and strong"
26
real rights or interests in property, but this does not affect the rights
in rem.
The interest of the beneficiary if he dies intestate will descend
25. Honor^, A.M., "Rights of Exclusion and Immunities against
Divesting", Tul.L.R., 1960, pp. 466-467.
26. Ibid, p. 466.
in the same way in which the legal interest wou^d descend. The results
of succession both in case of equitable and legal ownership are the same.
The heir ox the beneficiary takes the property interest not as representa¬
tive but as heir. Various interests can be created on the trust as in
the case of legal ownership. Thus a new system of ownership was
created which in many respects is similar to legal ownership yet differ¬
ent from it. The result is something unique, a double form of owner¬
ship. Down beneath is the trustee who holds the legal title, above him
27
is the beneficiary who has an equitable ownership. This is as if the
legal owner had the bag and the equitable owner the substance. As
Commons puts it:
We must distinguish between titles of ownership and
substance of ownership. If I own a piece of property and
somebody else owns the net income from tj£At property,
I hold the bag and he takes the substance.
Substance includes the duty of the trustee toward the trust property so
29
as to produce benefit for the beneficiary." So there is no difficulty in
saying that the trustee has the legal title to the subject-matter of the
27. Professor Ames insists that it is inaccurate to say that the
beneficiary is the equitable owner of the trust property
because the trustee is the owner, and of course two persons
with adverse interests cannot be owners of the same thing.
Lectures on Legal History, London 1913, p. 262.
Maitland, F.W., Equity, A Course of Lectures, London 1936,
Lecture iv.
Salmond, however, does not agree with them and recognises
equitable ownership. Jurisprudence, London 1947, p. 278.
28. Commons, op.cit., p. 169.
29. The idea of trust has much contributed to the development of
incorporeal property. ?Jodern industry has developed on this
idea. The shares are evidence not of ownership of the physical
property, but of residual income. The shares are encuxnbrances
on which itself as a 'corporate person' owns the physical assets.
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trust and that the beneficiary has an equitable ownership of it. The two
types of ownership are necessarily parallel and therefore can co-exist
simultaneously.
The equity judges enlarged the idea of property by means of the
change in the working rules from that of ownership of corporeal objects
to that of incorporeal objects, not identical with the corporeal objects
but having almost total identity in form and content. Thus acts and
transactions made between different persons affecting their future
conduct involving pecuniary considerations were regarded as property.
Property became acts and activities involving pecuniary values. This
relationship may be actual or intended. This enlargement from
material objects to acts and activities of pecuniary value made future
acts and activities a form of present property. For example, the
promise to do or abstain from doing an act involving pecuniary considera¬
tions is the present property as in the case of good-will. This is the
present property interest in the future economic advantage, and this
can be sold and bought as a present property interest. The emergence
of this new conception of property as including both corporeal and
incorporeal things is geared towards the market economy as it facilitates
economic transactions.^ The modern conception of property is, thus,
30. Professor Law son states:
The reason why the property lawyer turns all these
rights and interests into things, however abstract they
may be, is that since they have value, people are willing
to buy them; and any value asset which is the object of
commerce is properly treated as a thing, just as much if
it is an abstraction such as a share in a company as if
it is a physical object such as a ship or a motor-car. The
main reason why far more attention is devoted to abstrac¬
tions than to physical objects is that, since they are creations
(see over)
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explained in terms of economic acts and activities, or, in short we can
explain more fully in behaviouristic terms. As Commons states:
The behavior is the expected transactions on
commodity markets and money markets. It is not
corporeal property, but is incorporeal and intangible
property. Its name is "assets", the exchange values
of things, and assets are the expected additions to income
to be derived, not from physical things, but from expect^
profitable transactions with persons who are not owned.
As a result, property comes more than ever before in modern times
to be primarily a source of economic power to an even greater extent
than previously. The notion of property, as an expression of self, to
control and use to fulfil needs of individuals was left in the back-ground
during the course of the development of property.
The equity judges, thus, in transforming personal relations
into property relations in effect elaborated an implicit theory of pecuniary
value arising out of transactions of man with man as the criterion of
what constituted a 'thing' capable of being owned. Their judicial
analysis led them to believe that behind the primitive notion of property
lies the reality not in physical things but in individual expectations arising
from promises or otherwise. Their second premise in concluding the
pecuniary theory of property lies in the answer they gave to the question,
30. (Continued from previous page)
of the human mind, they can be made to conform to
patterns consciously chosen for their pratical utility
and capacity for combination with each other. These
patterns and combinations can be made the objects of
a calculus which is a fit subject of study by lawyers.
In comparison with them natural objects such as land
or animals are too individual to serve as mathematical
units of this kind.
Introduction to the Law of Property, Oxford 1958, p. 16.
31. Commons, op.cit., p. 168.
why did society permit or favour the development of private property?
And it seems certain that they found the answer in economic contents
of property. And since the security of such expectations is of high
importance in a market economy they came to be regarded as property
having pecuniary value. Thus these personal relations turned into
property relations. It is the 'behaviouristic' conception of property,
developed principally by equity judges, that transformed personal
relations into proprietary relations. Equity, thus,worked out a system
of' jural relations of economic advantage. A stinking example is found
32
in the case " in which the equity court issued an injunction to restrict
the recipient of a private Tetter from publishing information therein
contained regarding an estate of the sender. Relief could not possibly
have been given on the basis of an orthodox property interest. The
estate had no possession of the paper on which words were written.
Any interest in the non-publication of the letter had none of the character¬
istics of tangible property. The relief was granted on the basis of the
breach of confidence which might prejudice the estate by the disclosure
of the information. So the concept of property was extended to the written
information about the estate. Professor Commons explains this
by the peculiar faculty of the equity courts to command specific
behaviour by issues of writs and injunctions in order to create those
intangible property rights of modern business which have made the
transition from physical property to intangible property. "By means
of injunction the court can, in advance, enter into the most minute detail
of behavior needed to recognise new rights and protect new definitions
32. Gee v. Pritchard (1818) 2 Swan. 402.
'
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of ... property ... Equity looks on property as behavior claimed of
,,33
other persons.
This 'behaviouristic1 theory was applied to human acts and
activities and where it fitted, the acts and activities were termed
property. The old conception of property as being confined to such
objects as land was thus extended into the field of behaviouristic acts
and relief was given solely on the ground of human acts involving
pecuniary considerations. For example, in case of trademarks a man
has no independent property interest as in the case of land. He has it
as appurtenant to a business he is carrying on. The real basis of
giving relief in case of trade marks is to prevent fraud, unfair competi¬
tion, etc. so as to avoid unjust enrichment at the expense of trade
mark holders. The economic considerations were undoubtedly the
basis in deciding these points. As Commons explains:
The transition from concepts of physical things to
concepts of business assets, could not be fully completed
until the idea of ownership was shifted from the holding of
physical tilings to thg^expectations of profit from the trans¬
actions of business.
If economic considerations were supposed not to have been the basis
of equity relief, but purely conscience, it would be impossible to explain
the class of expectations protected by equity as contrasted with those
not so protected. It is this activity of the equity courts in case of
35
trusts and in transforming corporeal property into incorporeal
33. Commons, op.cit., p. 234.
34. Commons, op.cit., p. 274.
35. Nussbaum, A. , "Sociological and Comparative Aspects of the
Trust", Col. L.B . , 1938, p. 410.
property which is the strength and dynamic force in the rise of capitalism.
To have given relief on the basis only of breach of confidence or breach
of fiduciary relations would have prompted the courts to give relief in
such cases where any interest of personality is involved, as in love
matters. So either one must regard all interests as property or develop
a criterion to differentiate proprietary interests from purely personal
interrests. The equity judges for the sake of distinction attached the
37
insignia of pecuniary considerations to personal-property interests.
Similarly in the case of good-win, the 'behaviouristic' theory
38
involving pecuniary considerations was applied. In case of intangible
things, they are protected processes which exist as objects of property,
entirely separate from the material objects, having no immediate or
ultimate relation to particular material objects. They are by their
nature separable from particular material objects. The courts have
constructed the concept of good-will on the approved and disapproved
transactions of a business concern when they found it commercially
36
vaiueable and not before. The nature of good-will is realised not in
the material objects of the firm or business, but is separate and
independent of them, hence it is an intangible asset. A business has
36. Commons, op.cit., p. 235.
37. Salmond regards money value the distinguishing mark between
property rights and personal rights. Jurisprudence, London 1947,
p. 257.
38. Copyright is another example of intangible property which
represents a shift in the meaning of property from physical things
to expectations of profit to the author.
The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the
purpose of giving a bounty to writers.
Chafee, Z. , Jr. , "Reflections on the Law of Copyright",
Col. L.R. 1945, p. 507.
39. Pollock, op.cit., p. 134.
a good-will because of the approved services, good dispositions, which
customers entertain towards it and because they identify it by a particular
name. Good-will represents a mixture of the equity principle of good-
faith coupled with pecuniary value as a principle in recognising economic
contents of intangible property. As Commons says:
[An] engineering economy, while it produces
commodities, does not of itself produce confidence in the
commodities. This springs from honesty and good service.
[For] production of wealth ... Ethics is the field of
production of that invisible utility, confidence, without which
the tangible utilities are not even produced. The use-value
of ethics is confidence in others, and the exci^jpge-value of
ethics is the market value of their good-will.
The courts protect good-will to secure confidence in the business
concerns by protecting them against fraud and unfair competition.
Because of the earning value of good-will, it has a market value. When
the good-will of a buaness concern is sold along with the business, law
compels the seller so to conduct himself that none of what he has sold
stays with him. The seller may not trespass upon the 'good-will'
transferred by himself, continuing in the same business in the same
locality (and no one else may pass himself off as trading under the same
name ). The restrictions on the competition are not general, even after
consideration.has been paid for the restrictions imposed on the seller,
but particular, for the law will strike down a bargain which unreasonably
restrains anyone from practising his trade. In the case of good-will
these restrictions are limited to places and persons. The sale by the
seller is of an incident of his property, not of his personal liberty, as
Commons argues.^ Noyes says:
40. Commons, op.cit., p. 206.
41. Ibid, pp. 267-268.
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Legally, goodwill is the persona, or personality, of
a business. It is that which is injured by any infringement
on its exclusive identity - by "unfair competition". So far
as a purely legal analysis is capable of arriving at the
nature of the quasi-material object in this case, it is this
individuality.
The objects of property thus owned or protected are merely beneficial
transactions. By protecting this mutually beneficial expectancy and
giving to it the attribute of negotiability the law converts a valueless
personal right into a valuable property right - valuable precisely
because the law has rendered it capable of exclusive exercise and inter
personal transfer.
These are examples which show how the institution of property
dev^oped from corporeal property to incorporeal property and resulted
in a pecuniary definition of proprietary interests. The idea of property
as an expression of a human- self, one's personality, and fulfilling
one's needs both spiritual and material, was lost during the course of
development from the infancy of society to its present form of property
in most civilised countries. The economic power developed through
the incorporeal property severely curtailed the property rights of
43
individuals affecting both their personality and their ownership. The
property enjoyed by people both with respect to objects and rights is
less than a century ago because tie subjective factors found in the
notion of property are absent though objectively property has reached
42. Noyes, C.R., The Institution of Property, London 1936, p. 450.
43. Limitations on the institution of property are not only the result
of increase in the objects of property and their proper distribu¬
tion to maintain economic equilibrium, but also increase of
economic power through these incorporeal rights in the hands
of the individual.
153
considerable heights. The development of the institution of property
as to include acts and activities having pecuniary value has affected both
writers of jurisprudence and the practice of the courts. As civilisation
became complex, the realisation was forced on the courts that business
privileges and transactions are things of value because men are willing
to pay for them, and therefore, the courts adjusted themselves to
treat these activities as assets. In general the courts seem to define
as property at law whatever is treated as property in the economic life
44
of the time. This forced the institution of property into the domain
45
of economics. In fact both law and economics are inseparable and
are necessary for social order. But in this juxtaposition, the practica1
discipline of economics fully submerged the spiritual element of the
institution of property. Non-material contents of property have been
ignored; the idea of persona^ liberty disappeared. Any right to earn
property itself became property because of the pecuniary insignia
attached to it. Again in case of shares, the subjective element of
control in one's hands to use one's own property is replaced by corporate
control. This is the end product of the development of the institution
of property and its transference in pecuniary terms. Again the intro¬
duction of the idea of exchange value (acquisition and disposition)
rendered certain personal creations such as ideas unworthy oi the
concept of property and thus of protection.
44. Noyes, op.cit., p. 411.
45. Under certain legal systems the right of property has been
termed as economic rights.
Kruse, V., The Bight oi Property, trans, by Federspiel, P.T.,
vol. i, p. 130.
Increasing influence of economic theory on jurisprudence is
clearly evident in the development of the institution of property.
Juristic writers and courts both lay great stress on pecuniary values
in distinguishing property rights. The touch stone or insignia which
became necessary to identify and protect property interest is pecuniary
va^ue. The writers of jurisprudence concede or attach considerable
importance to this criterion. As Salmond states:
The aggregate of a man's proprietary rights con¬
stitutes his estate, his assets, or his property in one of
the many senses of that most equivocal of legal terms
The sum total of a man's personal rights, on the
other hand, constitutes his status or personal conditions,
as opposed to his estate. If he owns land, or chattels, or
patent rights, or the goodwill of a business, or shares in
a company, or if debts are owing to him, all these rights
pertain to his estate. But if he is a free man and a
citizen, a husband and a father, the rights which he has as
such pertain to his status or standing in the law.
What, then, is the essential nature of this distinction?
It lies in the fact that proprietary rights are valuable, and
personal rights are not. The former are those which are
worth money; the latter are those that are worth none.
The former are the elements of a man'^gvealth; the latter
are merely elements in his well-being.
Hence land, or chattels, or patent rights, or the goodwill of a business,
or shares in a company, or of debts owed, etc. are property. But
such rights that are of immense value to a man as>citizenship are not
property because they have no money value. Hence they are worth
none, since they refer to status and not to property. But Salmond could
not make it clear how rights such as citizenship are not as valuable as
proprietary rights. In Roman law there were many restrictions on
non-citizens in acquiring property, while citizens were free from these
46. Salmond, Jurisprudence, London 1947, pp. 256-257.
restrictions. Citizenship was more valuable than proprietary rights,
of immense value for human life, a part of one's personality, which
enables him to acquire property. Thus it cannot be said that it was
worth nothing. In fact Salmond could not make the distinction clear
merely by applying a monetary criterion. Moreover he states that the
term status can be used in many senses, and one of the senses in which
he used the term status is this:
Legal condition of any kind, whether personal or
proprietary ... A man's status in this sense includes
his whole position in the law - the sum total of his legal
rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations,
whether proprietary or persona^ or any particular group
of them separately considered.
The explanation which Salmond offers for this confusion is that the above
48
is the most comprehensive use of the term 'status, but the mere fact
that status includes both personal and proprietary rights is enough to
show that the idea of property as merely money value, though simple
and easy, is an insufficient criterion as a characteristic of property
rights. The monetary tag on property rights, however perfect and
simple it may be, fails to make conspicuous the very idea of property
as a reflection of human sentiments in terms of man's psychological,
philosophical and moral aspirations. A a An oa states:
It is not material wants, hopes, desires, and
tendencies alone to which ownership lends its aid as a
potent instrument of satisfaction and even development.
The moral aspirations and needs of individual men are
scarcely less signa'ly ^stained and gratified by owner¬






Amos, S. , T no science of Law, London 1874, p. 155.
A similar view is expressed by Lawson when he uses the
pecuniary insignia to make clear the distinction between property right
and personal rights, and thus states:
The object of the law of property is to provide a secure
foundation, so far as the law can do it, for the acquisition,
enjoyment, and disposal of wealth. For this reason it is,
in contrast to the law of persons, and especially of family
law, the part of the law moat closely allied to economics.
It might therefore be expected to cover the whole field
of economics, and in particular not only real relations,
including relations protected against persons having notice
of them, but at least some personal relations. For a man
may have many claims on other persons, arising from
contract or otherwise, which add materially to his wealth.
He may be entitled to be retained in an office or employment.
If so, he is clearly the richer for it; if he can alienate that
right and turn it into money by substituting some other person
in his office or employment, the offiqe^or employment is
still more clearly part of his wealth.
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So is the view of Vinogradoff, Goodhart, and Anson.
50. Lawson, F.H., Introduction to the Law of Property, Oxford 1958
pp. 2-3.
51. Vinogradoff states:
In so far as objects of right may be regarded as possess¬
ing marketable value they are caned 'property'. Not
every object of right admits of such an estimate; a
person's honour or reputation, for instance, cannot be
appraised either for consumption or for sale, although
heavy damages may be awarded for a wanton or malicious
attack on it. On the other hand not only concrete things
like estates, houses, furniture, but a1 so abstract things,
such as the goodwill of a firm or the copyright of a novel,
have a value in the market and therefore form items of
property.
Common Sense in Law, London 1946, pp. 62-63.
52. Goodhart, A.L., Essays in Jurisprudence and Common Law,
Cambridge 1931, p. 41.
53. Anson states:
The matter of the obligation, the thing to be done
or forborne, must possess, at least in the eyes of the
law, a pecuniary value, otherwise it would be hard to
distinguish legal from moral and social relations.
Principles of the English Law of Contract, Oxford 1910, p. 7.
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Criticism of monetary criterion as a basis of ownership
Though such wide meanings as are being attached to the concept
of property help in enriching and widening the scope of the concept, yet
it will take the concept out of its original limits and create a confusion
because of the illogicality and danger manifested in such an approach.
To clothe the concept of property in such shaded clothes will destroy
it from within. The concept of property will go out of the domain of
jurisprudence and become subject to the shifting tide of fashion in
economic theory. This is reducing property to mere pecuniary
benefit and making the dictum "money makes the mare go" a juris¬
prudential maxim. With the development of market economy (capital¬
ism), this error of interpreting rights of property as merely pecuniary
value has reached its heights and is presented as an exhaustive definition
of the concept of property (including within it all types of rights which
can be exercised in earning money).
The illogicality and danger of such an approach is recognised
by Kruse. Professor Kruse gives a sketch of the economic develop¬
ment of the institution of property and states:
It was only when practical conditions changed, when
the economic development assumed new and greater
dimensions, when world trade gradually came into exist¬
ence through the discoveries, and big industry through the
inventions, and the mental and spiritual qualities were
changed accordingly, thg^ the earlier legal forms lost
contact with the period.
In its inception, the institution of property started with the allocation
of control over things necessary to satisfy human needs. Even in
54. Kruse, op.cit., vol. i, p. 74.
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modern times this remains the chief and main task of the institution of
property. These objects of property at a later state of development
are called economic goods and find their way into legal ideas. Property
in modern laws becomes purely concerned with economic rights. As shown
above it is now emphasised both in lega' text books and courts that the
right of property must be of economic value. Kruse points out that
the materialistic view point of different social philosophies imprinted
on the institution of property the stigma of economic value and alienated
it from its subjective contents. He states:
The materialistic views of the different social schools
have naturally exerted an influence also on legal thought of
to-day ... we must bear in mind the enormous influence - _
of Roman law which knew only the material property rights.
56
The emergence of new property rights' like copyright is protected on
economic grounds but deep in the mind of the author, into which law
does not peep, lies the non-materialistic va^ue of immense importance
to the author, the subjective satisfaction in his intellectual production,
for which he claims it as his property. Similarly in case of easements,
the convenience and justification, they afford in providing human life a
comfortable living, themselves support the non-materialistic values
found in the institution of property. No rights are regarded as absolute
in the sense of overriding pubHc interest. Socia1 interests always
stand between man and his rights. No Une can be drawn between rights
and public interests, as it is visible from their role in social order that
55. Ibid, p. 129.
56. Olson, H.R., Jr., discusses the emergence of property rights
in ideas in his article, "Dreams for Sale, Some Observations
on the Law of Idea Submissions and problems arising therefrom",
Law and Contemporary Problems, 1958, p. 34.
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rights are nothing but products of social interests in one form or the
other. It is not materialistic values embodied in rights but it is the
social spirit of those rights that prevail. As Kruse states:
There are a number oi rights which, thougn to some
extent differ in detail, all have this essential quality in
common, that they do not apply to external, material
objects, but to internal, spiritual, or rather intellectual
values or products.
Trespass on land adjoining a highway is justified if the highway is
impassable due to floods. Similarly in case of a house on fire, enter¬
ing the house to help without prior permission of the owner of the house
is justified. Limitations on the rights of property arose out of those
values of life which find no substitute or parallel in material goods.
Our factory legislation and socia1 welfare schemes arise out of those
spiritual values which are the basis of the institution of property.
These limitations and schemes represent not only the economic values
but the other side of life to which Kruse calls 'spiritual value of property'.
Kruse is, therefore, opposed to the criterion of money value for deter¬
mining property. He states:
In the text-books of property law it is emphasized
that the physical objects or things to w hich the right of
property, the right of use, the mortgage rights, &c.,
apply must be of economic value or barter value, in other
words, fit to satisfy common human economic require¬
ments. Sometimes, however, it is asserted that one
particular right, the right of retention, a right for A to
remain in possession of B's thing until B has fulfilled an
obligation, especially performed a payment, need not
apply to a thing o: pecuniary value, but, for instance, to
letters of no such value, just as it is occasionally pointed
out that the owner must have a right to viqxj^Lcate or recover
a thing even if it is of no economic value.
57. Kruse, op.cit., vol. i, p. 75.
58. Kruse, op.cit., vol. i, p. 129.
He further states:
Not only the rights to intellectual production must
be regarded as property rights, and may not be considered
solely as a sanction protecting the economic interests of
the intellectual producer ... but in large fields of human
life the actual right of property in external material objects
satisfies also certain non-material needs and are even
based thereon. This is true not only of the immediate
right of property, but to my mind a new sphere of law has
developed unconsciously within the legal form of easements
to satisfy interests which are not essentially economic but
serve also other sides of life. To define the property
rights as economic rights is to-day no longer true to real
conditionsA new reality of a spiritual nature is coming
into being.
Essentially the subjective nature of property is the essence of the
60
institution of property.
"in so far as objects of rights may be regarded as possessing
G1
marketable value they are caPed 'property'" says Vinogradoff. The
62
courts take this view as a settled characteristic of property. Some
statutes have gone to the length of substituting the words 'economic
63
rights' for property rights. This indicates a growing tendency to
substitute economic rights for property rights, and the time might come
when we find only economic rights and no property rights and lose what¬
ever solace we find in the idealistic side of property, in the words
meum and tuum.
Justice Holmes remarks that "property, a creature of law does
59. Ibid.
60. Bowen, F., 'The Concept of Private Property", Cor.L.P., 1925,
p. 41.
61. Vinogradoff, op.cit., p. 62.
62. Noyes, op.cit., p. 411.
63. Kruse, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 130.
not arise from value, although exchange values may be destroyed
intentionally without compensation. Property depends upon exclusion
64 65
by law from interference. " So is the view of ^Justice Brandeis.
But one should not conclude that the 'value concept' is not an essential
part oi property, though one can dispense v, ith the 'economic value
concept' as an essential part oi property. Property is any valuable
interest or right. But it is wrong to pinpoint this right or interest in
economic (especially market) values alone. Sometimes a right or
interest may have an immense value because of sentimental or other
66
attachments without having any economic value. One idea of Austin
with regard to the institution of property implies the use of right in the
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widest possible sense, viz, any legal right. Such use of the word
'right' will alleviate the economic character as a primary character of
property, though it will transgress the distinction between property
rights and personal rights. But we can avoid this difficulty if we insist
on property as concerning rights over 'things', and admit within the
category of 'things' whatever is considered essential to human life or
to the maintenance of human personality. For example, a hockey player
64. International News Service v. The Associated Press, (1918) 248
U.S. 215.
65. Ibid.
66. Austin, Jurisprudence, vol. ii, London 1873, pp. 819-220.
67. Salmond, however, is against such an idea and says:
In its widest sense, property includes all a person's
legal rights, of whatever description. A man's property
is all that is his in law. This usage, however, is
absolete at the present day, though it is common enough
in the older books.
Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 423.
68. Rowe, v. Hewitt, op.cit.
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who has been refused a certificate to play in a match is deprived of his
property because of his personaUty being affected through loss of the
opportunity to exercise his skin as a player.
The courts are also inclined to take the view that those things
that are essential to a man's career are his property. An admission
card to sit in an examination has been considered property by the court
(in India) which states:
Though the admission card as such has no pecuniary
value it has immense value to the candidate for the
examination. Without it he cannot secure admission to
the examinatiggi hall and consequently cannot appear at the
examination.
Indeed the very idea of property has often been used as a means of
demarcating the sphere of human activity. Ihering says:
In making it my own, I stamp it with the mark of my
own person, whoever attacks it, attacks me, the blow
dealt it strikes me, for I am present in it. Prope^y is
but the periphery of my person extended to things.
Property is a part of the self. Hegel says, "Property is the embodi-
71
ment of personaUty. " A simPar view is expressed by Kruse when
he states:
As far as your activities reach and have effect, so
far the world is yours, but no fartly^r. This is an ideal
of justice common to all property.
This subjective element in the institution of property and the use of an
economic measure is justified only as a more or less objective criterion
69. Abhayanand Misra v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961, S.C. 1698.
70. Ihering, Struggle for Law, trans, Lalor, J.J., Chicago 1879,
p. 55.
71. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 1rans. Knox, T.M., Oxford 1971, p. 45.
72. Kruse, op.cit., vol. ii, p. 76.
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for establishing 'value' especially when the subjective element is far
removed from an individual self. But in cases where the subjective
criterion, as in the case of the admission card, of ideas, or of the
certificate to play hockey, can be directly applied, there is no need to
refer to the 'objective' criterion of exchange value, and no justification
for refusing to grant proprietary protection. The subjective criterion
ought to be the basis of the institution of property and economic criterion
should serve only as supplement. The idea is not to discard the old
73
framework within which the concept of property works but to see it
for what it is, as a part, not the whole, of what is essential to a concep¬
tion of property as dealing with all the essentials of human existence.
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New realities are emerging and they cannot be recognised under the
old standards. This is like putting new wines in old bottles. The
rejection of new realities, on the basis of the absence of pre-existing
legal pegs, would frustrate social aspirations. Take the case of
property in ideas; their proprietary character at present is denied
because they do not satisfy the 'exchange value' criterion of property.
But if an idea is concrete and contains a plan, it is protected irrespective
of any contract or good faith on the part of the disclosee. Again if the
idea is abstract but there is a binding contract between the parties,
73. Dennis Lloyd while realising the insufficiency of old criterion
of property states:
All I desire to rebut is the attempt, so to speak,
to distil the development of the law out of a fixed
framework of concepts, so that these become the
masters rather than the servants of the argument.
"The Recognition of New Rights", C.L.P., 1961, p. 42.
74. Ibid, pp. 39-57.
Olson, op.cit., p. 34.
that is diacloser and disclosee, the idea is protected. But even here,
it is the contract that is protected not the idea. But if the idea itself
is to be protected, then on what grounds? It is not 'property' like the
concrete ideas which receive protection under copyright or patent law.
Is one to conclude that an abstract idea becomes property as soon as
contract is entered between the parties for its protection? If that is
so, then when an abstract idea is revealed by one party to an other,
no property is created in the absence of a contract. Referring to this
anomalous position Turner states:
To say that a novel abstract idea is only
protectable by an express contract, is tantamount to
saying that an abstract idea is no more protectable
than a practically worthless unoriginal idea, because
the latter is protectable by express contract, if the
disclosee chooses so to bind himself. Thus under this
doctrine if an idea is held to be 'abstract" however novel
and valuable it may be, the circumstances of its novelty
and value will not be permuted to help give rise to an
implication of confidence.
Under the present law, what makes an idea 'property' is the circum¬
stances which put value on the idea, not the intrinsic value of the idea.
It is the external circumstances that constitute property, not the
expression of the self which is the origin and source of all values; and
thus despite the fact that rights, as such, do not only or necessarily
refer to material and external objects, but also to the internal and
intellectual values and products. In these conditions, it becomes
essential to determine whether a thing is property in itseU' or only due
to its economic worth. My submission is that things' can and should
be included within property not on the grounds of their mere economic
75. Turner, A.E., The Law of Trade Secrets, London 1962, p. 385.
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contents but because of the value, economic or non-economic, we attach
to them. Property is a right. The only quality of this right is its
exclusive nature. The only value we attach to this exclusive right is
our subjective expressions. As Kruse expresses:
Here, and only here, is the property of the individual,
spiritual or material, a circle, great or small, but a circle
which is his, because he has created it, a world for which
the community may fix certain rules for the sake of other
circles, but an orbit whose essence no community can
violate with impunity, for th^the kindled fires of this
society will be extinguished.
Thus things are property independent of their economic contents, for
it is not the thing but the right over the thing that determines property.
Thus an idea can practically be treated as an object of property in its
own right. Any breach or violation of a property right in an idea,
should be judged in terms of its practical utility as-a trade secret not
in terms of what the idea win fetch in the market place. Moreover in
case of an idea being regarded as property, its breach or violation will
involve an element of good faith in securing proprietary relief. Breach
of confidence in itself will not be a ground of action unless it is related
to something. II it is granted that there is property in ideas (subjective
elements irrespective ox economic contents) the anomalous position
presented by the traditional criterion of property win be avoided.
The emergence of new rights and the decay of old ones through
abrogation and modification of existing rights, is not a new phenomenon
77
for the institution of property. Alterations and modifications,
76. Kruse, op.cit., vol. i, p. 76.
77. Austin, op.cit., vol. ii, pp. 819-820.
definitions and redefinitions, of rights of property are an ever present
process, and there is no end to it as there is no end of intellectual
78
production. It is no exaggeration to say that the institution of
property in terms of its stability is always at stake. But at each stage
of its development the subjective element in it is pressing itself with
more vigour. Such a recognition finds support in the minority judge¬
ment of Malins, V.C., when he says:
I am told that a court of equity has no jurisdiction
in such a case as this, though it is admitted it has juris¬
diction where property is likely to be affected. What is
property? One man has property in lands, another in
reputation; and whatever may have the effect of destroying
property in any one of these things (even in a man's good
name) is, in my opinion, destroying property of a most
valuable description.
A similar view has been expressed by Vaisey J. when he remarks:
If a man, be he musician, portrait painter or writer
of articles in newspapers, gets to be know under a
particular name, that name becomes inevitably part of his
stock-in-trade, and apart from some special contract or
anything of that kind, he is entitled to say that it is his
name, and that anyone who adopts or causes the adoption
of that gjp1© by some other person is inflicting on him an
injury.
78. Philbrick, F.3. says;
Each recognition of a new tiling as the object of legal
rights has opened a new chapter in the law, often one
of vast complexity. But even as regards things
recognised for seven centuries as property, the rights
in them recognised by law have been forever changing.
Of inconceivable importance has been the slow develop¬
ment, in relation to different types of property ...
instances of new rights thus recognised, and of old rights
that have decayed or totally disappeared, might be given
in great numbers.
"Changing Conceptions of Property in Law", Un.Pen. L.R., 1938,
p. 692.
79. Dixon v. Ho"!den, (1869), L.R. 7Eq.Cas.488. Quoted in
Robinette, J.J., "Protection of Property Interests in Equity",
Can. B.R ., 1932, p. 176.
80. Hines v. Winnick, (1947) Ch. 708. Quoted in Lloyd, D., "The
Recognition of New Rights", C.L.P. 1861, p. 46.
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"Objects of property in the economic sense have increased enormously
but property is an essentially subjective matter; the concept of
81
property has constantly decreased. " The great confusion in the
present day ideas of property is due to the neglect of this subjective
element. If its importance is restored and realised, the right of
property would not fail to solve problems raised by the idea of a property
82 83
right in a voice or in ideas. By sticking to the old framework in
its traditional manner, the contemporary law is on the wrong track and
has therefore reached a deadlock in dealing with certain social problems.
Socially the most important field for human existence is man's relation
with the surroundings and all that belongs to it. The strong personal
element in this relation to the things, may be of economic or non-
economic nature, but their protection should find its true and natural
expression in law. My purpose is neither to expect nor to desire a
definite meaning of property as to its finality but to show that the
property criterion at the present time is proving inadequate to grasp
the social values. The old framework needs re-examination under the
pressure of new realities. This is to plead for a better and more candid
recognition of juristic forms of development. This is not to reject the
practical value for many purposes of the economic concept of property
but to give it a secondary role. Exchange values are not the primary
facts but are secondary consequences which legal systems have adopted
as unanalysed expressions of primary facts.
81. Bowen, E., "The concept of Private Property", Cor.L.Q. 1925, p. 43.
82. Lloyd, D., op.cit., p. 39.
83. Olson, H.R., Jr., op.cit., p. 34.
Winfield, Tort, London 1971, pp. 483-485.
Turner, A.E., op.cit., pp. 382-386.
CHAPTER IV
JUSTIFICATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
The institution of property is a means of securing to individuals
control over things. It gives the individual control over things and
their disposal within the given legal system. The existence of an
institution of property in some form is morally and socially justified
by the fact that the existence of human life would be impossible without
it because (or to the extent that) it is the means for securing to people
the means for living. Human control over things is essential to human
life. But the equal need of all human beings for control over the means
of their subsistence has never determined the principles on which the
distribution of property has been based. The laws of property have
made property of things which never ought to be property, and absolute
property where only a qualified property ought to exist. They have not
held the balance fairly between human beings, but have heaped impedi¬
ments upon some, to give advantage to others. A system of property
as such does not guarantee any particular distribution of assets among
individuals. As is obvious, some may have excessive property holdings,
some moderate holdings, and some - often the great majority - none of
any significance. It is the positive provisions of the law of property
which establish or secure a particular distribution oi' property. The
laws concerning distribution of property are not of uniform nature but
change from time to time in accordance with political and social changes.
When the landed gentry wielded political power in mediaeval times, all
forms of property other than the land were looked down upon and kept at
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a social disadvantage. As Pollock states:
In the first half of the tenth century this is fixed
as a positive rule, and the landless man must find a lord
at his peril. If he or his kindred for him fail to do tjiis,
he becomes outlawed, and may be dealt as a robber.
With the advent of industrialisation, the landed gentry lost effective
political power and the urban industrialised class made property laws
to their advantage. The laws of property struck at a class whose
political power was weak. Since those in the majority were politically
weak, it is round them that the battle of laws of property rages.
Similarly classical writers struck against usurers who did not belong
to the industrialist class, and lacked any effectual power to introduce
factory legislations. All theories concerning the justification or
criticism of property have to be seen as arguments in favour of or
against some given distribution of property, rather than the actual
existence of the institution itself.
The oldest and until recently the most influential justifications
of the institution of property were based on such grounds as the occupa¬
tion theory, the social contract theory, labour theory, and the theory
of promoting security of possession to encourage accumulation of wealth,
and so forth. These theories dominate much thinking from the times
of the Roman jurists to the modern philosophers; so much so that
the first three theories, though offered at different times by different
thinkers, ultimately ended on the common ground that labour has a right
to occupy the material that is fashioned by labour into the finished
1. Pollock, The Land Laws, London 1896, p. 31.
product. The last of the theories - promoting security of possession
to encourage accumulation of wealth - is drawn from the belief that
individuals are basically selfish and will work hard if they are secured
in their possessions. In fact this theory is a corollary of the labour
theory but its justification of labour is not based on occupation or social
contract theories but on ideas of economic productivity. But whatever
be the basis for all these theories, the fundamental idea that lurked in
the mind of all those philosophers who propounded these theories was to
justify the existing social systems with unequal distribution of wealth.
They all feared the unstable situation that might arise from any radical
change of the existing social system. Although the grounds for expound¬
ing these theories and sustaining the existing order of societies were
supposedly the demands of justice. It could well be argued that the
theorists were so afraid of upheavals that they ignored whatever injustice
2
was in the existing political and social systems.
The institution of property has its basis in the satisfaction of
the economic needs of individuals. On that ground it seems obvious
that the institution of property will continue to exist in one form or
2. Looking to this injustice in society Mill remarks:
If, therefore, the choice were to be made between
communism with all its chances, and the present (T%b2]
state of society with all its sufferings and injustices; if
the institution of private property necessarily carried
with it as a consequence, that the produce of labour
should be apportioned as we now see it, almost in an
inverse ratio to the labour ... if this or communism
were the alternative, all the difficulties, great or small,
of communism would be but as dust in the balance.
Mill, J.S., Principles of Political Economy, edited by Ashley, M .J.
London 1909, p. 208.
171
another so long as there are human needs to satisfy. But the law of
property in its present forms does not in fact apply wealth to the reason¬
able satisfaction of the economic needs of each individual. Why is it
that the laws of property allow extreme differences in the possession
of wealth so that the economic needs of the majority remain unsatisfied?
And why should it be assumed that property systems which permit ox
extreme differences are justifiable at all? Property could be but is
not,a means of securing to each individual the means of comfortable
subsistence. It is this primary interest of satisfying his economic
needs which a property owner has in his property. But if this function
is basic to any justification of property, as I would assert, and if each
individual who has a right to life must have the means to support life as
well, then it follows that each individual has a right to sufficient property
for that purpose. To take away the means to support life is to deprive
one of one's life. Thus the right to life implies right to the means of
subsistence, and it may be added, to the means of comfortable sub¬
sistence. The basic implication that I draw concerning the existence
and continuation of the institution of property, is that there may as time
changes and civilisation develops, grow a more socially just milieu for
the maintenance of the institution of property.
That being the assumption from which I start, I shall proceed
to a critical scrutiny of some classical theories which expressly or
tacitly aim to justify property system on other principles.
Before that, I shall make some preliminary remarks (not
unrelated to points already taken in previous chapters) about the social
V
172
context of the institution of property. The institution of property is
a socio-legal institution. Both social and legal aspects of the institu¬
tion of property are important for its continuation and existence. The
chapter on the origin of property clearly points to the satisfaction of
human needs as the basis of the institution of property though later
developments show how it was moulded into different forms by the
struggle for supremacy within various societies, and how unequal
distribution and division came into existence. That shows how the
institution of property acquired a predatory basis. In the course of
development economic power came to be associated with political power,
and the existing unequal system of property came to be regarded as a
final solution before being challenged by the new socialist tendencies.
In modern times there is a growing tendency in our social and legal
developments to direct the institution of property towards what I regard
as its proper function of meeting the subsistence needs of each indi¬
vidual.*^ These signs are visible in national insurance schemes,
educational systems, old age pension schemes, labour legislation,
public works projects, food and drug laws, and other social legislation.
The Social Context
In approaching the problem of the justification of the institution
of property in view of the above discussion some remarks made by
3. Renner states:
Every member of society must have a share, however
humble, of the annual product, regardless of whether
he has taken an active part in production or not.
Renner, K., The Institutions of Private Law and their Social
Functions, edited by O. Kahn-Freund, London 1949, p. 74.
Adam Smith need consideration. He remarks:
The acquisition of valuable and extensive property
... necessarily requires the establishment of civil govern¬
ment. Where there is no property, or at least none that
exceeds the value of two or three^day's labour, civil
government is not so necessary.
But civil governments, so far as they are instituted, are instituted for
5
the preservation of peace and not only for the protection of the rights
of property, though the ability of the courts to regulate property rights
is one essential element in the preservation of peace and order.
History furnishes an ample demonstration of the necessity of positive
law with machinery to enforce it. Wherever we find men dwelling
together, there we observe law and government existing, in however
rudimentary a form. Some authority superior to the individual controll¬
ing his actions is always apparent among savages and civilised alike.
As Thompson states:
Law is a natural necessity because the social
relationship of men is naturally organic, made so by the
natural appetities and wants of individual human beings;
and the social organism cannot live without a resisting
and controlling structure connecting all parts for the
conservation of each.
7
When Bentham talks about the least agreement among savages, he has
expressed a fact out of which grows the necessity of law. Blackstone's
remarks that "the only true and natural foundations of society are the
8
wants and the fears of individuals, refer to the fact out of which
4. Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations, edited by Scott, W.F.,
London 1925, vol. ii, p. 228.
5. Mill, J.S., op.cit., p. 201.
6. Thompson, D.G., Social Progress, London 1889, p. 23.
7. Bentham, J., Theory of Legislation, London 1876, pp. 112-113.
8. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, London 1830, p. 47.
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social order emerges in the form of a common restraint and an authority
eufficient to enforce it.
To argue that so far as governments are instituted they are
solely to protect property rights, implies that government finds these
rights already existing. This leads to ignoring the part played by a
government in defining, altering, and creating new property rights.
Moreover, to agree with the notion of pre-existing property rights is to
admit that there is only one natural and national system of property, and
is to ignore the various kinds of ownership existing in different modes
of social order. Again even if it be granted that there are pre-existing
property rights, it is c'ear that the duties and remedies which go with
them are in need of revision from time to time in order to keep up with
the development of new social relations. No system of specific duties
and remedies can possibly embody for all times the requirements of
social order.
Again Smith's remarks that government is to protect property
9
which is valuable and extensive and no government is required where
10
there is no property implies that those who have no property need no
security. If Smith is right, there are a number of persons who have
no property* * at all and their desire for security is much less (or say
9. Smith, A., op.cit., p. 228.
10. Ibid.
11. Smith states:
Men who have no property can injure one another
only in their persons or reputations. But when one man
kills, wounds, beats, or defames another, though he to
whom the injury is done suffers, he who does it receives no
benefit. It is otherwise with the injuries to property.
Smith, A., op.cit., p. 227.
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none) as compared to those who have property. Security is instituted
only for property and nothing e^se. If by accident or chance those who
are rich become poor, their desire for security evaporates. In a
society of poor people the need of civil government for instituting
security would be a paradox. The absurdity of these conclusions which
logically follow from Smith's premises shows their falsity.
No government is necessary according to Smith if property
12
does not exceed the value of two or three days labour. Smith does
not seem to think that if a man earns for two or three days, his labour
is of such value as to need protection. The poor man who finds labour
only for two or three days and prolongs his meagre earnings for his
four or five days subsistence, if not provided protection against
deprivation of the fruits of his labour, finds that the social system in
which he is living is issuing his death warrant by depriving him of his
subsistence. In fact Smith's theory of property is a protection not for
safeguarding property rights but a device to protect the rich in their
distribution of wealth and to curse the poverty of the poor.
Property is a socio-legal institution. It refers neither to
13
richness nor to poverty. It is not wealth (a quantity of things owned
beyond the needs of immediate use). It is a right, a facility by which
man encroaches on the external physical world. The institution of
property is a social institution; its individual aspect is visible only in
12. Smith, A., op.cit., p. 228.
13. The distinction between wealth and property is clearly made in
chapter 1.
the sense that it is in the service of an individual. Ihering makes this
very clear when he states:
The only reason that the demands of society are
not so evident in property is the circumstance that the
proprietor's own interest determines him as a rule to
use his property in such a way as will father the
interests of society along with his own.
Even in its individual aspect, it is limited and subject to various social
limitations. The use of property by an owner to the detriment of
others is not allowed. It has recently been shown that even under the
classical Roman law conceptions of dominium
an owner was free to build up his house as high as
he wished providing that it did not cut off the light to his
neighbour's house to an intolerable extent. He had to leave
his neighbour at least enough light for ordinary everyday existence.
14. Ihering, Law as a Means to an End, trans. Isaac Husik, New York
1968, p. 368.
Hobson states:
If an individual is living a solitary, self-sufficient
life out of society, the attribution of these natural
rights is an empty form; the word "right" has here no
content or significance. If he is living as a member
of society, since he is an organic being in an organic
society, no action of his can be considered purely
self-regarding or wholly void of social import. Some
individual actions may be so indirect, so slight, or so
incalculable in their social effects, that we speak of
them and treat them as "self-regarding", and hold it
foolish for society, either through the state or otherwise,
to interfere with individual liberty with respect to
them. But such "individual rights" can have no natural
or absolute validity; for society, and not the individual,
must clearly claim, in the social interest, to determine
what actions shall fall within this "self-regardi ig"
class. Thus these rights, if rights they be called,
are sanctioned and bounded by society. Social utility
must be paramount and absolute in marking the limits
of such "rights".
Hobaon, J.A., The Social Problem, London 1901, pp. 88-89.
15. Rodger, A., Owners and Neighbours in Roman Law, Oxford 1972,
p. 38.
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Legal systems are even going to the extent of safeguarding the third
party not only against the infringement of his legal right but against the
malicious use of a right which exclusively serves the purpose of hurting
others. Holmes, J. made it c^ear that the right to use one's property
for the sole purpose of injuring others is not one of the necessary rights
of ownership. It is not a right for the sake of which property is
recognised by law. ^
Even the most ardent advocates of the absolute conception of
property could scarcely say of property that it is in all or any legal
systems without restrictions. An absolute conception of property is
possible in legal logic but not in any legal-social evaluation of property;
and property is essentially a legal-social concept. There is no such
thing as entirely private property. An individual is a product of social
circumstances. There is no isolated and self-sufficient individual.
Within the period of social development no individual is living by itself.
The inner personality of the individual is not his own in the sense of
not being affected or influenced by surrounding circumstances. If
this be so any individual always represents the synthesis of derived
emotions and ideas and his personality is the product of his intercourse
with other personalities. When inner personality is not one's own,
how can one regard one's outer personality or property as entirely
private? There is thus no doubt that legal or social restrictions in the
use of property which an individual regards as his own, are inherent
elements of property. It is safe to say that strictly speaking there is
16. Pideout v. Knox, 19 N. E. 390 (1889).
no absolute private property. As Dunning states:
Private property ceases to be such by natural law
in case of necessity, by divine law, for the sake of
charity, aby the civil law, for the benefit (utilitas) of
the state.
In the history of ownership, limitations on private property are
not only historically and legally necessary, but it is also the case that
their existence is a corollary to all theories of the rights of property.
Blackstone who is considered the most vocal English exponent of the
absoluteness of the right of property stated:
So great moreover is the regard of the law for
private property, that it will not authorise the least
violation of it; no^ot even for the general good of the
whole community.
Again he states:
The right of property is the t sole and despotic
domonion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusic^of the
right of any other individual in the universe.
But he realised that.,that absolute characterisation of property is
extravagant and untenable; he elsewhere qualifies this despotism by
20
making it subject to control and diminution by the laws of the land.
Private property includes the right to enjoy and dispose of things in
the manner allowed by law. The economic necessity to dispose of
things finds its expression in legal systems. Similarly Austin's
definition of property as
17. Dunning, W.A., Political Theories, London 1902, p. 219.
18. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, London 1830, p. 138.
19. Ibid, vol. ii, pp. 1-2.
20. Ibid, vol. i, p. 138.
a right - indefinite in point of user - unrestrained
in point of disposition - and^nlimited in point of duration
- over a determinate thing.
is out of harmony with the social realities unless we drop all the
negatives in his definition. If one reads these definitions along with
the statement of Ihering that
The idea of property cannot carr^with it anything
that is contrary to the idea of society,
one finds that the institution of property is subject to all types of social
restrictions and is protected by law subject to those restrictions.
One can appreciate how important the subject has become in
modern times by observing the introduction of a more and more
restricted conception of property. This has brought a change in the
very idea or meaning of private property since it first became
23
established in history. The very conception of it is different from
what it was a century or two centuries ago. At one time the right of
property implied the right to do with an object, within the limits of
law, as one pleased. One had the right to use and abuse. Even if
one's property right was injurious to others, such an abuse might be
24
allowed as a part of the law of property. Restrictions to that effect
were very trifling in earlier stages of society. But at present,
restrictions cover ever wider and wider fields. Toleration of the
injurious effects of the abuse of property rights (though it was once
21. Austin, Jurisprudence, vol. ii, London 1873, pp. 817-818.
22. Ihering, op.cit. p. 389.
23. See chapter ii.
24. See chapter iv.
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within the legal restrictions) has been eliminated and the dominant
contemporary idea is that property rights are to promote individual
purposes only so iar as consistent with social purposes. The modern
conception of rightiis based on social well-being. The right of property
is exercised as a social trust, and forces the individual to reflect upon
his right in terms of its social purpose. The doctrine of legally
permissible abuses of right is rejected in modern times and is replaced
by acceptance only of conduct commonly regarded as conducive to
social well-being. The three doctrines - police power, taxation, and
eminent domain have changed the conception of property, so that it could
hardly be said to exist as variant of the older conception. A new theory
is gradually coming into supremacy, and Dietze remarks:
It was argued that the advantages accruing from
them to other individuals and society were out of pro^g>r-
tion to the disadvantages suffered by the proprietor.
All this makes it plain that rights of private property cannot be justified
in terms of the logical consequences of acknowledging the concept of
property at all.
Closer investigations have shown that the institution of private
property has not existed in all forms of society. It was not the indi¬
vidual but society which first asserted the principle of ownership. It
was the tribe, the clan or the family which asserted - this is ours. Maine says,
26
"Ancient law knows next to nothing of individuals." Communal
possession is the preliminary stage in the evolution of property.
25. Dietze, G., In Defense of Property, London 1971, paperback ed.
p. 109.
26. Maine, H. , Ancient Law, London 1880, p. 258.
Private ownership came as a ^ater step in the 7ong series of changes,
though this transformation is obscure to human knowledge. One needs
to quote the words of Maine about the beginning and transformation of
this change:
We at length know something concerning the
beginnings of the great institution of property in land.
The collective ownership of the soil by groups of men
either in fact united by blood-relationship, or believing
or assuming that they are so united, is now entitled to
take rank as an ascertained primitive phenomenon, once
universally characterising those communities of mankind
between whose civilisation and gyr own there is any
distinct connection or analogy.
.Again in Ancient Law he says:
W e have the strongest reason for thinking that
property once belonged ... to larger societies ... but
the mode of transitior^'rom ancient to modern ownership
/Ts7 obscure at best.
Private property cannot, therefore, claim for its justification that it
has always existed as an institution. It is most impressive to observe
how institutions begin, alter, and take new shape and part from the
old but at the same time maintain continuity with the old. No institution
can continue its usual life without changing itself to the new circum¬
stances. As Maine states:
No institution of the primitive world is likely to
have been preserved to our day, unless it h^s acquired
an elasticity foreign to its original nature.




Maine, H. , The Early History of Institutions, London 1880, pp. 1
Maine, H., , ncient Law, p. 268.
Maine, H., Ancient Law, p. 264.
possession. Asa first principle we believe that every thing must have
an owner. Human nature may be the same in its fundamental character¬
istics, but in every period it is living under new and widely different
kinds of civilisation. The institution of property at every stage
represents a new conception. The change is slow and silent as pointed
30
out by Dietze. If we look at the present and compare it with the past
the difference in the end amounts to something Uke a revolution. So it
is with changing conception of property. The rights of property exist¬
ing under Roman taw no longer exist now in the same sense. Law does
not allow a man to spend his own money in all sorts of gambling and
opium eating, nor does it allow him to destroy his own money by defacing
currency. Requirements on cigarette manufacturers to declare their
own product as injurious to health are a most recent example of the way
change is wrought in the conception of property. All such restrictions
on the right of property have been justified on the ground of public
welfare for which the institution of property exists.
Civilisation is a rare event in human history. It begins, as
Sheldon states
When the epoch has been reached at which men,
besides asserting "This is mine", come also to say, "That
is thine."
What is it that authorises a man to say of anything - This is mine?
What gives him the right to what he possesses? Property is a social
institution. Its function is to fulfil tne needs of human existence. What
30. Dietze, G., op.cit., Ch. IV.
31. Sheldon, W.L., "What Justifies Private Property", I.J.E., 1893,
p. 21.
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is the inherent quality of the institution of property that justifies the
quantitative aspect of the institution of property? It is not an issue
that pertains exclusively to one element of human society. We all own
something, however small it may be. Of each thing that we possess,
we say - this is mine. Why is it mine? To what extent is it right for
me to dispose of it as I please? It is for each and ail of us, irrespective
of our condition in life, to answer the query as to what justifies in
speaking of anything as - this is mine. At this point both legal science
and social sciences like economics and ethics etc. provide an answer.
VIen are troubled in thought over this question of property. They
believe they are right in their possessions yet they introspect to seek
justifications of their convictions. They feel uncomfortable because
they need justification for their possessions. How to justify private
property has become a vexed question because its justification is not
found in the idea of property itself.
Occupation theory
The question of justification of private property cannot be
answered by studying the origin of property and one who sets out with
this end in view will certainly end as a corrupter of history and science.
Nor, as has been shown, is the justification of private property found
in the idea of property itself. Still private property does exist and is
a recognised institution. Restrictions on private property are
justified on social grounds, but what are the grounds for justification
of private property itself?
One obvious, and often restated, argument is that private
property is nothing but restrictions on appropriation of objects,
converted into a right by labour, necessary for hurran existence. Thus
if appropriation is essential to life, the justification for the right of
appropriation is social and ethical. Property - the appropriation of
which is required to fulfil the necessity of human living is the only
justifiable and justified property. As Bastiat says:
Man lives and develops by appropriating certain
objects. Appropriation is a natural, providential
phenomenon, essential to life, and property is £ply
appropriation converted into a right by labour.
Without understanding the real facts, it was at first suppoaed
by Poman jurists and others including Grotius, Blackstone, Savigny,
etc. that justifications of property can be found by establishing a
principle as to how it came to exist and be established. They took it
for granted that private possession is a reward for first occupancy.
The theory of occupancy is the result of Roman idea of acquisition of
res nullius. Their belief that all things are res nuPius in a state of
nature is belied by historical facts and lega1 systems. The origin of
property is communal and an act of occupation is a singular act. Again,
there can be a recognition by society that the first occupier becomes the
owner of a res nullius only when society first gives its recognition to
the notion of res nullius. It is an expression of a simple and accepted
principle under most legal systems that "everything must have an
owner". The state of war which some jurists describe as state of
nature does not hdmit of any such principle of res nullius and first
32. Quoted in Laveleye, Primitive Property, London 1878,
p. xli.
occupancy. For example, during turbulent periods in various
countries, evacuee property laws were passed which falsifies the
theory of first occupancy as a title to property. Savigny's formula
that "property is founded on adverse possession and ripened by
prescription" is open to similar objections. Proudhon would not allow
that wrong can be made right by prescription. Maine raised a very
cogent and significant point against the doctrine when he states:
It is not wonderful that property began in adverse
possession. It is not surprising that the first proprietor
should have been the strong man armed who kept his
goods in peace. But why it was that lapse of time created
a sentiment of repsect for his possession .. .
I venture to state my opinion that the popular
impression in reference to the part played by occupancy
in the ^rst stages of civilisation directly reverses the
truth.
Again Maine states:
The sentiment in which this doctrine originated is
absolutely irreconcilable with that infrequency and
uncertainty of proprietary rights which distinguish the
beginnings of civilisation. Its true basis seems to be,
not an instinctive bias towards the institution of Property,
but a presumption, arising out of the long continuance of
that institution, that everything ought to have an owner.
When possession is taken of a "res nullius", that is, of an
object which is not, or has never been, reduced to dominion,
the possessor is permitted to become proprietor from a
feeling that all valuable things are naturally the subjects 01
an exclusive enjoyment, and that in the given case there is
no one to invest with the right of property except the
Occupant. The Occupant, in short, becomes the owner,
because all things are presumed to be somebody's property
and because no one can be pointed out as having a better ^
right than he to the proprietorship of this particular thing.
Another suggestion given by John Stuart Mill that it is not occupancy
33. Evacuee Property Act in India 1948.
34. Maine, Ancient Law, pp. 255-256.
35. Maine, Ancient Law, pp. 256-257.
that gave the right of property but the purpose of maintaining peace and
order in primitive systems matured occupancy into right of property.
To quote the words ofMill:
Private property, as an institution, did not owe its
origin to any of those considerations of utility, which plead
for the maintenance of it when established. Enough is
known of rude ages, both from history and from analogous
states of society in our own time, to show that tribunals (which
always precede laws) were originally established, not to
determine rights, but to repress violence and terminate
quarrels. With this object chiefly in view, they naturally
enough gave legal effect to first occupancy, by treating as
the aggressor the first person who first commenced
violence, by turning, or attempting to turn, another out of
possession. The preservation of the peace, which was the
Original object of civil government, was thus attained: while
by confirming, to those who already possessed it, even what
was not the fruit of personal exertion, a guarantee was
incidentally given to them^nd others that they would be
protected in what was so.
Upon these theories one may justify past occupancies for being long
37
established, but ownership of the present day commercial properties
would be at best remotely analogous because it is not might but law that
bestows right upon occupancy. Legal and social evolution reveals to
us a stage of right based on appropriation, not any supposed state of
nature in which individuals by 'natural right' occupy res nullius objects.
Property is a creature of law which furnishes it with its ethical basis.
Bossuet says:
Banish governments, and the earth and all its
fruits are as much the common property of all mankind as
the air and the light. According to this primitive natural
36. Mill, J.S., op.cit., p. 201.
37. The stability of an institution being long established cannot be a
criterion for its justification that it is right. Stability is not
a criterion of ideal sense of justice. Stability might be the
result of suppression and hence injustice.
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right, no one has an exclusive right to anything, but every
thing is a prey for all. In a regulated government no
individual may occupy anything ... Hence arises the right
of property, and, generally sggaking, every right must
spring from public authority.
A similar view is expressed by Bentham when he states:
I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which I
regard as mine, except through the promise of the law
which guarantees it to me ...
Property and taw are born together, and die together.
Before laws were made the^was no property; take away
laws, and property ceases.
The principle of occupancy is thus not a principle of justifica¬
tion of private property. As Mill suggests:
In considering the institution of property as a
question of social philosophy, w^must leave out of
consideration its actual origin.
41
Prescriptive occupation is recognised even today, but it is a principle
for settling or preventing disputes. Law does not always stick to
abstract justice at the expense of peace and security. The theory of
occupancy is, thus, not a theory about the justification of property but
a theory of convenience. Second, it ignores the main idea of property
- the appropriation of externa1 physical objects necesaary for human
existence since it leaves those who have nothing to occupy without
direct access to means of subsistence. It is thus quite certain that
38. Quoted in Laveleye, op.cit., p. 344.
39. Bentham, op.cit., pp. 112-113.
40. Mill, op.cit., p. 201.
41. The philosophy of the Statute of Limitation is not based on
sense of justice but preservation and stability. If an individual
has he^d or occupied property for a certain period, he is given
the title to it. Law sets a limit beyond which it does not like
to interfere.
one cannot justify private property through the notion that it is originally
established by occupancy.
It has been asserted that ownership is utterly without justifica¬
tion. But as yet the world accepts the institution of property in one
form or the other. The issue is to square private property with the
function for which the institution exists. Every one has asked how the
institution of private property came to be established. What is its
origin? But there has been less attention to the question why it was
established and should continue to be accepted. What purpose does it
serve? Any theory which purports to juatiiy the institution of private
property must answer that question.
In my submission the best answer to these inquiries takes
account of the right to the necessities of life implied in the right to life
for
you do take my life when you do take the means by
which I live.
Contractarian arguments
Sometimes the justification of the institution of property is
found in the contract which individuals, at some time in the past,
perhaps thousands of years ago, entered to respect the rights of one
another. The right of property is thought to be one of them. This
original contract is considered the source of the right of property and
hence its justification. In the first place there is no evidence of this
original contract. Even if one presumes the existence of such a
42. Hobson, J.A., op.cit., p. 90.
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contract, the following questions arise. Is it still binding after thousands
of years? Is it not affected by the rule of perpetuity? Is not the
doctrine of frustration appUcafre to it with the change of circumstances?
Ten obey contracts because of the mutual advantage they derive from
their performance, independent of contracts. It is to their common
interest to obey. If this is so, the presumption of an original contract
becomes superfluous. It is the mutual interest that brought the
institution of property into existence. Hume gives a final blow to the
idea of original contract when he states:
Almost all the governments which exist at present,
or of which there remains any record in story, have been
founded originally either on usurpation or conquest or
both, without any pretence of a fair consent or voluntary
subjection of the people. When an artful and bold man is
placed at the head of an army or faction, it is often easy
for him, by employing sometimes violence, sometimes
false pretences, to establish las dominion over a people
a hundred times more numerous than his partisans ...
By such arts as these many governm ents have been
established; and this all the original contract which
they have to boast of.
Hume thus states:
The original establishment ||as formed by violence
and submitted to from necessity.
The justification of such governments is in the utility of the function
they now perform, not in any pretended legitimacy of their foundation.
Applying this negation of original contract to the institution of property,
Hume states;
It is confessed that private justice, or the abstinence
43. Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Aiken, H.D.,
New York 1948, p. 360.
44. Ibid p. 363.
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from the properties of others, is a most cardinal virtue.
Yet reason tells us that there is no property in durable
objects such as land or houses, when carefully examined
in passing from hand to hand, but must income period
have been founded on fraud and injustice.
46
Kant comes to the rescue of the theory of contract by holding
that provisional rights are created by specification and become final
only by the consent of the members of the society. He does not regard
it as a historical fact, but as a juridical necessity. But the moment
one speaks of juridical necessities, one begs the question of general
principles of law which, it is submitted, belong to the realities of
social institutions, and cannot be established a priori by transcendental
reasoning.
The justification of property does not depend on contract or
convention. Such a contract does not secure to the individuals the
fruits of their labour on which property depends. Nor does it take
account of the necessity of private property to meet the need of the
individual for the necessary means of living.
Property as the fruit of labour
What constitutes a valid title to property is enunciated by
Locke in a very innocent and simple principle - one who labours is
entitled to the fruits of labour. Labour is the justification of property.
Locke states:
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be
45. Ibid, p. 368.
46. Kant, Philosophy of Law, trans. Hastie, W ., Edinburgh 1887,
pp. 81-99.
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common to all men, yet every man has a property in
,own person; this nobody has any right to but himself.
But the ownership of one's body is not property but poverty.
One's body is a means to acquire property but not itself property.
How can an arm or leg be the object of property? They are not
objects of appropriation.
Locke further states:
The labour of his body and the work of his hands
we may say are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he
removes out of the state that nature hath provided and
left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it
something^|jbLat is his own, and thereby makes it his
property.
The principle enunciated in Locke's theory is very simple but
it does not harmonise with real facts and circumstances. It gives to
the individual 'right to the whole produce of labour'. It is possible
only if production is a single man's act. There is, even in the
primitive economy particiiarly, no individual production and no individual
productivity. The isolated individual is not a productive agent.
Production takes place only in society - in a group, large or small.
It is thus not possible to point out which part has been produced by a
particular individual. No one can say: 'that is absolutely mine'.
But one can separate men in their consumption if not in their production.
What one eats, one digests as well.
A more fatal objection concerns the creative process. Wealth
47. Locke, J., The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter
Concerning Toleration, ed. J.W. Gough, Oxford 1946, p. 15.
48. Ibid,, p. 15.
is produced out of something, out of previously existing wealth or
sources of wealth. If it is already owned or possessed privately then
all members of society have not an equal opportunity of creating wealth.
Thus the principle, production is the produce of the producer, becomes
illusory. The institution of private property is recognised not because
of any inherent right of the individual, but because it is an institution
which iB thought to be for the good of society.
Locke's theory that the natural owner is the person who has
produced an article directly appeals to human sentiments and (similarly
to the theories of Kant and Hegel) attaches property to the owner's
being. It has always been a favourite plea that property was rooted in
human nature before it appeared in social systems. But the relation
between an object of labour and a labourer imposes no obUgation on
others to regard that object as his property. It leads to an idea out
of which the concept of property is formed. This intimate relationship
with the article produced which is the immediate result of creative
industry is like man's shadow, the reflection of his image in water.
These articles produced lie outside the limit-of his person and to many
of them he stands in an economic relation rather than in an organic
relation. As Veblen states:
Under the guidance of this habit of thought, the
relation of any individual to his personal effects iB
conceived to be of a more intimate kind than that of owner¬
ship simply. Ownership is^>o external and colorless
a term to describe the fact.
Locke imposes a limit on appropriation of property. His
49. Veblen, T., "The Beginning of Ownership", A.J.S., 1898, p. 855.
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theory is based on equal rights of all individuals. In his theory he
maintains the spirit of natural law that all men are equal and have equal
rights of appropriation as
labour being the unquestionable property of the
labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is
once joined to, at least there is enough and as good
left in common for others.
In a state of nature where property is common, man should take as much
as is necessary for him. For this act of appropriation he does not
require the consent of his fellow beings because
If such a consent as that was necessary, man had_^
starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.
Locke makes a presumption that in state of nature everybody takes
care of others because everybody will take as much as is required:
No mail's labour could subdue or appropriate all;
nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part
so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to
entrench upon the right of another, or acquire to himself
a property to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would
still have room for as good and as large a possession
(after the othegv^had taken out his) as before it was
appropriated.
If in the state of nature men are so careful of one another,
how did they become so selfish when the state of nature came to an end?
Habit is the fly-wheel of character. Suppose that I completely agree
(for the time being) with Hobbes that man is selfish by nature. Then
either men are not careful of one another in the state of nature, or it
is a mere wish of Locke that they so behave themselves. Second,
50. Locke, op.cit., p. 15.
51. Ibid, p. 16.
52. Ibid, ip. 18-19.
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Locke is postulating a society where everything is in abundance; needs
of the individuals are uniform. But such a society, even if presumptive,
where needs of the individuals are the same, is illusory. Property
must keep pace with the needs of the individuals or, eitner the one or
the other must perish. With the disparity of needs certain things will
be absorbed quickly and others remain dis-proportionate. In such a
state of things disputes are bound to occur irrespective of their good
character in state of nature. Third, Locke does not provide any
remedy where an individual takes more than his share. Where an
individual has collected more than his share and has not left enough for
others, either they must die of hunger and let nature in Malthus's
sense execute her order; or they must revolt and deprive some one
else of the fruits of his labour. If such a thing happens, or if Locke
lets it happen, his idea of the state of nature falls down. Locke does
not provide any solution to the problem except by insisting on his theory
of social contract that it allows unequal division of property and thus
discarding any idea of revolt by those who have nothing since they
consent to have nothing; a situation which indeed seems a paradox. In
fact Locke was content to devise natural limits to private property.
But his limits devised by the method of
As much as any one can make use of to any advantage
of life before it spoils,
were promptly overridden with the invention of money (as conceived by
Locke) and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it as an instru-
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rr.ent of exchange. Locke indeed considered it legitimate for men to
53. Ibid, p. 17.
54. Ibid, p. 26.
collect as much as possible because it does not spoil. Here one can
argue with Locke and conclude that it is not use but rather perishability
that is the real limit of private property. Excesses of private
property do not consist in hoarding of non-perishable material but in
hoarding perishable stuff. Locke in fact did not follow the logical
conclusions of his own theory but was busy in fact defending the status
quo. As Larkin says:
While Locke seems to recognise the importance of
distinguishing between what one may call essential or
natural and positive or institutional property rights, he
appears, on the whole, to be so convinced of the pragmatic
value of existing property arrangements that he is disposed
to regard them as natural and necessary. Thus it is a
matter of some difficulty to determine how far, if at all,
he desired that the criterion of labour and human needs,
which limited the right of property at one period of the
"state of nature", should be applied to the facts of property
in his own time ... Probably Locke did not realise the
far reaching consequences of this concession to self-interest,
any more than he perceived the revolutionary import
of his statement that human needs and labour set natural
limits to the acquisition of property.
The net result, however, of his vacillating attitude
was that a theory of property rights based on the legal
status quo of his day tended to be substituted for one which
traced the justification of property to its origin in human
needs and human labour. In other words, the state's
sanction could be regarded as a sufficient justification of
lajcge fortunes no matter by what means acquired.
Larkin's assessment is right because Locke also provided a concession
to the then prevailing views that the poor are lazy and immoral, it is
their way of life that is responsible for their poverty by insisting that
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"the penury of his condition required it of him" to labour for his
55. Larkin, P., Property in the Eighteenth Century with Special
Reference to England and Locke, London 1930, pp. 77-79.
56. Locke, op.cit., p. 17.
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existence which led to the minimum of wages for labour so as to secure
that their poverty incites them to work.
Landed property can be acquired in the same way as any other
property - by mixing one's labour with it; and thus landed property is
subject to the tame limitations as any other property. As Locke
states:
As much land as a man tills, plants, improves,
cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his
property.
For he that leaves as much as anothg^ can make
use of does as good as take nothing at all.
Locke's argument is that a man can take as much land for cultivation as
he can n ake use of, and second, as much the product of which he can
use. Suppose one man takes one acre of very fertile land the product
of which is sufficient for his use. Another man takes two acres of arid
land and gets produce sufficient for his use. Through extensive labour
and he makes this land as fertile as that of a first man, and starts
getting more than sufficient for his use. According to Locke's principle
he has more than his fair share, but there is no way of depriving him
of his labour because that would again be a robbery as per Locke's
principle of labour. The reason for such paradoxes in his theory is
that he builds his theory on presumptions, which ought to exist in society,
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and tried to apply then to existing society where these do not work.
57. Ibid, pp. 17-lb.
58. In fact the postulate of the 'state of nature' should be used
to show not what has occurred in the past, but what would occur
if intelligent decisions should be made in future social
arrangements.
Private property in land may have been justified on Locke's principle
in the beginning, that is, in the state of nature, if there was any such
state, but it is difficult to see how it can be justified now.
Legislatures are introducing wider and wider restrictions on property,
especially on land, due to increase in population and dwindling natura1
resources. Thus Locke's theory, though its truth is very doubtful,
applies only to a particular time. It cannot be of general application.
Even in Locke's time it was not true, apart from its political implica-
59
tion^ to defend his theory of limited government.
Locke admits that a state of nature cannot continue in which
g' I
whole property remains common. He gave two reasons by which
state of nature came to an end and resulted in unequal possession.
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1) Division of property by contract.
59. Locke's political views are beyond the scope of this thesis.
60. Locke states:
God gave the world to men in common; but
since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest
conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it,
it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain
common and uncultivated.
Op. cit., p. 18.
61. Locke stated:
Men at first, for the most part, contented
themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their
necessities; and though afterwards, in some parts of
the world (where the increase of people and stock, with
the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some
value), the several communities settled the bounds of
their distinct territories, and, by laws within themselves,
regulated the properties of the private men of their
society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the
property which labour and industry began.
Ibid, p. 24.
2) Introduction of money.
Locke here introduces a new element, which he could not avoid
to explain the unequal possession of property, that property was the
conventional creation of men. In the original state of nature property
was common. Civil society is the result of agreement and agreement
is binding because of natural law. It is not clear in his theory, how
he reconciles the thesis that property is the product of human labour,
a natural right which existed before the agreement, with the fact that
it came to be regulated by positive law which even creates new property
rights which were either non-existent in stete of nature or in Locke's
time. Locke's explanation of this reconciliation is self-contradictory
because either the natural rights do not change and remain the same;
or, if they change, they are not natural rights. He claims that private
property itself requires no justification; but surely the property that
the modern state creates is justified on the ground of social welfare
by reason of the duties of property and the responsibilities of owner¬
ship. The contract which brought the state into existence merely
63
"settled the property which labour and industry began," for those "who
02. Locke further explains:
And thus came in the use of money - some lasting
thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that,
by mutual consent, men would take in exchange for the
truly useful but perishable supports of life.
And as different degrees of industry were apt to
give men possessions in different proportions, so this
invention of money gave them the opportunity to
continue and enlarge them.
Ibid, p. 25.
63. Ibid, p. 24.
have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this
original law of nature, for the beginning of property in what was before
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common, still takes place . Again he says:
As families increased, and industry enlarged their
stocks, their possessions enlarged with the need of them;
but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in
the ground they made use of, till they incorporated,
settled themselves together, and built cities; and then,
by consent, they came in time to set out the bounds of
their distinct territories, and agree on limits between
them and their neighbours, and by laws within them^lves,
settled the properties of those of the same society.
He gives recognition to property rights created by men which are valid
only because men have agreed to respect them. He even goes to the
length of admitting the fully positive measures in dealing with property
rights when he states:
In governments the laws regulate the right of
property, and the possession offend is determined by
positive constitutions.
This is thus turning to the theory of property which was later promoted
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by the positivist school. Locke's sense of convenience led him to
contradict his own theory. On the one hand he gives the impression
68
that rights are natural, inborn and inalienable, and on the other hand
64. Ibid, p; 16.
65. Ibid, p. 21.
66. Ibid, p. 26.
67. Strictly speaking Locke is a utilitarian. In his theory of knowledge
he denies the existence of innate and inborn ideas. In his theory of
property he defends his utilitarianism and states "Right and conven¬
ience went together." (Locke, op.cit., p. 26) But in general,
when dealing with theory of property, he treats his subject as if
property rights are innate and inborn.
68. What is the meaning of natural right? Is it inborn and innate in
Locke's theory of property? Or does it mean a right which is
necessary for human living? To say that right of property is
natural in the sense that without it man cannot survive does not
mean that it is inborn. It is the recognition of this subsistence
(see over)
tries to justify them on utilitarian basis.
Locke enunciated his theory that natural rights give to the
producer the product of his produce. He introduced an equalitarian
principle. But in the end he implied that it was the right of each man
to keep what he had, however he had acquired it and whether he could
use it or not. He says that modern property rights are instituted by
law but he ended by asserting that they are superior to law and states:
The reason why men enter into society is the
preservation of their property; and the end why they
choose and authorise a legislative is that there may be laws
3 mde, and rules set., as guards and fences to the properties
of all the members of the society, to limit the power and
moderate the dominion of every part and member of the
society. For since it can never be supposed to be the will
of the society that the legislative should have a power to
destroy that which every one designs secure by entering
into society, and for which the people submitted themselves
to legislators of their own making, whenever the legislators
endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the
people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power,
they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who
are thereupon absolved from any further obedience, and are
left to the common refuge which^od hath provided for all
men against force and violence.
68. (Continued from previous page) that constitutes the right of
property, and this recognition does not make it a Natural right',
at any rate in the sense of the 'innate1 one. Right of property is
not only based on subsistence but something more - it is economic
as well. It refers not only to food but the means of appropriation.
Thus the right of property is not inborn but a conventional right.
Second, if right of property is secured only by labour, what
about a man who is totally handicapped for his life? He cannot
mix his labour, and thus cannot get property. In fact he is
born propertyless, or with less property, since according to
Locke property is in one's faculties. But even Locke would
not refuse a life to such a man, and would arrange for his
subsistence. Thus the right to property is not inborn, what
is inborn is right of subsistence. Property is to be based on
this right of subsistence and not on labour. Labour is only
one of the means to secure property.
69. Locke, op.cit., pp. 107-108.
Philosophers ox natural law have not been able to derive property
from the law of nature. Property cannot be derived from laws of
nufcire, but laws of nature can provide the contents of a good society for
the better living of her members. The laws of property have their
basis in human needs and wants. The logical obscurities in Locke's
theory and the futility of attempting to justify ownership on natural laws
is well demonstrated by the utilitarian arguments of Hume and Bentham
who found a substitute for it; and by socialist writers who took Locke's
theory to its logical conclusion. However, the principle that produce
is the product of the producer remained the accepted principle with
all 'isms'.
Locke's principle cannot seek justification in present social
conditions and environments because to be rich one uses the labour ol'
others. As Mill says:
The laws of property have never yet conformed
to the principle 5^^n which the justification of private
property rests.
Capital is not personality, even though Locke seeks the justification of
capital ownership in one's organic faculties.
Utilitarianism - Expedience and security of possessions
There is another aspect of the problem which needs careful
introduction and expression to understand it as a justification of private
property. The basic idea is that of expediency. The utilitarian thesis
which has been popularised by Bentham, but which was previously
70. Mill, op.cit., p. 208.
stated by David Hume, is that private property and its laws have no
other justification than utility. The obligation which we recognise to
respect each other's property, depends on the existence of conventions
and laws which are ju stified as essential both to our own and to the public
interest. For Hume states if
the necessities of human race continue the same as
at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete
with friendship and generosity, that every man has the
utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no more
concern for his own interest than for that of his fellows;
it seems evident, that the use of justice would, in this
case, be suspended by such an extensive benevolence,
nor would the divisions and barriers (^property and
obligation have ever been thought of.
An individual in seeking his happiness promotes that of the community.
In promoting his interest, he promotes the general interest. Applying
this principle of utility to property, Hume argues that property and its
laws are in fact based on utilitarian principles, and states
Not only is it requisite, for the peace and interest
of society, that men's possesions should be separated;
but the rules, which we follow, in making the separation,
are such as can best^e contrived to serve farther the
interests of society.
Hume says that in a society where there is unlimited supply of goods,
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there is no need of laws of property, since they serve no purpose.
Hume agrees with Locke that laws should secure to the
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producer the product of his industry. But whereas Locke seeks a
71. Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Aiken, H.D., New
York 1948, p. 186.
72. Ibid, p. 192.
73. Hume states:
For what purpose make a partition of goods, where
every one has already more than enough? ... Why call
this object mine, when, upon the seizing of it by another,
I need but stretch out my hand to possess myself to what
is equally valuable?
Ibid, p. 185.
74. Ibid, p. 194.
natural law justification, Hume justifies private property on a
utilitarian basis and states:
Examine the writers on the law of nature; and you
will always find, that, whatever principles they set out
with, they are sure to terminate here at last, and to assign,
as the ultimate reason for every ru^ which tjlfy establish,
the convenience and necessities of ma ind.
Hume objects to Locke's idea that an individual joins his labour with
the object. The connection between the labourer and the object of his
labour imposes no obligation on other men to regard that object as his
property. t the most such a relation leads to an idea of ownership.
Hume, who is generally as the founder of the modern utilitarianism
gave the idea that all duties consist in promoting the general good, that
is, happinessHn the sense of pleasure. If all duties spring from this
principle, then rights must spring from the same principle. Thus the
right of property and obligations spring not from this close relation,
as Locke believes, but from utilitarian considerations of the promotion
of happiness. Hume agrees with the theory of social contract only in
the very diluted sense that the convention is defined as a sense
of common interest which ^eads each man to concur with others, into a
general plan or system of actions which tends to public utility. Nothing
but the sense of advantage is the basis ox convention. ' The laws of
property are conventions which men obey because it is normally in their
common interest to do so.
Hume examines a number of possibilities to find out the basis
75. Ibid, p. 194.
76. Ibid, pp. 357-358.
on which a man should acquire property. Hume clearly rejects an idea
that property ought to be proportionate to man's virtues. Hume says:
... were mankind to execute such a law; so great
is the uncertainty of.merit, both from its natural
obscurity, and from1 the self-conceit of each individual,
that no determinate rule of conduct would ever result
from it; and the total dissolution of society must be the
immediate consequence. Fanatics may suppose, that
dominion is founded on grace, and that saints alone inherit
the earth; but the civil magistrate very justly puts these ^
sublime theorists on the same footing with common robbers.
The second alternative, Hume scrutinises, is of absolute
equality of property. He rejects an idea of absolute equality and
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regards it as a work of political fanatics. About equality he says:
It must, indeed, be confessed, that nature is so
liberal to mankind, that, were all her presents equally
divided among the species, and improved by art and
industry, every individual would enjoy ail the necessaries,
and even most of the comforts of life; nor would ever be
liable to any ills, but such as might accidentally arise
from the sickly frame and constitution of his body. It
must also be confessed, that, wherever we depart from this
equality, we rob the poor of more satisfaction than we add
to the rich, ... It may appear withal, that the rule of
equality, as it would be highly useful, is not altogether
impracticable, but has^ken place, at least in an imperfect
degr ee, in ... Sparta.
But he further adds:
... however specious these ideas of perfect equality
may seem, they are really, at bottom, impracticable;
and were they not so, would be extremely pernicious to
human society. Render possessions ever so equal, men's
different degrees of art, care,and industry will immediately
break that equality. Or if you check these virtues, you
reduce society to the most extreme indigence; and instead
of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it
77. Ibid, pp. 192-193.
78. Ibid, p. 193.
79. Ibid, p. 193.
unavoidable to the whole community. The moat rigoroua
inquisition too is requisite to watch every inequality on its
first appearance; and the most severe jurisdiction, to
punish and redress it. But besides, that so much
authority must soon degenerate into tyranny, and be
exerted with great partialities; who can possibly be
possessed of it, in such a situation as is here supposed?
Perfect equality of possessions, destroying aH
subordination, weakens extremely the authority of
magistracy, and mu^reduce all power nearly to a level,
as well as property.
The third alternative which Hume reconyends, is similar to
that of Locke, though justified it on different grounds:
Who sees not ... that whatever is produced or
improved by a man's art or industry ought, for ever, to
be secured to him, in order to give encouragement to
such useful habits and accomplishments? That the
property ought also to descend to children and relations,
for the same useful purpose? That it may be alienated
by consent, in order to beget that commerce and inter¬
course which is so beneficial to human society? And that
all contracts and promises ought carefully to be fulfilled
in order to secure mutual trust and confidence, by whi^|i
the general interest of mankind is so much promoted?
Hume from the very beginning was convinced that Locke and
his followers have confused between natural rights and utilitarian
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principles. Hume argues that uninstructed nature does not make
any distinction between waat is to be mine and what yours. In fact,
Hume argues, all writers of natural law philosophy act on the principle
of convenience and necessities of mankind. And this convenience and
necessity is the ultimate basis of al1 rules.
Hume is, thus, also the proponent of an idea which would
80. Ibid, pp. 193-184
81. Ibid, p. 194.
82. Ibid, p. 194.
ascribe the whole produce of labour to the labourer. But his aim in
enunciating and supporting such a theory is the happiness and the
interest of human society. As he says:
We must have recourse to statutes, customs,
precedents, analogies, and a hundred other circumstances;
... But the ultimate point, in which they ail professedly
terminate, is the interest and happiness of human society.
W here this enters not into consideration, nothing can appear
more whimsical, unnatural, and even superstitiou^ then
all or most of the laws of justice and of property.
By insisting that all laws of property are conventions and not natural as
Locke claims, since uninstructed nature surely never made the
distinction between mine and yours, Hume makes all proprietary
questions subordinate to the authority of civil laws, as he says - civil
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laws here supply the place of the natural code. Hume thus m ade an
improvement on natural law theories by establishing the authority of
state law which is the binding force to social stability. He, like Locke,
though through the different path of positive law,, tavours maintaining the
free play of private property. So the labour on which Hume insists
is that of the capitalist as well as that ox the labourer. If labour has
nothing to labour on, it is the owner of.capital, a capitalist labourer,
on whom the simple labourer will depend for work. But then the
capitalist ought to gain, while the labourer win get his wages in return
for his work on the capitalist's stock. Hume, however, in order to
maintain the status quo and to avoid justifying any social unrest,
rejected equalitarian principles; but like Aristotle, he recommends
88. Ibid, p. 186.
84. Ibid, p. 195.
some measure of equality, and states:
It will not, I hope, be considered as a superfluous
digression, if I here observe, that as the multitude of
mechanical arts is advantageous, so is the great number
of persons to whose share the production of these arts falls.
* too great disproportion among the citizens weakens any
state. Every person, if possible, ought to enjoy the fruits
of his labour, in a full possession of ait the necessaries,
and many of the conveniences of life. No one can doubt but
such an equality is most suitable to human nature, and
diminishes much less from the happiness of the rich, than
it adds to that of the poor. It also augments the power of
the state, and makes any extra-ordinary taxes or impositions
be paid with more cheerfu'ness. Where the riches are
engrossed by a few, these must contribute very largely to
the supplying of public necessities, but when the riches are
dispersed among multitudes, the burden feels light on
every shoulder, and the taxes make not a very sensible
difference on any one's way of living.
Add to this, that where the riches are in few hands,
these must enjoy all the powers, and will readily conspire
to lay the whole burden on the poor, and oppress them still
further, to the discouragement of all industry.
Men must have profits proportionable to their expense
and hazard. Where so considerable a number of the labour¬
ing poor, as the peasants and farmers, are in very low g~
circumstances, all the rest must partake of their poverty.
B 6
Hume like Locke suggests that every person should be in the
full possession of all the necessaries and many of the conveniences of
life. The welfare of the state is in the proper distribution of wealth.
Thus one can conclude that according to Hume there should be no
propertyless person in the state because the distribution of wealth
85. Hume, D., Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, London lb83,
pp. 271-273.
86. Locke in his Letters Concerning Toleration states:
For the politica1 society is instituted for no
other end, but only to secure every man's possession
of the things of this life.
Locke, op.cit. , p. 153.
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according to the fruits of labour is in the interest of the state. But
Hume did not reach the conclusion of his own theory because he also
37
states that the poverty of the common people is a natural phenomenon.
Second, his plea for reduction of taxes on the poor so that they do not
fall on the necessaries of life, is not derived directly from his theory
or justification of property, but is presented as a desirable provision
of positive law which would encourage more work and industry. Third,
lume contradicts his own plea for a tendency towards equality by stating
that long possession is a just title to property, even though he clearly
realised and openly .stated that the first occupation was often usurpation
and based on fraud. In fact his insistence that experience gained with
the growth of commerce and industry would strengthen the humanitarian
forces and would lead to profits proportionate to the fruits of labour,
prevented him from reaching the logical implications of his theory for
practical purposes. As he states:
Industry, knowledge, and humanity, are linked
together by an indissoluble chain, and are found from
experience as well as reason to be peculiar to the more
polished, and wj^gt are commonly denominated, the more
luxurious ages.
But the humanitarianism of which Hume speaks as accompanying the
development of commerce and industry is a wish in vain.
Bentham agrees with lu ce that some ir easure of equality would
provide the greatest happiness though both are antipathetic to equality
at the cost of security. As Hume (substantially followed by Bentham)
87. Hume, Essays, op.cit. , p. 272.
88. Hume, Essays, op.cit., p. 276.
states:
The safety of the people is the supreme law; All
other particular laws are subordinate to it, and dependent
on it: ...
... all questions of property are subordinate to the
authority of civil laws, which extend, restrain, modify,
and alter the rules of natural justice, accoig^ing to the
particular convenience of each community.
Both are busy in protecting the status quo by insisting that the present
distribution of wealth is to be maintained, they might indeed have it in
mind, in allowing for a measure of equality, to maintain the property-
less people at a level at which they would remain 'middle of the road'
thus more readily accepting the existing distribution of property, and
therefore the security of actual property holders. This was a measure
devised for preserving security, giving to the poor people, to Keep
their spirits up, hope of equality and of catching up with the wealthy
people. As Benthani says:
The industry and the labour of ttyp^poor place
them among the candidates of fortune.
This was also a measure to keep the wages low as Bentham states:
The attraction oi pleasure; the succession of
wants; the active desire of increasing happiness, will
procure unceasingly, under the r<gi£n of security, new
efforts towards new acquisitions.
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Bentham while insisting on security as the principal object ol law
expresses his urge for equality and states:
89. Hume, op.cit., p. 195.
90. Bentham, J , Theory of Legislation, London 1876, p. 114.
91. Ibid, p. 101.
92. Ibid, p. 109.
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The nearer the actual proportion approaches to
equality, the greater wit! be the total mass of happiness.
He further states:
W hen property by the death of the proprietor ceases
to have an owner, t.r? law can interfere in its distribution,
either by limiting in certain respects the testamentary
power, in order to prevent too great an accumulation of
wealth in the hands of an individual; or by regulating the
succession in favour of equality in cases where the
deceased has left no consort, nor relation in the direct line,
and has made no will. The question then relates to new
acquirers who have formed no expectations; and equ^^ty
may do what is best for all without disappointing any.
Bentham's means of reaching equality by waiting to see whether a man
leaves his property without making a will, or dies without leaving any
heir, is too remote a possibility and in every-day experience is very
rare. He favours tnc free piny of property and hopes that with the
passage of time the e v alities v.ill follow automatically. Thus despite
his sympathies for equality the means he envisaged were too remote
to be of any practical value and ignored social actualities. This is
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because of his obsession with security, and because of his failure to
make a distinction betw een the positive and norm ative aspect of property
free fror lis principle of security.
Bentham states that equality is one of the aims of the principle
of utility and it would in fact result from the operation of laws framed
93. Ibid, p. 104.
94. Ibid, p. 122.
95. Bentham states:
Equality ought not to be favoured except in the
cases in which it does not interfere with security.
Ibid, p. 99.
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on that principle. Equality of wealth will produce happiness only if
there is wealth to equalise. If one goes on equalising wealth at fixed
periods of time, the time will come when there would be nothing to
equalise. He states:
If all property were equally divided, at fixed periods,
the sure and certain consequence would be, that presently
there would b<^£to property to divide. An would shortly
be destroyed.
Equality of wealth will not produce happiness, if there is no
wealth to equalise. The legislators must first make sure that men
will work and produce. Bentham, like Hume, asserts that in order to
incite men to work the law ought to secure to each man the results of
his labour. Locke also reached the same conclusion in his theory of
labour. Bentham says:
In legislation, the most important object is security.
Though no laws were made directly for subsistence, it
might easily be imagined that no one would neglect it.
But unless laws are made directly for security, it would
be quite useless to make them for subsistence. You may
order production; you may command cultivation; and you
will have done nothing. But assure to the cultivator the
fruits of his industg*,^, and perhaps in that alone you will
have done enough.
Bentham admits that law is to secure to the producer the
product of his industry, but from this he draws no conclusion that to
reduce inequalities of w ealth, property ought to be redistributed. In
this he violates his own principle of utility - the nearer the actual
proportion approaches to equality, the greater will be the total mass
96. Ibid, p. 99.
97. Ibid, p. 98.
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of happiness. He left this flaw in his theory due to two reasons.
First,he was too much occupied by his principle of security. Second,
there is an ambiguity in his principle of utility.
Bentham states that the legislators have one end in view in
distributing rights and obligations and that is to promote the happiness
of the individual. And the happiness of the individual consists in sub¬
sistence, equality, abundance, and security. Of these four ends
99
Bentham's maximum sJress is on security, so much so that he ignores
others. Without security, he believes that there is no happiness. It
is because of hi3 stress on security that he abandons even subsistence
98. Ibid, p. 104.
99. Cohen states:
It is undoubtedly for the general good to obviate
as much as possible the effect of economic shock to a
^arge number of people. The routine of life prospers
on security. But when that security contains a large
element of injustice the shock of an economic operation
by law may be necessary and ethically justified.
Cohen, M.R., Law and the Social Order, New Yor.< 1333, p. 61.
Stone, while commenting on Bentham's principle of security as
a paramonnt element in the administration of law, states:
What, for instance, did he mean by ''security", and in
what sense could it be said that "security" is paramount
over "subsistence"? In terms of the individual life
man may live without security, but he cannot live with¬
out subsistence. If by security he bad reference to a
collective state then it may indeed be true that security
may exist for some or even for many, even if sub¬
sistence is lacking for some or even for many. But if
that is his meaning he must have permitted the entry of
extraneous factors into his egalitarian calculus of indi¬
vidual pains and pleasures. Moreover, of course the
modern tendency is to deny that, in the 1ong run at any
rate, security (i.e. social stability) can be achieved
except on the basis of subsistence for substantially all
individuals.
Stone, j., The Trovince and Function of Law, London 1947, p. 286.
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which is the economic basis of the institution of property. Private
property exists and survives as an institution first and supremely
because it makes provision for the necessities of human society. In
his eagerness to avoid the radical conclusions of his theory of right of
the labourer to the whole produce of labour, he concluded that any
system of secure ownership, even one which did not award things to
their creator, was inviolate. As he says:
He IThe legislator/ ought to maintain the distribu¬
tion as it is actually established. It is this which, under
the name of justice, is regarded as his first duty. This
is a general and simple rule, which applies itself to all
states; and which adapts itself to all places, even those
of the most opposite character. There is nothing more
different than the state of property in America, in
England, in Hungary, and in Russia. Generally, in the
first of these countries, the cultivator is a proprietor;
in the second, a tenant; in the third, attached to the glebe;
in the fourth a slave. However, the supreme principle
of security commands the preservation of all these
distributions, though their nature is so different ,j^id though
they do not produce the same sum of happiness.
Bentham in rejecting equality as the basis of property repeats the
arguments of Hume and states:
If equality ought to prevail to-day it ought to prevail
always. Yet it cannot be preserved except by renewing
the violence by which it was established. It win need an
army of inquisitors and executioners as deaf to favour as
to pity; insensible to the seductions of pleasure;
inaccessible to personal interest; endowed with all the
virtues, though in a service which destroys them all. The
levelling apparatus ought to go incessantly backward and
forward, cutting off all that rises above the lime prescribed.
A ceaseless vigilance would be necessary to give to those
who had dissipated their portion, and to take from those
who by labour had augmented theirs. In such an order of
things there would be only one wise course for the governed,
- that oi prodigality; there would be but one foolish course,
- that of industry. This pretended remedy, seemingly so
100. Ibid, p. 119.
pheasant, would be a mortal poison, a burning cautery,
which would consume till it destroyed the last fibre of life.
The hostile sword in its greatest furies is a thousand times
less dreadful. It inficts butjp^rtial evils, which time
effaces and industry repairs.
Can an individua' be happy if he lacks the means of subsistence,
or if he has resources which are inadequate or insufficient fcr human
life? Security is necessary to protect subsistence, but security for
some at the cost of subsistence for others cannot promote happiness;
and if there is no subsistence, there is no need of security. Security
as a principle of utility leads to happiness only if it secures to each the
means of subsistence. The human race must live. It will adopt those
institutions which are most liable to preserve and perpetuate its exist¬
ence. The institution of private property exists and survives because
it provides the means of subsistence. Its most basic justification is
that it secures to owners of property at least the means of their
subsistence which they control independently of interference by others.
The problem is that the mere existence of an institution of private
property does not necessarily guarantee that to everyone. Aristotle
realised this r.nd insists on providing secure subsistence for a1! citizens
in order to avoid anarchy. If socia1 institutions guarantee inviolability
of the person, they must also guarantee security of subsistence which
is necessary for social existence. Nero put six people to death in
Roman Africa not because tnere was any danger to security but because
the wealth possessed by them was so disproportionate that it deprived
others of subsistence and the evil was becoming so incurable that it
101. Ibid, pp. 120-121.
might lead to anarchy. Security comes to protect property and this
leads to happiness. But security will lead to happiness only if there
is property to protect. It means there is no happiness if there is no
property.
Bentham defines utiUty thus:
By the principle of utility is meant that principle
which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever
according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose
interest is in question, or what is the same thing^i other
words, to promote or to oppose that happiness.
The pi inciple of utility guides one in the approval oi actions if they
lead to happiness and disapproval of actions if they oppose happiness.
Happiness is thus intrinsically good and whatever opposes happiness is
intrinsically bad . The meaning of the principle of utility becomes
clear when Bentham says that
by utility is meant that property in any object
whereby it tends to promote benefit, pleasure, good, or
happiness, all this in the present case comes to the same
thing, or what again comes to the same thing, to prevent
the happening of mischief, pain, evil, o^i^nhappiness, to
the party whose interest is considered.
In deciding about the interest, the party whose interest is considered,
is the individual, as a social unit. Bentham says:
A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be
for the interest of an individual when it tends to add to the
sum total of his pleasures, or what comes to^t^ same
thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.
102. n Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, London 1970, pp. 11-12.
103. Ibid, p. 12.
104. Ibid, p. 12.
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Regarding society he states:
The community is a fictitious body composed of the
individual persons w^grare considered as constituting as it
were, its members.
What interest is focused >on the individual, society is considered as
a system of mechanical and external alliance. The right of property
becomes one exclusively pertaining to individuals, having its source
in the individual not as a member of society but as a unit. Such a view
will lead Bentham to concede to TSocke's idea of property as a natural
right, though through his utilitarian principles. The rights will be
the rights of the individual, not as a member of the society but as a unit
which composes the society which is an aggregate of these units, and
will be accepted or rejected by him not for social considerations but
for his ego-centric pleasure or happiness. The ideal win be that an
action is good not because it is socially advantageous but good because
it is advantageous to the individual. Bentham stresses the development
of society through individuals and not the development of individuals
through society. His is an attempt to discredit objective criteria and
substitute subjective standards. It is the business of society to main¬
tain and make effective the right of property, but it has no power to
modify and control the right. Of course this is not the intention of
Bentham. But given his premises the conclusion is unavoidable,
because of society being considered as an organic whole, the units
comprising it
will be inseparab^ aspects of a complex whole,
neither one coming first nor standing above the other; but,
105. Ibid, p. 12.
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through the conscious interaction of individuals, thjp^gne
will be seen in the many, and the many in the one.
and on that hypothesis it is possible to maintain and harmonise rights,
in Other words, to maintain harmonisfcble rights. The principle of
utility will direct property for the convenience of society. In such a
case the result will be increase of total happiness, rather than the
happiness of
the individual agent, for that would make the principle
of utility nothing but the principle of enlightened self-
interest and not, as Bentham ^gjpnded it to be, the funda¬
mental principle of morality.
Bentham intends adoption of the principle of utiUty to augment the
happiness of the community, and states:
An action then may be said to be conformable to
the principle of utility or for shortness's sake to utility,
meaning with respect to the community at large, when the
tendency it has to augment the happiness^c^the community
is greater than any it has to diminish it.
It was due to Bentham's inability to see society as an entity
in which
the life of each citizen is not regarded as limited by
birth and death; it is but a continuation of the existence of
his forefathers, jjLgg it will be prolonged in the existence of
his descendants,
that the interest of the individual appears to him as separately existing
not as an organic interest but as if it were a sfareholder's interest in a
"•united company. An action that would augment the interest of society
106. Haney, L.H., "The Social Point of View in Economics",
28 Q. J.E., 1913, p. 128.
107. Bentham and Legal Theory, ed. James, M.H., Belfast 1978, p. 11.
108. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals & Legislation, op. cit. , p. 12.
109. Maine, Ancient Law, London 1880, p. 258.
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is the action of its individual members taken together against the action
o those whose acts are diminishing utility - the principle which gives
Bentham his quantitative variables comparable to physics. But when
this principle read with his theory of society as an aggregate of indi¬
viduals is applied to private property, it means that the greatest number
of individuals having property would mean greatest happiness and this
leads according to Bentham to the greatest dispersion of property,
which would lead to ultimate equality. But Bentham shuns this
conclusion and avoids the full implications of his theory. Instead he
declares that equality is not to be preferred to security because it
would threaten the institution of private property; thus he nullified his
own principle of utility.
Whether under the natural right theory of Locke or the
utilitarianism of Bentham, it is agreed that producer is the rightful
owner of the produce. The utilitarnianiam ox Bentham rejects natura1
rights because of their metaphysical basis, but he accepts the practical
conclusions which natural right theory sustains. Their conclusions
are the same though they empToy different means. They all give support
to the doctrine of Adam Smith as he states:
The property which every man has in his own
labour, as it is the original foundation other property,
so it is the most sacred and inviolable.
All these thinkers discussed above repeat the idea, first, of
the right of theindividuai to require property, and second, the right of
110. Smith, A., op.cit., vol. i, p. 126.
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the labourer to the produce of his labour. But as soon as we admit that
one mailer ay belong to another , even in the case oi' the contract of
employment, we have radically transformed the original simplicity oi
the theory. The owner of capital owns the fruits of the labour of
others, which does not seem justifiable on the original premises of the
labour theory. The idea expressed by Locke*** that it is labour indeed
that puts the difference of value on everything, is carried on by others,
but in practice it is labour that gets the minimum as Adam Smith states:
As soon as land becomes private property, the
landlord demands a share of almost all the produce which
the labourer can either raise, or collect from it. His
rent makes the first deduction froip^tpe produce oi the
labour which is employed on land.
Since the period of industrial growth and capital accumulation the
theories that made headway in practice through these thinkers, were
those that recommended the low wages so as to give an incentive to
the labourer to work hard to earn his living. This is a theory of
social expediency rather than of justice and it reversed the very conception
of private property as subordinate to rum an needs. Appropriation
became separate fror labour. In fact the idea that prevailed was the
protection oi property rather than labour, and Montesquieu's remarks
trium phed
When the rich^jp.inish their expenditures, the




Locke, op.cit., p. 26.
Smith, op.cit., p. 66.
Quoted in Moran, T.F., "The Ethics of Wealth", The American
Journal of Sociology, 1901, p. 332.
A similar remark was made by Adam Smith when he states - those
who live oy rent are inseparably connected with the general interest
oi society.1 The emphasis was on the subordination of the use of
property to tae rignt of ownership rather than of the right of ownership
to the use of property. No one declared that human needs should be
the first charge on industry in an age when many workers had no
definite property in anything but their labour. In fact the rationale of
private property was lost in the desire to find the mode or ways by
which property was acquired and the sense of equality and social
purposiveness lost ground to preserving existing inequalities in the
name of maintaining security. Property as an institution lost its
essential justifying merit at the very hands of those who themselves
found its origin in human and social needs and started welcoming its
existence in a law of property, of which it could justly be said that :
our present law of property, which centres in private
possession, does not, in the first place, guarantee to the
labourer the whole product of his labour. By assigning the
existing objects of wealth, and especially the instruments
of production, to individuals to use at their pleasure, our
law of property invests such individuals with an ascendency,
by virtue of which without any labour of their own, they
draw an unearned income which they can apply to the satis¬
faction of their wants. This income, for which the
legally-favoured recipients return no personal equivalent
to society.
T^e justification of private property on utility is not an ideal
solution. The utilitarian version of the institution of property may be
ideal under particular conditions and at particular times but might be
114. Smith, A., op.cit., p. 263.
115. Menger, A., The Right to the Whole Produce of Labour, trans.
Tanner, .I.E., London 1899, pp. 2-3. r
unsatisfactory under other conditions. There is a struggle on the
part of human race for its own life and preservation which in the long
run is determined by economic institutions. The institution of property
based on the economic needs of society under whatever conditions and
circumstances would be an ideal solution. To treat the institution of
property as based on the right of subsistence is to my mind the best
solution of the problem of justification. The control of the individual
over property for his well-being and development (over those tilings
which are necessary in the circumstances) is the guide to the justifica¬
tion of private property. This includes all those forms of property
which in a given society are necessary for individual's social life and
turns property natural because of the physical and moral limits
provided by the conditions in a given society. Thus the justification of
private property is not to be found in any utilitarian criterion, but in
the need of the institution of property for each individual's living.
Property in the simplest conditions of society would be based on this
criterion. Even a slave, whose owner is intelligent enough, would
grant him right of property on this criterion of subsistence. Hobson,
while expressing his feelings about right of life, states:
"The right to life" is not a foolish or a useless
phrase. It implies a recognition that it is the supreme
duty of society to secure the life of all serviceable members,
together with an implication that the life of every member
shall be deemed serviceable, unless known to be otherwise.
So there is a clear individual right to property in all
"necessaries" of life implied in the right to life, for "youjcto,
take my life when you do take the means by which I live. "
116. Hobson, J.-A., op.cit., pp. 8t-y0.
Aristotle suggests that wealth should be sought as a basis for livelihood.
The true basis of property is as a means of supplying the needs of
117
human existence.
117. Aristotle, T.H.F., Politics, Penguin Books, 19 68, Book I, Ch. 8.
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CHAPTER V
Justification of Private Property (Contd.)
THE SOCIALIST CRITIQUE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
The ap^xoach of the classical liberal writers representing both
natural right and utilitarian philosophy as justifications of the institution
of property clearly demonstrate adherence to the idea that social
stability must be maintained even at the cost of injustice in relation to
the distribution of property and existing inequalities. The organisation
of the working classes, and the development of the socialist theories
attacked these inequalities with a view to securing justice for the working
classes by limiting the institution of property to the function of meeting
personal needs of each individual. In recognising that the classical
theorists did not advocate distribution or redistribution of property in
accordance with their own labour theory and that they avoided the logical
conclusions of their own theory in their actual social context the socialist
writers insisted on taking that theory to its logical conclusion, viz. that
labour ought to be the sole owner of the fruits of labour.
The common basis of these socialist theories consists mainly of
that strain of natural law thinking which lays down the labour theory of
property. By reference to that theory of property, the socialist writers
claimed the right of the labourer to his whole product. In advocating
this theory the socialist writers argue that the present system of private
property, which the classical writers support, deprives a labourer of
the product of his labour and hands it over to the capitalist. They argue
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that such a system of private property is ethically wrong since under
its sway the labouring ira sses, the majority of the people, are >
condemned to misery. Nor can such a system of private property lead
to any real social stability or security, for the produce of the labour is
not secured to the labourer, but is taken away from him by the capitalist.
In the context of this type of socialist theory, a critique of the
\
labour theory must focus on the question whether such a right can even
in principle be fully realised. If not, how can the institution of property
be modified to meet the aspirations of the working people, and to restore
it to its primary basis as an institution for meeting the economic needs
of each individual? In answering this second question we shall review
the ways in which criticism of the implications of the labour theory
within the socialist tradition enables it to be transcended.
Property in Socialist Thought
Even as classical liberal theorising was reaching its finest
flowering towards the end of the 18th century and during the 19th century,
there were already movements in thought aimed at radically reorganis¬
ing society. Certain thinkers of that period started with a searching
criticism of the existing economic conditions which led them to propound
schemes for the reconstruction of the actual right of property. This
movement for economic reconstruction of the law of property (and much
else) came to be known as socialist thought. Property regulates
economic life and thus the satisfaction of the needs of human life. The
law of property on that view must be defective if it does not secure to each
individual the economic means for the satisfaction of his needs.
The main theme of these earlier socialist thinker's is the same
as that of natural lawyers - that a man has no right to any property
save that which is the fruit of his labour. In a simple form it is stated
as - labour's right to the whole produce of labour.
Another question which (as we saw) necessarily arises on this
hypothesis is that concerning the regulation and exercise of this right
to the whole produce of labour. Locke states that an individual in an
act of appropriation must take care as to leave enough for others.
Thus the right of an individual to the whole produce of his labour is
restricted not only by his own needs but also by the needs of others.
But only where an individual lives in a state of nature and has abundance
at his disposal is such a right a possibility. In modern society where
production is co-operative, two difficulties arise. First, a man cannot
point out to a particular share as having been produced by him alone.
Second, the needs of an individual form a part of the large perspective
of the society in which he lives. Locke's theory is based on the state
of society where things are in abundance and it is a question of pick and
choose. Thus even if Locke's principle that fruits of labour are the
product of the labourer still holds goc .the distribution of the fruits on
that principle is not practically workable in the modern productive
system. Bentham's principle of utility in the distribution of the fruits
of labour does not take into consideration the economic needs of the
community, but is an ego-centric principle. These socialist thinkers
have realised all these difficulties and tried to solve the problem
through reference to a wider perspective.
From a sociological and historical point of view, the conditions
of the last half of the 18th century (which saw the improvement in
agriculture and the rapid rate of enclosure movements in England and
other European countries leading to a large private land holdings)
attracted the attention of many reformers towards agrarian reforms.
Thomas Spence advocated that property in land be made common
property in which each native of the land has an equal right,
with free liberty to sustain himself and family with the
animals, fruits and other products thereof. Thus such a
people reap jointly the whole advantages of their country, or
neighbourhood, without having their right in so doing called
in question by any ... to depy them that right is in effect
denying them a right to live.
He feared that unless this right were reorganized, acceptance of the
principle of the natural right of the labourer to the whole produce of his
labour would give the landowners an excuse to deprive anyone from
property in land since they could claim property in the land as the
produce of their labour. He states:
Were all the landholders to be of one mind, and deter¬
mined to take their properties into their own hands, all the
rest of mankind might go to heaven if they would, for there
would be no place found for them here . .. And those land-
makers, as we shall call them, justify all this by the
practice of other manufacturers, who take all they can get
for the products of their hands; and because that everyone
ought to live by his business as w^l as he can, and conse¬
quently so ought the land-makers.
He thus argues that the natural conditions ought to be restored, and that
the local parishes should distribute equal shares of land to people on
rent, thus establishing a fund which will be employed to maintain those
1. Spence, T., The Real Rights of Man, in The Pioneers of Land
Reform, edited by Beer, VI., London 1920, pp. 5-6.
2. Ibid p. 9.
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who are unfit to work or cannot find work and to meet other government
3
expenses.
A similar view is expressed by Ogilvie against landed monopoly
when he states:
All right of property is founded either in occupancy
or labour. The earth having been given to mankind in
common occupancy, each individual seems to have by
nature a right to possess and cultivate an equal share . . .
No individual can derive from this general right of
occupancy a title to any more than an equal share of the soil
of his country. His actual possession of more cannot
of right preclude the claim of any otherperson who is not
already possessed of such equal share.
He pleads for the equal share of property in land as a birth right,
limited only by the equal share of others, and the right of the farmer
5
to the full produce of the soil on which he is to exercise his industry.
This will accommodate both the original right of universal occupancy
6
and the acquired rights of labour. For the purpose of carrying out his
plan Ogilvie suggests the letting of land on fixed rent for a term of one's
life.
Paine states:
There could be no such things as landed property
originally. Man did not make the earth, and, though he had
a natural right to occupy it, he had n^ right to locate as his
property in perpetuity any part of it.
3. Ibid p. 11.
4. Ogilvie, W., The Right of Property in Land, in The Pioneers of
Land Reform, edited by Beer, M., London 1920, pp. 33-35.
5. Ibid p. 53.
6. Ibid p. 54.
7. Paine, T. Agrarian Justice, in The Pioneers of Land Reform,
edited by Beer, M., London 1920, p. 184.
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Paine argues that it is improvement and cultivation that makes land
the property of the cultivator, while the ground itself belongs to all.
Paine, like Spence and Ogilvie, suggests the payment of ground rent to
the community by the cultivators, in an attempt to balance the improver's
and the community's right.
i
The ideas of these thinkers are based on natural law theories and
the utilitarian principle of maximising happiness. Like Locke they
maintain that in a state of nature the earth is given to mankind in common
and labour is the basis of private property. But they do not believe in
historical titles to property in !and which exclude tnose who are landless.
By no provision of positive 'aw can the natural right of man be altered.
Thus they reject all types of monopolies in land. They agree that the
natural right to the whole produce of labour is nullified if all the things
to be worked upon belong to somebody else. Land is to be kept in
common as it is not the product of labour; men should only acquire the
fruits of their labour.
Both these principles, the right to life and the right to the whole
produce of labour, as the basis of the institution of property, are
irreconcilable. Since everybody, whether fit to labour or not, has a
right to life, then to base property on the right of labour is to deprive
some of the means to support life. Again in the industrial production,
the right to the whole produce of labour cannot be realised. Since all
production is social, no one can claim to a specific part of production
for himself. Even a man who has no part to play in the operation of a
machine in the factory contributes to the production process. For
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examples police constable who just maintains orderly behaviour and
Keeps watch outside the factory cannot be ruled out as an agent in the
production process. For it is not dependence of A on B, but the inter¬
dependence of A and B that rules production in modern times. The idea
of creating a 'fund' to provide for those who could not work, as suggested
by these thinkers, did not create a right of property but a different
species of right, whereby it becomes the duty of state to maintain them.
Godwin, however, tried to base the right of property both on
labour and on the satisfaction of needs. He ascribes all evils of
society like selfishness, oppression, fraud, etc. to the classical con¬
ception of property which supports accumulation irrespective of needs
and personal labour. He states:
No sooner is accumulation introduced, than they begin
to study a variety of methods for disposing of their super¬
fluity with least emolument to their neighbour, or in other
words by which it shall appear to be most their own. They
do not long continue to buy commodities, before they begin
to buy men. He that possesses or is the spectator of
superfluity soon discovers the hold which it affords us on
the minds of others. Hence the passions of vanity and
ostentation. Hence the despotic manners of them who
recollect with complacence the rank they occupy, and the
restless ambition oigthose whose attention is engrossed by
the possible future.
While rejecting all monopolistic ideas Godwin suggests that land, the
chief instrument of production, should be in the hands of those who are
willing to cultivate themselves. But a society where a man after unceasing
toil returns to his family famished with hunger, exposed half naked to
the inclemencies of the sky makes him like a brute machine in the hands
8. Godwin's Political Justice, A reprint ofThe Essays on 'Property',
edited by Salt, H.S., London 1890, pp. 60-61.
of monopolist; in such circumstances the real cultivator is deprived
of the means and the results of labour. He is against all types of
9 10
monopolies and succession which lead to the accumulation of wealth,
with these consequential evils.
In his view no appropriation, even of a man's own products1* can
be authorised beyond a man's need since other men have also to satisfy
their needs. For he asserts that all men could afford to live well and
12
happily sharing the fruits of their combined labour. His main
concern is not to make property collective but to bui'd a system of
private property which enables everyone to satisfy his needs. He
states:
I have an hundred loaves in my possession, and in
the next street there is a poor man expiring with hunger,
to whom one of these loaves would be the means of preserv¬
ing his life. If I withhold this loaf from him ., am I not
unjust? If I impart it, am I not complying with what
justice demands? To whom does the loaf justly belong? .. .
If justice have any meaning, nothing can be more
iniquitous, than for one man to possess superfluities,
while there is a human being in existence that is not
adequately supplied with these.
Justice does not stop here. Every man is entitled, so
far as the general stock wil|^suffice, not only to the means
of being, but of well being.
9. Ibid p. 57.
10. Ibid pp. 53-54.
11. Ibid p. 43.
Babeuf expresses a similar view as to distribution of property.
Gray, Alexander, The Socialist Tradition Moses to Lenin,
London 1946, p. 104.
12. Godwin, op.cit., pp. 111-112.
13. Ibid pp. 38-39.
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The standard of how much,may be possessed is thus the wants of the
individual, and anyone who accumulates property disproportionate to
his needs is guilty of fraud and robbery and thus does injustice to his
fellows. To correct these inequalities in the institution of property,
he appeals to reason. Reason, he be'ieves, is an infallible guide to
truth and goodness, implanted in all men, though overshadowed in exist¬
ing societies by irrational conventions and coercive practices. By this
method, he states:
The word property would probably remain; its
signification only would be modified. The mistake does
not so properly lie in the idea itself, as in the source from
which it is traced. What I have, if it be necessary for my
use, is truly mine; what I have, though the fruit of my own
industry if unnecessary, it is an usurpation for me to
retain.
Thus Godwin does not adhere to the idea of right of labour to the
whole produce of labour, but insists on labour as the basis of property
with the distribution of the products of labour limited according to needs.
Though it is true that without labour, which is the means of producing
wealth, there will be nothing to distribute, yet his idea is that if a man
has produced more than his needs require, this extra becomes communal
property. But this does not offer any solution to the basis of the
institution of property except implicitly admitting that all property
should be communal. Godwin's solution lies in proposing a criterion
for the order of property in which all should live like ascetics rather
than renaissance princes. His criterion poses an abundance of
material from which everyone draws according to his needs - but when
14. Ibid p. 110.
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nothing is left those who thus could not draw must somehow live without
property. He did not presume that production is a social process but
his individualistic attitude to production makes the application of his
principle difficult. In fact he is too much dependent on his idea of human
rationality and his sense of idealism. To make ait property communal
is no solution to the just distribution of property, if that means securing, .
that the needs of each individual are served.
The idea of securing a just distribution of property, by restoring
to the labourer the product of his industry, found further allies in a
similar idealistic movement in favour of workers cooperatives. Robert
Owen in Britain, oaim-Simon, Fourier, and Louis Bianc in France, and
Lassalle in Germany were the protagonists of this movement.
Owen, like the agrarian radicals, traces the misery of the poor
people to the violation of natural right and attacks private property in
land. Under the new circumstances of industrial development he
broadened his attack to cover the ownership of capital as well. But the
initial theory of labour and labourer's right to the product of his industry
remained unchanged. He states:
They have created an aggregate of wealth, and placed
it in the hands of a few, who, by its aid, continue to absorb
the wealth produced by the industry of the many. Thus
the mass of the population are become mere^laves to the
ignorance ahd caprice of these monopolists.
To give the labourer the right to the whole produce of his labour, Owen suggests
that the standard of exchange should be labour value and states:
Id. Owen, R., Report to the County of Lanark, in A New View of
Society and Other Writings, edited by Cole, G.D.H. , London 1927,
p. 258. .
Of this new wealth, so created, the labourer who
produces it is justly entitled to his fair proportion; and the
best interests of every community require that the producer
should have a fair and fixed proportion of all the wealth
which he creates. This can be assigned to him on no other
principle than by forming arrangements by which the natural
standard of value shall become the practical standard of
value. To make labour the standard of value it is necessary
to ascertain the amount of it in all articles to be bought and
sold.
Owen advocates that the conflict of interests between rich and poor
cannot be solved by any violent desire to dispossess the rich of their
riches, because this will not remove the jealousy and hostile feelings;
it can be solved only by the change of human character by moral educa-
17
tion and change of circumstances. The path to progress lies in
improving and changing men's circumstances so that they can learn to
act together and sense the error in valuing only individual exertions
and separate interests. Owen rejects the view of liberal classical
writers and states:
From this principle of individual interest have arisen
all the divisions of mankind, the endless errors and
mischiefs of class, sect, party, and of national antipathies,
creating the angry and malevolent passions, and all the
crimes and miser^gWith which the human race have been
hitherto afflicted.
Owen believed that the labourer's right to the product of his industry
will be restored by establishing workers cooperatives wherein they
will be self-employed, self-governed, and self-supported. To
establish these cooperatives he appealed to government, poor law





Ibid p. 148 (An Address to the Working Classes).
Ibid p. 269.
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were to receive interest in return, his hope being that when they
realised the virtues of such a system they would renounce their claim
to it. With these worker cooperatives, communal ownership and self-
19
satisfaction win prevail.
Owen's scheme concerning the handicapped is open to the same
objections discussed before. His principle of distribution is too
idealistic and depends on the establishment of communal living. His
idealism becomes clear when he says that the technique of cooperation
will produce so much that there will be left no need to produce any
more, since every body win be satisfied. The consequence of this
will be
The dominion of wealth, and the evils arising from
the desire to acquire^pd accumulate riches, are on the
point ot terminating.
Saint-Simorfs proposal to establish a just order of distribution is
21
based on proportionality to one's labour, J that is, men ought to be
rewarded according to the value of labour tiiey perform. To establish
such an order, he believes, the means of production should be handed
over to those who are best suited to organise them - he thus advocates
the idea of setting up worsers cooperatives. He did not visualise any
conflict of capitalists' and workers' interest and holds that their
interests are identical. He ignored this conflict of interest because he
followed in the tradition of Owen that these apparent conflicts are due
19. Ibid pp. 268-269.
20. Cole, G.D.H., Socialist Thougfc 1789-1850, London 1953, vol. i,
p. 94.
21. Cole, G.D.H., Socialist Thought, London 1953, vol.i, pp. 42-43.
to error of judgement; he too looks to reason for correction of this.
He argues that society is under an obligation to provide work for all.
Saint-Simon in fact like Owen is led by his desire to establish a
collectively planned society, and he too fails to provide a sound
criterion for the justification of property. His principle of distribution
according to one's labour will lead to more inequalities rather than
reducing inequalities because of differences of labour and labour condi¬
tions. But his initial criterion, in fact, is a prelude to the establish¬
ment of collective communities.
A similar plan for workers cooperatives was devised by Fourier.
But Fourier suggests the setting up of these cooperatives by voluntary
associations as modern private corporations. He suggests that in these
corporations workers win be shareholders to the extent of their capital
22
investment as well as drawing wages according to their labour. But
his fear that the return of interest on workers' capital will lead to
accumulation of unearned income led him to devise a diminishing rate
of interest as the capital investment of anyone increases. Thus he did
not aim at the abolition of unearned income but only as a means of
keeping it in check. His scheme is no better than that of Saint-Simon.
Gray contends that Louis Blanc represents a transition from the
Utopian socialism of Owen, Safcit -Simon, and Fourier (which endB up in
an ideal of communal living) to proletarian socialism and says:
Doubtless, with Fourier and Owen, he is an
'associationist', but the form of association at which he
22. Ibid pp. 66-67.
236
aims has a more modern flavour; nor is it expected that
some generous millionaire by his touch heal and
renew this putrescent world.
Louis Blanc contends that a strong state is needed to protect the
interest of the workers. He advocates that the state set up 'social
workshops' and give them into the charge of the workers, who by their
own elected representatives win run the social workshops. He argues
for industrial democracy as well as for political democracy and favours
/ Kir ? ':
giving voting rights to all the people so that they make the state strong
by backing up the state. He argues that the social workshops will
compete with the private enterprise. The sheer weight of state regula¬
tions and state help for 'social workshops' will lead to the disappearance
of private enterprise. This win be an end of competition which is the
source of all evils. Since all these organisations will be in the hands
of the workers, Louis Blanc, in the tradition of Godwin and Owen,
maintains that the anti-social attitudes and egotism from which the
world suffers will be cureu by the rise oi a higher morality in the
workers. Tne net profit of these workshops will be divided into three
parts - one part in equal proportion will be divided among the workers,
the second will go for the help of handicapped, and the third will be for
24
reinvestment in the industry. " At the same time Louis Blanc does
not object if an employer retires into private life as a debenture holder
- thus he violates his own principle of labour as a basis of property.
In fact like all other thinkers discussed already he takes refuge in the
23. Gray, A., The Socialist Tradition, London 1946, p. 219.
24. Ibid p. 225.
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idea of vesting all property in the 3tate and in effect assuming that every-
25
one can live in a communistic cell without providing any basis for the
justification of the institution of property.
In Germany Lassalle advocated the idea of national workshops similar
to Louis Blanc. He contends that by the establishment of national
workshops, labour will be enabled to receive as its reward the whole
produce of labour. This will give the workers the right to work and
26
the enjoyment of the full product of their labour. In this way the
distinction between wages and profit disappears, as indeed does the
27
conception of wages itself. Here again he drags his theory into
corporate property which does not suggest any justification of the insti¬
tution of property. Moreover any idea relating to the right of the labour
to the produce of his industry as the basis of distribution will produce
more inequalities instead of reducing them because of differences in
labour and labour conditions.
Despite all their differences the thinkers of the cooperative movement
were trying to avoid the free competition of laiaaez. faire between man
and man for the means of existence which according to them is not a
sound principle of social order. The real producers should conduct
their own social affairs by becoming masters of their own product. A
cooperative system, they hold, would avoid competitive patterns of
behaviour, but in the end with their aim of solving the problem of conflict
25. Cole, op.cit., vol. i, p. 171.
26. Ibid vol. ii, p. 79.
27. Gray, op.cit., p. 339.
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between the claims; of justice and the claims of labour, they end up in
advocating communal living.
The labour theory as originally propounded by Locke began to lose
ground when taken to its logical conclusions. The justification of private
property as based on labour remained the ground both of natural right
philosophers and socialist thinkers. For the socialists it remained an
article of faith that the labourer should receive the full award of his
labour. Though both classical economists and socialist thinkers started
with the identical primises that all value in exchange is derived from
labour, from this the socialist thinkers have drawn the juridical infer¬
ence that whosoever has created this value is the owner of it. The
capitalist's justification of private property is at present based on
28
liberty necessary for the development of human personality and fore-
29
sight. " This line of argument, which defends the right of private
property as a necessary consequence of the claims of liberty is logical
only in appearance because the contract between the capitalist and the
<.
labourer is not voluntary but based on the state of coercion which derives
its sanction from the wealth of the capitalist, which leaves the labourer
no choice. Hall expresses the reality of that relation in the following
terms:
28. Cf. Hayek, F., The Road to Serfdom, London 1944.
29. It is argued that private property is necessary for foresight
and deliberation. So one's control over one's wealth is
necessary. But this is not true in the case of modern corpora¬
tions because of the divorce between ownership and control.
This implies that control of wealth does not imply foresight and
deliberation. As in the case of corporations so is the case of
public ownership.
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If you will labour for me in such and such a way,
I will give you out of those things such as you stand in
need of; but unless you will do these things igjjich I
require of you, you shall have none of them.
Such an approach fails to take into account the fact that the work of
preserving the produce and results of individual labour falls into society
itself. The individual cannot claim a never-ending return from society
for work accomplished in the limited space of his life time. The works
of social order are not only his preserve but the never ending contribu¬
tion of many generations. It is impossible for an individual to acquire
private property without the aid of society. Paine refers to the paradox
of individual production and states:
Separate an individual from society, and give him an
island or a continent to possess, and he cannot acquire
personal property. He cannot become rich. So inseparably
are the means connected with the end, in all cases, that
where the former do not exist, the latter cannot be obtained.
The capitalist systems failed to justify capitalist property on any natural
right of property - especially in so far as they assured the right of the
labourer to his produce. In modern times no further developments in
the conception of property can be based on such natural right theories.
32 33
Hall attacks, but does not reject like Kant and Hegel , the natural
30. Hall, C., The Effects of Civilisation on the People in European
States, London 1850, p. 44. Quoted by Gray, A., op.oit., p. 2d4.
31. Paine, T., op.cit., pp. 199-200.
32. Kant states that man acquires property not by mixing his labour
with the external objects, but by transcendental operation of the
will upon external objects. This approach does not present any
difficulty in possessing landed property. Again this theory does
not present any difficulty in the acquisition of unequal personal
property. Justice requires that men should enjoy equal rights,
but by virtue of their unequal talents they acquire unequal property
to realise their fullest development.
Kant, Philoaophy of Law, Edinburgh 1887, p. 92.
33. Similar views are expressed by Hegel.
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Oxford 1971, pp. 40-45.
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law interpretation of labour theory of property, and regards rents and
interests as unjust appropriation on the return of labour and claims for
the labourer undiminished product of his industry. He sees the real
conflict of interest between the capitalist and labourer which was earlier
ignored,and, keeping this conflict in view, defines wealth as that which
gives power over, and commands, the labour of man: it is, therefore,
34
power; and into that, and that only, ultimately resolvable. He does
not pose any Utopian solution like Godwin, Owen, Fourier, etc., that
with moral development and the rule of reason, society will grow wiser
so that everybody will live in a communal society and enjoy the fruits
of labour from each other. Hall is very specific in pleading for the
labourer's right to the full produce of his labour. To secure to the
'abourer the whole produce of his labour, Hall lays down two fundamental
3 5
principles. " First, every man should labour so much only as is
necessary for his family, and second,each should enjoy the whole fruit
of his labour. But such an approach does not solve the problem of
distribution of production in modern complex industrial production and
is open to the objections already discussed like that of the property
rights of the handicapped. Hall is considered the pioneer in bringing to
attention the existence of class conflicts.
Similarly other socialist thinkers like Thompson, Hodgskin,
Rodbertus, etc., lay stress on the principle that it is labour that gives
value in exchange and, therefore, it is the labourer who has a right to
34. Hall, C., Quoted by Gray, A., op.cit., p. 264.
35. Ibid, p. 268.
the produce of his labour. This in short is the main basis of their
theories though they devised different means of implementing their
onclusions. For example, Rodbertus, like Owen, favours the unit of
i
abour as a standard for exchange.
To express the right of the labourer to the full produce of his labour,
Proudhon stresses this conclusion of the labour theory to such an extent
that he states^that the labourer even after receiving his wages still has
a natural right in the object he has produced - in case of cultivation
the labourer even after getting his wages leaves his labour that he has
36
spent in making the land fertile. That implies, then, that property
is limited by reference to a social interest and is not an absolute right.
Labour is the only justification of property. Proudhon explains in great
detail the wrongs involved in the existence of private property, which he
calls robbery and indeed tyranny, and therefore declares the capitalistic
37
conception of private property to be indefensible. An unearned
income is nothing more than the payment made by the working classes
for the mere permission to engage in productive activity. In the
radical tradition, he insists that land should remain common property,
and that capital, because it is created by labour, ought to belong to the
labourers. Labour is the only legitimate source of all income without
38
which land and capital produce nothing. To establish a just order
36. Proudhon, P.J., What is Property, trans. Tucker, B.R., London
1898, ch. i.
37. Ibid, ch.iv.
38. Henry George explains the function of capital and states:
Capital does not supply the materials vhich labour works
up into wealth, as is erroneously taught; the materials of
wealth are supplied by nature. But such materials partially
(See over)
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of property, Proudhon devised the thesis that industry should be based
011 small scale enterprices. Under small scale enterprises capital
and labour are provided together by the same individuals, and there is
no appropriation by a non-labourer of the surplus value created by
labourers.
The theory of socialism reached its culmination in the writings of
vlarx who made full use of all the developments made both by the
classical writers in their classical economic theories and the preliminary
preparations made by other socialist writers. Even more than earlier
writers he thought of labour as a cooperative effort rather than an
isolated act of an individual. The fundamental idea is that ownership
ia derived from labour. The point is not in controversy that labour is
the basis of value; it is accepted both by conservative and socialist
writers. The classical, economists like Adair Smith have been caught
38. (Contd. from previous page)
worked up and in the course of exchange are capital.
Capital does not supply or advance wages, as is
erroneously taught. "Wages are that part of the produce
of his labour obtained by the labourer.
Capital does not maintain labourers during the
progress of their work, as is erroneously taught.
Labourers are maintained by their labour, the man
who produces, in whole or in part, anything that will
exchange for articles of maintenance, virtually
producing that maintenance.
Capital, therefore, does not limit industry, as is
erroneously taught, the only limit to industry being
the access to natural material. But capital may
limit the form of industry and the productiveness of
industry, by limiting the use of tools and the division
of labour.
George, H,, Progress and Poverty, London 1932, p. 61.
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in their own grip. For them it has become as much trouble as it has
been worth. If labour is the justification of private property how can it
be said that the capitalist is the producer of the goods that pass into his
possession? In Marx's theory it is the main theme from which he
derives his theory of surplus value, lie does not argue for the capitalist
conception of private property but against the violation of this very
principle which is accepted by the capitalists as well. Marx states:
All that we want to do away with, is the miserable
character of this appropriation, i^ier which the labourer
lives merely to increase capital.
Ely explaining this view point states:
The foundation of the capitalistic method of produc¬
tion is to be found in that theft which deprived the masses
of their rights i^the soil, in the earth, the common
heritage of all.
Marx is following the radical interpretation of natural law writers, and
holds that property rights should be based on labour. He states:
At first the rights of property seemed to us to be
based on a man's own labour . .. Now, however, property
turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to
appropriate the unpaid labour of others or its product, and
to be the impotaibility, on the jj^rt of the labourer, of
appropriating his own product.
39. Adam Smith regards labour as the true and original basis of
property. From his theory he draws a different conclusion than
that drawn by socialist writers. He does not draw the conclusion
that the whole produce belongs to the labourer who produced it.
Instead he states that he is free to sell it to any one he pleases.
Smith, A., Wealth of Nations, edited by Scott, W.B., London 1925,
p. 126.
40. Manifesto of the Communist Party, in Marx, K., and Engels, F.,
Selected Works in One Volume, London 1970, p. 48.
41. Ely, R.T., French and German Socialism in Modern Times,
New York 1883, p. 181.
42. Marx, K., Capital, vol.i, London 1974, p. 547.
Applying Marx's principle of surplus value, the exchange value of an
object is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour required
to produce it. He used capitalist economic laws to reach the conclusion
that capitalism violates its own principle by depriving labour of the
product of labour. The labourers must retain their full rights in their
produce and accordingly a^l deductions made in the name of capital must
be repudiated, whether as rent, profits, or in any other form. The
appropriation of capital would transfer property from the capitalist class
to the workmen whose labour has created it. The new owners would
hold their property as a common social product rather than in individual
43
shares. This will deprive no man of the power of appropriation of
the products but it will deprive every one of the power to subjugate the
labour of others by means of such appropriation. And Marx states:
When, therefore, capital is converted into common
property, into the property of all members of society,
personal property is not thereby transformed into social
property. It is only the social character of th^property
that is changed. It loses its class character.
But how this common social product would be individually appropriated
and justified is laid down by Marx in a formula which he suggested in
his critique of the Gotha Programme (1875). He proposed that in the
43. SchIatter state a:
Property rights can no longer be defined as a
relation between the individual and the material objects
which he has created; they must be defined as social
rights which determine the relations of the various
groups of owners and non-owners to the system of
production, and prescribe what each group's share of
the social product shall be.
Schlatter, P., Private Property, London 1951, p. 273.
44. Manifesto of the Communist Party, op.cit., p. 47.
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first stage of the socialist society, when rent, interest, and profit had
been abolished as forms of property, individuals should be rewarded
according to the different values of their work measured according to
its duration and intensity, or quantity and quality; ultimately he
suggested, the principle of 'from each according to his ability, to each
45
according to his needs' would regulate work and distribution.
Work being universally necessary, every member of society has an
equal right to a share of the product according to his needs. The
product of labour belongs not to the labourer but to the whole society of
workers, and is allotted to each individual according to the measure of
his reasonable needs. The Marxist thus uses this labour theory of
property to repudiate capitalism and to demand of the capitalists that
property be owned socially as it is the product of cooperative effort in
the society. As Marx states:
Capital is a collective product, and only by the united
action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by
the united action of all members of society, can it be set
in motion.
Cagjjtal is, therefore, not a personal, it is a social
power.
Both conservative writers and socialist thinkers stick to their own
interpretation of the labour theory of property. But one thing on which
both agree is that labour is the basis of property; their dispute is
regarding the proper distribution of the produce of labour. The
conservative thinkers in their structure of social systems ignore the
45. Critique of the Gotha Programme, in Marx and Engels.
Selected Works in one Volume, London 1970, p. 321.
46. Manifesto of the Communist Party, op.cit., p. 47.
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implications of their labour theory of property and draw different conclu¬
sions to support existing political systems. They ignore the question
why if all products are the result of labour, is the labourer not the owner
of his products? These conservative writers, as discussed above,
from their labour theory advance different corollaries to support their
own conclusions and ignore the right oi' the labourer to his product; so
much so that they lose the essence of their own theory. The socialist
writers on the other hand sticking to the labour theory as the justification
of property regard the "labourer as having the right to the whole produce
of his industry.
But how can the labour of X be compared to the labour of Y? The
quantum of each cannot be measured exactly. The exchange oi one with
the other will involve some exploitation, however small or large it might
be. One may reap the benefit of others' work and never be conscious of
f
it. Can we determine precisely that we are no longer exploiting the
labour of others? The principle of distribution based on individuals'
needs rather than on their capacities or capabilities will in fact yield
an independent criterion for the justification of private property or,
rather, for its social distribution. It reflects the purpose of the
institution of property, because it makes provision for providing the
necessities of existence to human life to all human beings, and gives
security for its existence and continuation. But it is clear that botn
these principles, namely, that of the right of the labourer to the whole
produce of his labour and that of distribution on the basin of needs,
cannot be realised in any society at the same time. Labour and wants
do not necessarily coincide in any constitution ox society. Second, the
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right to the whole produce of labour cannot be implemented in case
of certain members of society such as the handicapped. One cannot
say that because of their incapacity they have got no right to live.
For social life human beings need social institutions. A society
will adopt those institutions which are most liable to preserve and
perpetuate its existence. One cannot avoid this conclusion. It is
almost an axiomatic truth. The institution of property exists and
survives as an institution supremely because or to the extent that it
makes provisions for the necessities of human life. The only justifica¬
tion for the existence, preservation, and continuance of the institution
of property is the fulfilment of the function of meeting the needs of
human life. It is this conviction which is keeping this institution in
existence. When it ceases to perform this function, human beings in
pursuit of their right to preservation of their life win seek another
institution which, subject to appropriate regulation, provides for the
necessities of their preservation. This is the due to the whole problem.
If this view is correct, it would require the present social,structure of
the institution of property to be reconstructed so as to secure fulfilment
of needs of each individual, with recognition of individual economic
rights rather than simply political rights such as were postulated in the
past centuries. It would also answer the question why people do cling
so stubbornly to the preservation of the system of private property of
some kind, unless they forego the merits and advantages of civilised
life like a hermit who avoids the corruptions of civilisation by foregoing
its advantages.
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If one looks at the economic life by which one is surrounded, one
inds that the main purpose of everyone's labour is the greatest reason¬
able satisfaction of his needs. The ideal justification of the law of
property would then be the satisfaction of human desire for those things
which are reasonably necessary for human living. The recognition of
the principle of equal satisfaction of human needs provides a principle
for regulating the institution of property, which is presupposed in
recognition of the right of subsistence of each individual. It is the
right of subsistence which, thus, provides the fundamental justifying
ground for private property. Private property has a true justification
only so long as it is based on the recognition and satisfaction of the
right to subsistence. Hun an needs for subsistence may vary consider¬
ably from place to place and time to time and may stand in sharp
contrast to some other less pressing needs but the right to subsistence
may well stand as the justification of the institution of property. To
deprive any one of subsistence or the means of subsistence is to deprive
one of one's life. The institution of property is the means devised in
society to regulate the order of things for human existence. As Ivlenger
states:
The necessities of life form the basis of the right to
subsistence ... which may be characterised as recognising
the claim of every member of society to the commodities
and services necessary to support existence, in preference
to the satisfaction of the less pressing wants of others.
The right to subsistence will present the individual interest as against
47. Menger, A., The Right to the Whole Produce of Labour, trans.
Tanner, M.E., London 1899, pp. 9-10.
the community so as to allow each individual property for his subsistence.
~uch a right to subsistence will, thus, represent on the one hand, each
individual's interest against the community of which he is a member,
and on the other hand, the duty of the community to protect its members
against exploitation by other members. As a logical conclusion it will
replace the right of property in the present legal sense which creates a
divergence between the use of property and the legal title to it. The
existing law of property is based on the traditional political conditions
and is not aimed specifically at the satisfaction of economic needs of
individuals. It neither secures to the labourer the produce of his
labour nor guarantees the satisfaction of the economic needs of indi¬
viduals. The deficiency of existing property law to some extent is
made good by such institutions as national insurance schemes, old age
pensions, national health services, etc. But these are state welfare
schemes and neither a part of the property law nor a property right -
but because of their economic importance can be regarded ancillary
institutions to the law of property.
All institutions exist to serve human existence. The institution of
property cannot exist and be used irrespective of the welfare of society.
It is to cater for the necessities of human existence. Those needs of
the individual which are absolutely basic to human living, that is,
necessary for subsistence, can be the basis of the institution of property.
It is on this principle that the institution of property ought to be so
reconstructed as to be an essential preliminary to the realisation of
individual needs. We can believe that it is right to own property because
it is sanctioned by these basic needs of human life. It is this principle
which can bridge the chasm which seemed to exist between different
principles for the justification of property. But if one asks what are
the basic needs of life - the answer is whatever is necessary for
subsistence, to sustain life at different stages of social development.
As Hobson states:
With the organic interdependency and the historical
sequence of needs ... the satisfaction of the lower material
need is always more urgent and important than the satis¬
faction of a higher need, because the latter is historically
non-existent, having as yet no soil out of which to grow.
But does this, mean that other intellectual and moral needs for subsist¬
ence, which are necessary to sustain life, are not real needs? Hobson
states:
What ia "necessary"? Something that is essential
to support life. But what life? "Physical life" is the
common reply. If, however, we endeavour to apply a
bare physiological test, it does not avail. What are the
physical necessaries of life? Are they the food, clothing,
shelter, ... that which was comprised in the "necessary"
or "bare subsistence" .. . ? Not so. The full physical
life ... is not thus secured ...
Physical, moral, intellectual, are not watertight
compartments of humanity. Whether we regard the
organic interaction of all these vital powers, or take into
our consideration the moral and intellectual needs and
satisfactions as claims of nature which emerge later on,
there is no excuse for refusing to admit the latter as
necessary to life, considered as the whole which it rightly
is.
Similar views were expressed by Marx. He stated that mere subsist¬
ence wages were paid to labourers to keep them alive and thus they
48. Hobson, J.A., The Social Problem, London 1901, p. 82.
49. Ibid pp. 78-80.
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were merely treated as commodities - "it has resolved personal worth
.,50
into exchange value. Under such conditions human potentialities
could not attain moral, physical, and intellectual maturity. They
could not become emotionally and intellectually fully developed human
beings because their bare existence forces them to attain nothing but
51
to "sell ... their own skin". Thus the right to subsistence as the
basis of property includes all those necessaries of life which may be
characterised as recognising the claim of every member of society to
the commodities and services necessary to support existence though
it must not be forgotten that they vary considerably according to time
and place.
The right to subsistence as the basis of ownership will maintain and
support the institution of property because the functional aspect of
ownership will find its economic basis as an essential condition for its
existence. Such a basis of the right of property will be different from
the traditional rights of property which is based on the idea of control
of an object irrespective of its economic basis. The right to subsistence
would represent the interest of an individuals against the community,
as well as the interest of the community in maintaining the individual
as a productive unit. The right to the whole produce of labour will
then mean that the individual as a productive member of the community
has a right to a fair share in the whole produce of the community which
will be treated as a social produce of the community rather than of a
group or an individual as under Lockean theory. Menger states:
50. Manifesto of the Communist Party, op.cit., p. 38.
51. Marx, K., Capital, vol. i, p. 667.
The right of all citizens to the satisfaction of their
absolute needs may in such a case bg^egarded as a form
of mortgage on the national income.
Hence labour, with the recognition of the right of subsistence, will
cease as a saleable commodity as a firest condition in the reconstruction
of the institution of property, but regarded as a service whereby a
social relationship is established. Unless this condition is met, labour
as a commodity fluctuating with the market's supply and demand shed
labour of all dignity, the idea of the right of subsistence cannot be made
the basis of any wages of any labourer. Labour will cease to be an
item in the cost of production - a mere commodity. This will produce
quantitive and qualitative changes in the relationship of worker and
wages, for labour is a social, and not merely an individual, matter.
Ownership being based on the right of subsistence would also dissolve
any difficulty as to attributing ownership to those who cannot participate
in the production of the gross national product, such as children,
infirm, or handicapped. Thus in the case of children, for example,
the right of subsistence will entitle them to support and education, etc.
Similarly in the case of the handicapped, the right of subsistence will
entitle them to support for the fulfilment of their needs. Housing,
education, etc., are all aspects of the institution of property, if not
directly but indirectly, since no economic activity that affects human life
can be dissociated from the institution of property.
Both the labour and the wages of labour are determined by the insti¬
tution of property and since the institution of property is to be based on
52. Menger, op.cit., p. 10.
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the right of subsistence, the question arises on what criterion labour
and wages of labour are to be calculated? The value of labour as a
measure of wages is not a practical solution to the right of subsistence
for there are different kinds of labour, and because of the variability
of the conditions under which the labourers have to work. The right
to the whole produce of labour is inconsistent with the right to subsist¬
ence, for people working in different factories and producing differently
will receive differently. This will create a fair equality in wages so
far as workers of one factory are concerned but will create disparities
among the workers outside the economy of the factory. The workers
of one factory may become richer than the workers of another factory.
Neither of these valuations, wages according to labour value and the
labourer's right to the whole produce of labour, fulfils the 'function of
the institution of property' to meet the needs of each individual. The
right of subsistence as the basis of the institution of property can be
satisfied if in a given society the wages are fixed on the basis of a
reasonable standard of living. The workers, irrespective of the value
of the work produced, must receive those standard wages. Second, as
far as production is concerned, in different industries the reasonable
standard of production and reasonable working conditions will have to
be set. Both these conditions are to be made independent of any
economic fluctuations and subject to adjustment in the case of economic
variations. The workers engaged in different set of works, with
different abilities and responsibilities are to be encouraged not so much
by the chance of making a fortune but by giving pubUc recognition to their
services. Again differences arise because the idea of labour is associated
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with only physical labour. Intellectual ability is not called labour.
But both mental and physical labour are alike, if not in nature„at least
as necessary and essential part3 of the social set up to keep society
going. One is as important as the other. So to degrade one in
comparison to another is to start a class distinction which will not
only disturb but upset the institution of property based on the right of
subsistence. Why should either the natural abilities or the external
physical conditions be allowed to affect the institution of property when
each condition is as important as the other to maintain social order?
Thus sometimes a little more wages for physical work or a little more
i
for mental work should not upset the workers because a given society
which accepts the right to subsistence as the basis of the institution of
property will not pay less than the efficient wages and will not be such
as not to recognise high capabilities whether mental or physical. If a
doctor gets the same pay as a miner, he is to realise if all become
doctors who will be a miner? The miner cannot do the doctor's job nor
is a doctor fit to be a miner, nor can either of them do both the jobs at
the same time. If there is one doctor in a city he will earn more, but
if ten more appear in the city, the former would not be able to earn as
much as he used to do, before the ten appeared on the scene. So it is
the situations in which a man of physical or mental ability finds himself
that makes him a candidate of fortune and not his ability. Thus grada¬
tions of Tabour are not essential from the point oi view of the institution
of property, but are important from the point of view of the running of
53
social order.
53. Tawney, R.H., Equality, Open University edition, London 1964, p. 113.
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Theoretically this concept of private property represents Aristotle's
idea of property - it is clearly better that property should be private
54
but the use of it common, common means whereby everybody draws
his subsistence according to his needs. It has the advantage of both
the communal and private property. Pollock repeats Aristotle when he
says:
How to foster and maintain a state of generous friendship
in which a man shall give and take in turn of the good things
of life, so that property shall in effect be several in title,
but common in use.^"
*
It will be equalisation of social conditions and at the same time
preserving the institution of property as a fabric of our social system.
Menger states:
Now, when so many communists speak of an equal
distribution of wealth in a communistic state, it is this
distribution in proportion to wants and existing means
of satisfaction to which they refer. For no one could
seriously strive for a really equal distribution in the face
of the enormous differences in wants due to age, sex, and
individual character.
Aristotle and Plato sought equality of conditions in ideal constitutions
by limiting accumulations. The social aspirations of our times are
trying to base property on the right to subsistence by making such
provisions in legal systems as providing subsistence to old age
pensioners, children, and handicapped, etc., as a duty of the community
towards its members.
How is it that labour which is the means by which property is
54. Aristotle, Politics, ii, 8.
55. Pollock, Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics,
London 1911, p. 23.
56. Menger, op.cit., p. 9.
produced is not the basis of property? Why iB is that the justification
of property is not sought in the right to labour but in the right to
subsistence? Labour is only the means by which property is secured.
If no one win labour there will be no property for consumption. The
basic idea of granting property to the individual is not to secure to the
individual the right to labour but to secure him his subsistence which is
necessary for his existence. Now subsistence is a biological necessity
and securing of the means ox subsistence is a social necessity. It is
the securing of the means of subsistence that is property. And the idea
of having property is having subsistence. Thus if legal systems, as at
present, only secure to the individual the right to labour as a justifica¬
tion of property, they secure him the capacity to produce property
whether it is sufficient for his subsistence or not. But if legal systems
secure to the individual the right to subsistence as a justification of
property, they secure him his subsistence which he must get as a result
of his labour. Tt is this character of property which distinguishes the
right to labour from the right to subsistence. The latter is an
immediate claim on the community from whom the claimant may demand
in return for his work the necessities for his existence, but duty to
labour can only be enforced when it is proved that the claimant has failed
57
to find work. Second, the right to subsistence can be extended even
to those who are not fit to labour, but the right to labour cannot be
extended to all those who are not fit to labour. If the institution of
property has its justification in the right to labour all those who are not
57. Menger, op.cit., p. 16.
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fit to labour will have no property. In short they have no right to
life; yet there is a clear individual right to all necessaries of life and
one is deprived of life as soon as one takes away the means by which
one lives. If the institution of private property has its justification in
the right to subsistence, the right can be extended to everybody. Every
one will be the owner of property.
Granting right of subsistence as a justification of private property,
Malthus need not say:
A man who is born into a wor^d already possessed,
if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he
has a just demand, and if tie society do not want his labour,
has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and,
in fact, has no business to be w£ere he is. At nature's
mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him. Fgg tells
him to be gone, and will execute her own orders.
Incentive theory of production
Despite aV that, conservative writers argue that the individuals
care more for their own than for social interests, and accordingly that
a system which provides individual incentives to more production, is
in truth best adapted to satisfy consumers' demands. The profit from
private property is an incentive, and thus inequalities are to be
tolerated on the ground that an egalitarian society would discourage
effort and lessen efficiency and thus diminish the total production avail¬
able for distribution. On the basis of such an incentive theory the
conservative writers seek a social justification of inequalities of
property - on grounds of 'the facts of human naiure' rather than on
58. Tvlalthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, London 1803,
p. 531.
grounds of ideal principles.
Bentham states that interference with rights of private property in
the system of production would lead to the loss of efficiency and reduced
production. But at the same time he himself wants to limit usury and
therefore restrict, in this case, the most productive use of property,
the source of wealth for a man who is making a productive use oi his
money. Similarly Adam Smith favours restrictions on the rate of
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interest. In fact the right of the owner to such unearned income as
interest is not found in economic incentives but in the positive provisions
of law which support the right of ownership of unearned income. If
there are good reasons against permitting unlimited rate of interest
they must be based on some conceptions of justice other than that
generated by the incentive theory.
Again the modern developments of property, as in the case of
corporation, show that the theory oi incentive to increase production is
not wholly workable. Under the laws of minimum wages, pensions,
working conditions, etc., corporations sometimes have to neglect the
profit motive of private capital and there is no certainty that the corpora¬
tion will be run for the benefit of the capitalist. In such circumstances
what is the incentive to the large scale capitalist to invest in the
corporations? The only incentive to such a capitalist is to achieve
private economic power and thus to achieve a position of political
influence so as to affect the future course of the social system in a
manner which is in principle undemocratic. Again the law is formed
59. Smith, A., op.cit., p. 363.
in such a way that it supports the idea of unearned income. As Menger
explains:
Generally the parties who propose such measures look
at their political and economic objects, ignoring the
social consequences, because the working classes - the
ultimate producer of unearn^ income - are but sparely
represented in parliaments.
To remove this control over men and their social milieu arising from
the economic power in private hands, Marx advocates not the abolition
61
of private property generally, but the abolition of bourgois property.
Rejecting the claims of conservative theory of incentive Ginsberg
remarks:
... it may well be that inequality of distribution was an
important factor in the earlier stages of capitalism, but is
no longer so in a stage of high technological development
and large-scale organization. Indeed, at such a stage
egalitarian redistribution may not only be compatible with,
but a condition of, increased productivity. The problem of
incentives completely changes its character as industry
moves from the type which prevailed when the factory owner
formed and managed his own business to that which exists
under Joint Stock institutions in which owgij:rship of capital
and management are almost dissociated.
Justice demands the relative equalisation of wealth in a society so as
to meet the subsistence needs of each individual in a given society.
Eut this equalisation rr easure is wrongly interpreted by conservative
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writers. Both Hume and Bentham interpret equalisation of
60. Menger, op.cit., p. 179.
61. Manifesto of the Communist Party, op.cit., p. 47.
62. Ginsberg, M., On Justice in Society, London 1956, pp. 99-100.
Girvetz, H.K., From Wealth to Welfare: The Evolution of
Liberalism, Stanford, California 1950, p. 140.
63. Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Aiken, M.D., New
York 1948, pp. 193-194.
64. Bentham, Theory of Legislation, London 1876, pp. 99 & 120.
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property distribution as absolute equality. No socialist writer ever
proposed absolute equality in distribution of property. How can the
subsistence needs of a child be equal to that of a grown up man? How
can the needs of a lawyer be the same as that of a doctor? When the
socialist writers speak of an equal distribution of wealth, it is accord¬
ing to the variability of needs. No one can establish an absolute or
perfectly equal distribution in the face of such a vast variability of
subsistence needs. Thus the right of property based on the subsistence
needs of each in a society does not mean absolute equality nor does it
mean tuat such a basis will lead to inefficiency and unproductiveness due
to lack of incentive to produce more. For example, restrictions on
inheritance do not Condemn people to produce less. .Again sumptuary
laws do not mean that people should produce less because they could not
use their product in every possib1e way they might wish. Thus incentive
is not the only possible motivating force to regulate production.
Realising that self-interest or the.incentive motive as a source of
maximising happiness of the individual as an intrinsic good, is not the
only intrinsic good, tne utilitarian thinkers include among intrinsic
65
good moral, aesthetic and intellectual activities. This modification
lent support to the ethical basis of property and transformed their
earlier stand based on psychological hedonism. If it is so, the theory
of the right of ownership as being based on self-interest for maximising
happiness as an intrinsic good and as providing an incentive is replaced
65. Cf. Rashdall, H., "The Philosophical Theories of Property", in
Property - Its Duties and Rights, ed. 1913, pp. 50-51.
by a theory allowing for the moral qualities and creative faculties, in
short, by the qualities of character and personality. It will then be
urged that private property is not a mere incentive but rather an
essential requisite for self-expression and development of personality.
The incentive for production and distribution will then not be external
profit but the development of the well-being of human personality which
lies not in the individual's independent interest but in his interest as a
member of society. A similar conclusion follows from what Locke says
when he states that the property which the state is obliged to protect
00 0f^
includes :'lives, liberties and estate"* ° of the whole people" . The
right to revolt arises when the state neglects her duties and tolerates
economic and social arrangements which render the majority of her
members propertyless. But it is ironic that Locke with such an idealistic
sense of human nature avoids the foregone conclusion of his own theory.
Private property is essential and no system of governnqent can do
without it in one form or another. But private property based on the
idea of conservative writers as providing an incentive to further produc¬
tion so as not to paralyse individual initiative cannot serve as a legally,
politically or morally sound theory of justice, because it places in the
hands of the capitalist overriding powers over men and social interests.
person's hands means less
others. The man who is taking more and more is not becoming much
happier but the poor by becoming poorer tend to reach a stage where
66. Locke, J. , The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter
Concerning Toleration, edited by Gough, J.W., Oxford 1946, p. 62.
67. Ibid, p. 152.
nature is working away at them to get them out oi' the way. Against an
incentive theory based on the egoism of psychological hedonism Spir
comments:
Do you believe that men win always earnestly desire
to see justice realised or not? If answer is No,
then it is useless to speak of right and justice at all.
If, on the other hand, the answer is Yes, then it must be
understood that present circumstances and conditions are
no criterion for the future. While e^g>ism holds sway,
justice certainly cannot be realised.
As has been stated in this chapter, labour is the essential condition
of production^bui is no.tobe the basis of the right of property,because
the distribution effectuated under such conditions clearly advances not
personal efficiency but the purpose of economic activity for the exist¬
ence only of those who are fit to labour. But virtuous disposition
is the altruistic, wherein one finds one's happiness in the happiness 01
others. The common interest must be each one's chief interest - the
good of the whole is his chief good. A healthy system of industry will
demand from each producer the best an ount of 1abour not because of
external reward lor his labour but because of his own appreciation of
socially useful work for the common economic needs of society. As
Hob son states:
It is an important task of economic science to
enforce conceptions of the operation of economic laws
which will support these newer and sounder views and
feelings. For only with this growing recognition of the
social harmony represented by industry can the social
will be nourished that is necessary to support and further
it. So long as the ordinary business man or worker has
his eyes, his mind, his heart and will, giued t9 the tiny
patch of industry to which his own directly personal effort
68. Spir, A. , Right and Wrong, translated by Falconer, A.F.,
Edinburgh 1954, pp. 69-70.
is applied, tlae pul3e of humanity beats feebly through the
system of industry. But let the ordinary education of every
man and woman impose clear images oi this economic order
as a great human cooperation in which each bears an
essential part, as producer, consumer and citizen, the ■»
quickened intelligence and sympathy win respond, so that
the blind processes of cooperation will become i^used and
strengthened by the current of a conscious wilL
The idea of classical economists is that it is self-interest that
propels a man to more production because of his profit motive. But
the question arises does self-interest consist only in accumulation?
V hat about self-interest in scientific inventions, literary works, national
interests, interests in humanitarian works, etc.? Therein seif-intereat
does not include accumulation of fortune. The classical economists,
when they interpret self-interest, stick only to pecuniary gain and thus
leave aside other types of conduct included in the sell. Again the
question arises whether tne altruistic virtues or what we may call other-
regarding virtues really form a part of human nature? Hume states
that other-regarding virtues depend on training and become habits by
conventions. It is here that one touches the most sensitive spot of
human nature and comes to realise that self-interest in fact can be
replaced by altruistic virtues through habits and conventions - which
shows that self-interest is, in fact, not an intrinsic nature of man.
Thus the classical idea about human conduct upon which they so firmly
fixed the institution of property is both false and trivial. Thus
economic activity need not be directed towards the external motive
of profit or any pecuniary gain because human nature is compatible to
69. Hobson, J.A., Work and Wealth: A Human Valuation, London
1914, pp. 281-282.
altruistic virtues. Thus it is a case for modification of institutional
arrangements because the classical writers following the pecuniary
tendencies of their times, fixed the insignia of accumulation of wealth
on human nafcire and thus on the institutional scheme of the institution
of property. Girvetz states:
Thus, the otherwise empty concept of egoism . . .
was identified with acquisitiveness, or, more precisely,
with the quest for pecuniary gain which passes as the
profit motive. Asa result, the profit motive could be
understood without reference to its institutional origins
and historical antecedents; it received its credentials
from human nature and, like human nature, it was thought
ineluctable, given - and therefore accepted. The identi¬
fication of self-interest and the profit motive was thus
mutually advantageous; self-interest acquired a specific
. meaning, and the profit motive was lifted out ^the flux of
history, was fixed, fastened, and made firm.
The classical writers have taken it for granted that existing property
rights and pecuniary incentives are the only basis to sustain a healthy
economic system. Criticising such preconceptions of fixed Newtonian
universal laws and their implications, Girvetz remarks:
Reading some of the orthodox economic tracts of the
nineteenth century, one gets the impression that the lack
of availability of food, clothing, and shelter to large numbers
of the population is a matter of sentimental and subordinate
concern; the main object is not to do violence to human
nature by departing from the principles of orthodox economics.
Precisely the same impression is left by those who strenuously
opposed large scale relief in the 1930's; many appeared to
believe that a glanced budget is more important than a
balanced diet.
The conventional writers instead of attending to how mah behaves in
concrete circumstances started ana framed theories based on a
70. Girvetz, H.K., op.cit., p. 131.
71. Girvetz, H.K., op.cit., p. 150.
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hypothetical mode! how men propelled by the principle of pleasure or
pain would behave given appropriate bait. On this basis ^egal systems
changed the institutional basis of the right oi property. There is,
thus, a plausible cas- for rethinking and modifying the existing
institution of property on a realistic basis so as not to defy concrete
human nature. w ey remarks:
It is "natural" for activity to be agreeable. It tends
to find fulfillment, and finding an outlet is itself satisfactory,
for it marks partial accomplishment. If productive activity
has become so inherently unsatisfactory that men have to be
artificially induced to engage in it, this fact is ample proof
trtht the conditions under which work is carried on balk the
complex of activities instead of promoting them, irritate and
frustrate natural tendencies instead of carrying them forward
to fruition. Work then becomes labor . . . Paradise
Regained means the accumulation of investments such that a
man can live upon their return without labour. There is,
we repeat, too much truth in this picture. But it is not a
truth concerning original human nature and activity. It
concerns the form human impulses have taken under the
influence of a specific social environment. If there are
difficulties in the way of social alteration - as there
certainly are - they do not lie in an original aversion of
human nature to serviceable action, but in the historic
conditions which have differentiated the work of the labourer
for wage from that of the artist, adventvvp^r, sportsman,
soldier, administrator, and speculator.
The classical economists start with the idea that man being selfish,
lethargic and passive needs some sort of motive power to work and
this motive power is a system of incentives and rewards. It is this
passive thought that gives credibility to the ideas of Locke and Bentham,
etc. Hume's only credit is in admitting that other-regarding virtues
are learned by men from training. But here one argues with Hume -
if other-regarding virtues become a part of human habit then in future
72. Dewey, J., Human Nature and Conduct, London 1922, pp. 126-124.
they will be part of human nature. -If this is so, then Hume's basic
contention that man is passive is untrue. One argues, is not human
activity a manifestation of the life-process itself? Does it need to be
bribed into displaying its initiative and inventiveness? Do people
sometimes not work by sheer habit, loyalties, ambitions to get prestige?
73
Modern thinkers do not agree with this quietism of psychology intro¬
duced into philosophy. It is against this passive theory that Dewey,
Veblen, Rasdhall, etc. react and hold that the psychological passivism
adopted by classical economists ignores the creative desire of man and
his sheer desire to engage in productive activity. Frankfurter remarks
The crucial fact of modern industry is its failure to
use the creative qualities ,o| men, its deadening monotony,
and its excessive fatigue.
The idea that man is a part of an organic society, given freedom
from want, provides an atmosphere in which his activities do not depend
on pecuniary rewards. Their standards and their values for life rise
and fall with that of society, social conditions determining the level of
economic activity. If fit people do not work and produce enough to
maintain society, it is not only those who are unfit to work who will fall,
but also those who will not be providing enough to maintain the whole.
For it is the duty and responsibility of members of any society,
whatever be its particular institution of property, that they must provide
subsistence to each of the members for her continuance and that of her
73. Ibid, p. 118.
Veblen, T., Essays in Our Changing Order, N.Y. 1934, p. 78.
Rashdali, op.cit.
74. Frankfurter, F., Law and Politics, New York 1939, p. 203.
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institutions. But where classical writers have considered society as
an aggregate of individuals their theory of incentives has ignored the
human side of the equation and is concerned only with production - it
has ignored the human cost involved in getting it. Hetzler remarks:
The stocks by which corporate industry are owned,
are bought and sold in complete divorcement from the
reality of the work situation. The concern of the stock
buyer is not with the social me^ . . . but with the ability
of the industry to make money.
Because of their concentration on external prodding as an instrument
of production, the classical writers and orthodox economists ignored
the ethical element in the production process. The classical economist
Veblen remarks-
make exchange value the central feature of their
theories rather than the conducj^nness of industry to the
community's material welfare.
Describing such an idea of common purpose and social cooperation in
industry, Hobson states:
Were such an order effectively achieved, in accord¬
ance with the rational and equitable application of our
human law of distribution, the economy of industrial
processes would be accompanied by a corresponding
economy of thought and emotion amon^the human beings
engaged in this common cooperation.
If such an idea of common purpose and social cooperation is to work,
it is only when the institution of property is first impressed on the
mind of the people as having its basis on social and moral foundations
rather than having any predatory and instinctive basis.
75. Iletzler, S.A., Technological Growth and Social Change:
Achieving Modernization, London 1969, p. 256.
76. Veblen, op.cit., p. 100.
77. Hobson, Work and Wealth, p. 290.
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The question arises: 'If subsistence is granted to everyone and
there is left a surplus, what is the right way to deal with the surplus?'
This, inquiry arises only if a!1 modes of production are state owned.
If they are not under public ownership, the extra will be taken by the
state by way of taxes for the maintenance of pub'ic services, for
society is the essential foundation of production. Second, as Menger
suggests:
But a complete realisation of the right /flight to
Subsistence^ would absorb so large a portion of the
unearned income which property now bestows on land- *
lords and capitalists, and deprive private wealth of so
much of its social vaiu^hat it would soon be converted
into common property.
But if all means of production are publicly owned and the state after
dispersing all the necessaries, is left with a surplus (which is only
hypothetical since there is no such affluent society to my knowledge)
how is this surplus to be dispersed? Society can disperse this surplus
by giving rewards to its citizens for quality of work. The distribution
of rewards cannot be fixed by any scientific rr ethod because variability
of occupational structures will elude any objective criterion. The
range of differentials can only be determined empirically by judging
the value of different occupations under variable conditions. The main
function is to establish the right of subsistence as the foundation ox the
right of property under all varieties of circumstances so as to promote
social well-being and make society a better place in which to live.
Hobson states:
An economic reformation which, by applying the
78. Menger, A., op.cit., p. 11.
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human law of distribution, absorbs the unproductive
surplus, would thus furnish a social environment which
was stronger and better in the nourishment and education
it afforded to man. Every organ of society would function
more effectively, supplying richer opportunities for healthy
all-round self-development to all. So far as the economic
activities can be taken into separate consideration, it is
evident that this justly-ordered environment would do much
to raise the physical, and more to raise the moral
efficiency of the individual as a wealth-producer and
consumer. But its most important contribution to the value
and the growth of human welfare would lie in other fields
of personality than the distinctively economic, in the
liberation, realisation and improved condition of other
intellectual and spiritual energies^gt present thwarted by
or subordinated to industrialism.
79. Hobson, Wealth and Work, pp. 299-300.
CHAPTER VI
THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS A SOCIALISED
CONCEPTION OF PROPERTY
The institution of property is a socio-Tegai institution. With the
change of circumstances and new developments, new rights are pressing
for recognition. This development, which follows from the growing
complexities of social life,is showing itself in social stresses on the
current conception of property. New legal norms, having their basis
in social purposes, are emerging to form the basis of the institution of
property and re-structuring the economic life of the society. As
VIenger states:
The social aspiration of our time aim essentially
at a reorganisation of the economic life of mankind. They
start, it is true, from a searching criticism of our
existing economic conditions; but this criticism leads to
certain juridical postulates which involve an organic
reconstruction of our actual rights of property.
It,is a commonplace that there are no water-tight compartments
in the history either of ideas or of institutions, and every historical
period is in a sense transitiona1. Every social institution is a product
of developments, whose causes are to be found in changing social
conditions. Each stage contains the next, in germ. It is, however,
an unstable equilibrium, as Giddings explains:
Since the tendencies toward both cohesion and
dispersion are persistent, the social system simultan¬
eously exhibits phenomena of combination and of
competition, of communism and of individualism.
1. .VIenger, A., The Right to the Whole Produce 01 Labour, trans.
Tanner, M.E., London 1899, p. 1.
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Neither order of phenomena can ever exclude the other,
but at any given time one or the other order may be
ascendant and there may be a rhythm of alternating
ascendency of combination or competition, communism
or individualism.
The reason why there is this perpetual state of flux, is to be found in
the development of human relations, which are continually posing new
problems for the society to solve.
V„ e are in danger of overestimating the stability of legal concep¬
tions. They appear to be entirely stable, many of them have their
roots in the most solid portions ox our nature. In fact, people who
have become accustomed to particular laws and institutions are apt to
suppose that they are essential to the well-being, if not to the very
3
existence, of society. We find various forms of visage communities
and of feudalism appearing all over the world, as if they were necessary
stages in the development of nations. This great stability suggests that
they are absolute and indestructible. But this is certainly not true.
Legal conceptions are undergoing changes and their functions also
change with the change of circumstances. Legal order exists for
human beings alone, to regulate their interpersonal relationships.
Since individuals have different personalities and, indeed, one genera¬
tion often has a different personality from another, the nature of the
relationship created is subject to change. Basically an order remains
an order, but is liable to change in form and content. Thus social
2. Giddings, F.H., Principles of Sociology, London 1896, pp. 398-399.
3. This ostensibly enduring character is the basis of natural law
theories and gives a wrong impression about the changing and
evolutionary character of law.
needs are the essentials of life that give vitality to all legal institutions.
As Pound states:
W e do not base institutions upon deductions from
assumed principles of human nature; we require them
to exhibit practical utility, and we rest them upon a
ioundat|on of policy and established adaptation to human
needs.
In the words of Justice Holmes - the life of law has not been logic, it
has been experience.^
The institution of property grew up in law to meet the economic
needs of individuals. The law did this task by assigning the control ol
things to individuals. During the long history of the development of the
institution of property the nature of the control, that is, the relation ol
the individual to things, was the subject of different variations. These
variations were the result of different social tendencies at different
periods in the long history of the institution of property. Sometimes
the individual was given unlimited control over things and at another
time the social needs guided his control. These variations were the
result of sensing of the relation between an individual and an object of
his control.
The institution of property in the fully developed classical laws
of ancient Greece and Borne was regarded as a two-tier relation -
relation between an object and an individual. Social or legal order
was merely instrumental in protecting this relation from interference
by third parties. Property was regarded an extension of the person
4. Pound, R., "Mechanical Jurisprudence", Col. L.R., 1908, p. 609.
5. Holmes, O.W., The Common Law, Boston 1945, p. 1.
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over things since it was given meaning primarily through the notion oi
occupation of res nullius. Fegulatory legislative measures as in
modern times, were merely administrative processes and not a part of
the conception of property. Exclusive of these measures the individual
was regarded as having sole dominium over his objects. The reason
for this two tier relation is found in the system ol those days when the
head of the family was in exclusive control over his family and its
belongings. With the disintegration of control into two spheres -
domestic control and control of things - the latter was the control ol
things. As Noyes states:
The system of control originally exercised therein,
indiscriminately over persons and objects, though it also
developed into, and at first gave form to, the differentiat¬
ing super-familial (political) and intra-familial (domestic)
controls of later times, was preserved most nearly intact ^
in the later system of property - the control over objects.
Ownership was confined to dominant control over objects and was
7
sensed in two tier relation. As Aristotle states, a piece of property
is sometimes spoken of as a part; for a part is not only part of some¬
thing but wholly belongs to it, as does a piece of property. So a slave
is not only his master's slave but wholly his master's property. Thus
ownership was regarded as absolute vis-a-vis the object. Only the
state acting administrative^ was allowed to deprive a man of his
property subject to payment of fun compensation. The proprietary
right of the owner vis-a-vis other individuals was absolute.
6. Noyes, C.R ., The Institution of Property, London 1936, p. 131.
7. Aristotle, Politics, i, iv.
Ownership in Roman Law was construed around this extension of
individual control over objects and its absoluteness was checked not by
general social considerations but by the state's administrative actions.
The individual was, therefore, conceived as having certain interests
which were recognised as being in some sense independent oi the
interests of the community. The right of ownership revolves'around
two entities - an individual and an object, the owner having the right oi
use and abuse independent of any social considerations except the power
of the state to interfere in case of public need. This absoluteness was
the nature both of Greek and Roman ownership.
The reason for this stress on the two tier relation (two tier theory
of property) was the failure of Roman jurists to analyse the nature of
the relation and relate it to other persons who have the duty of non¬
interference towards the owner to maintain an institution of property.
As Terry states:
The owner stands in a certain relation to the material
thing which he owns; and neither the nature of such a
relation, nor of the thing toward which it existed was
regarded by the earlier Roman jurists as a matter calling
for analysis or explanation. Each was treated as^ simple
idea, one of the praecognoscenda of legal science.
Chaudhuri, while commenting on the Roman theory of property and
similar theories, states:
Epistemologically speaking, these concepts of
property involved sensed persons and/or seneed things
in two-termed relations. No epistemologically clear
method for relating distant, unperceived, and hypothetic-
ally conceiveg persons with non-tangible property . ..
was devised.
8. Terry, H.T., Some Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law,
Philadelphia 1884, p. 28.
9. Chaudhuri, J., "Towards a Democratic Theory of Property and
the Modern Corporation", Ethics, id"7o, vol. 81, p. 272.
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This ambiguity of the two termed relation tends toward harshness
in social policy, since it stresses the right of the individual as an inde¬
pendent unit. It does not stress the relation of rights and duties between
individuals in defining their civil liberties in dealing with objects.
This social character which is an inherent part of the right of property,
which was in oblivion, was brought to the surface with the gradual change
of circumstances. Under Roman law, expropriation of private property
was the privilege of the state, but such expropriation even in the public
interest did not socialise this particular conception of property. The
observation of individual duties towards each other in appropriating
objects of property was not considered as a matter of social responsib-
ility, that is, public law, but was left to be decided by the individuals
among themselves. For example, if a man is using his property
which causes some damage or inconvenience to others, it was always
left to the parties to settle among themselves. There was no general
provision of the law regulating their conduct. The social effects of
such settlements were considered the parties' own affair. To compare
such a law with the modern law, one finds that now no such settlement,
pact or stipulation can be made outside the provision of law. Even if
the stipulation between two individuals affects only their own character,
it may be void or illegal. For example, eating opium is prohibited,
gambling laws restrict one use of one's own money, even sale of one's
own property for immoral purposes is prohibited. The extreme case
of destroying one's own property has in some circumstances been made
illegal, for example, defacing and destroying currency. Thus
expropriation though made in the public interest, limits the individual
rights and duties not vis-a-vis other individuals but vis-a-vis the state.
An institution is socialised when individual rights and duties with respect
to the functioning of the institution limit each other's rights and duties
not in the interest of each other but to promote some social purpose as
a whole.
The unlimited nature of the right of property dominated the social
and legal thought of the mediaeval times. The feudal system was a
hierarchical system in which the lord was at the apex and his vassals
were likewise assigned a definite station in the social hierarchy. These
vassals were bound to perform certain obligations towards the lord,
and in virtue of their ties to the ^ord were assigned land over which the
lord had direct control. Thus the vassal held the land in return for
certain duties towards the lord. Thus in relation to ownership, there
were three elements, the lord, the vassal, and the land. The vassal's
role, if one thinks of him as analogous to an owner as a title holder,
was not an independent social function of cultivating land, but as an
appendage to his obligation towards the lord. Thus in reality the real
property relation remained between the lord and the object - land.
The vassal merely served as an intermediate link between the land and
the lord. The vassal holds the land so lbng as he performs his obliga¬
tions towards the lord. The vassal cultivates the land not as a part of
his social responsibility towards the land, that it should not lie fallow,
but as a part of his obligation towards the lord. Thus the feudal
system is a two tier system of property relation. Suppose the vassal
is to pay his lord a certain amount of rent and he cultivates land
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towards the payment of that rent and no more, but lets the rest of the
productive power or fertility of land run to waste. The lord will not
charge him for not fully exploiting the productive capacity of land.
There is no social obligation on him to exploit the land fully and let it
not lie deserted, because the social obligation is not directed towards
the cultivation of land but is directed towards the lord who has supplied
him the land.
Feudalism is a system of governing men through the agency of
ownership of land. A system burdened with oppressive obligations,
directed towards maintaining the glory of the lord rather than directing
obligations for the general welfare of the public. The lord manages
land through his vassal not for the purpose oi performing social obliga¬
tions but attaches social obligations to the lord for the purpose of
maintaining his established system of social order. The obligations
imposed on the vassal through the lord's ownership of land enter into
all human relationships. And this snows the centralisation of all
obligations imposed on the vassal as obligations towards the lord. For
example, when the lord's son or daughter is to be married, the vassal
is to pay tributes, burdened upon him by virtue of his being a vassal.
The system shows its social, political, economic and legal value in
terms of services rendered towards the lord rather than the services
rendered by the functioning of the ownership of land towards the welfare
of the people. This is so because the lord is the owner of the land and
his allotment of land has little to do with the performance of duties
towards the community. If because of an allotment of land the lord
requires the vassal to go with him to the battlefield his duties towards
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the lord are performed not by cultivation of land but by going to the
battlefield. During the course of a vassal's absence from the land, it
is the lord who may or may not make alternative arrangements for the
cultivation of the land, but during that period the vassal as a cultivator
of land is free from his obligation to cultivate the land. The vassal has
performed his duty not by cultivating the land but by going with the lord
to the battlefield. This is so because the feudal system presents a
system of property which is based on a two tier relationship between
the owner and the object. Social functions do not form a part of the
institution of property. With the decay of feudalism, a system of
property based on individual enterprise, rather than individual relation¬
ships constituting enterprise, gradually established itself. Though
this rise of a new property system rejected the intermediate personal
relations, in essence the new system preserved the old relation between
an object and an individual, the unlimited nature of right of property.
This change has yet not touched the idea that economic and social
purposes were the end of the institution of property which give significance
to the institution of property.
With the rise of industrialisation, the idea of the rights of man,
in contrast with the suppression of individual liberty under feudalism,
got new vigour and became the guiding philosophy in all spheres of life.
The liberties of the individual in legal terms became equal and the
individual's right of property was defended. His free bargaining power
to acquire property itself was termed property. Any interference with
individual liberty was cautiously watched. These changes created new
rights in consonance with the needs of time. For example, the invention
of the printing press broughylnto existence new rights regarding freedom
of speech. Again industrialisation created new phases of rights like
rights arising from the relation of master and servant and right to
strike. With these changes, the individual became aware of new
rights, many of them unknown in previous stages of civilisation. This
explains the fact that, and the processes by which, the evaluation of
various rights differs under changing circumstances; and how all. legal
developments carry with them and have roots in social changes and
developments as Ehrlich says:
All legal development therefore is based upon the
development of society, and the development of society
consists in this, th^men and their relations change in
the course of time.
The eighteenth century adopted the freedom of property as
a main theme of its legal development; and by the end of the century
this freedom reached its climax. The idea of unrestricted appropria¬
tion of property was generally accepted. The idea of property relations,
the relation between an object and an individual, without reference to
the duties, was paramount. And this means the acceptance of static
property - property without its economic function to the community.
Such a freedom of property was defended both by naturalist philosophy**
12
and utilitarian thinkers. Idealist philosophers like Kant and Hegel
regarded the freedom of property as a cardinal requisite for the develop-
10. Ehrlich, E. , Fundamental Principles oi the Sociology of Law,
trans. Moll, W. L., Cambridge, Massachusetts 1936, p. 396.
11. See chapter v.
12. Ibid.
ment of human personality, and thus supported the unlimited right of
property. But Hegel, like other individualist thinkers, failed to stick
to the conclusion of his theory. If all individuals have personality then
all need property. If all need property then the rights of each cannot
be unlimited, because the unlimited right of each is the negation of the
right of some other. The main theme for the individualist thinkers in
their idea of property is the unrestricted freedom of use and abuse, and
the idea that property relations are limited within the bounds of an
object and an individual. The idea of duty as a function or basis of
property is negated as soon as one sticks to the two tier theory of
property.
This theory of economic justice which prevailed during the 18th
and 19th centuries finds support in the laissez-faire doctrine which
attained great popularity since it was identified with industrial progress.
The doctrine states that the duty of the state is to abstain from economic
activity and give the individual maximum economic freedom in conduct¬
ing his economic affairs. State interference is considered detrimental
to freedom and progress. It is not a theory of absolute exclusion
without exceptions of state interference but its general principle is
13
minimal state interference. This theory in its application was given
13. Adam Smith believes that such a freedom is natural and for the
well-being of society. But he suggests state interference in
three spheres - protection from foreign invasion, and protection
of citizens from injustice from the hands of other citizens, and
to erect works of public importance from which an individual
would never get profit.
Smith, A., The WeaHh of Nations, vol. ii, book v, ch. i.
But Spencer believes in absolute freedom and condemns all state
actions even in cases of national importance such as control of
epidemics, postal system, etc.
Spencer, H., Social Statics, London 1902, pp. 197 & 217.
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support on all grounds - social, moral, and political - as Friedmann
states:
14
Thus science, economics, and ethics joined hands.
Socially, this theory believes that man is the measure of all
things. Each individual has enough reason to look after himself. The
formation of society is for the protection of the individual and not for
interference. It is only by his free choice, that a man can express
himself, and develop his faculties. This view is based on the idea that
society is a collection of individuals and in reality the individual by
nature is an isolated and solitary being. Such a view is a pure fiction,
for man is a social being. He has always lived in society.
Morally, this theory believes that all social problems one way
or another reflect the character of man since man is a free being -
freedom of the will is the basis. This approach inevitably subordinates
the actions of man including his economic position and related conse¬
quences to his moral being. Poverty is, thus, a moral problem
because it is due to the moral character of the poor.
But this is not the moral aspect that involved the unjust suffering
of victims of economic forces beyond their control. The vast material
output realised by industrialisation is inconsistent with the notion that
poverty is a moral and inevitable condition of social life. With the
increase in industrialisation the decreasing role that human labour plays
in the production of industrial wealth inevitably weakens the proposition
14. Friedmann, W., World Revolution and the Future of the West,
London 1942, p. 13.
that moral character is the decisive factor in determining man's
economic welfare. These improvements set in motion great industrial
production and it is the socio-'egal order which, because it is not based
on just distribution, is the cause of poverty and not the moral character
of man.
Legally, the theory of laissez-faire expresses itself in the maxim
minimum of law maximum of logic - minimum of interference with the
individual's liberty to do as he chooses. Its legal effect is visible in
a free labour market where everyone sells his labour irrespective of
any legal restrictions. Professor Miller expresses this idea when
he states:
I have observed the important part that contract
fills in modern life ... and the individuals who enter into
the relation are truly free. It is through contract that
man attains freedom. Although it appears to be the
subordination of one man's will to^tjiat of another, the
former gains more than he loses.
The laws for the benefit of society were thought of i©conditions of
perpetual servitude, thus, vicious and void. It is not surprising that
in the new industrial societies which arose on the ruins of the old regime
the dominant note should have been the insistence upon individual
freedom.
The use of men, women, and children by factory owners under
the regime of laissez-faire had all of the advantages for the capitalist
rather than for the majority who depend on him for their subsistence.
It is, therefore, wrong to condemn legislative activity as a sign of
15. Miller, W.G., The Philosophy of Law, London 1884, p. 216.
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servitude. The individual gets more freedom under the laws for the
purpose of regulating social activity than without them. For example,
traffic rules give more security and freedom of movement by traffic
control than a man can get without them in a mob on the roads.
Similarly by the control of economic activity greater freedom is assured
to all. The government that regulates the economic activity with the
idea of securing economic tools to the satisfaction of the economic needs
of an individual secures greater freedom than is assured under laissez-
faire .
The subjective basis of the rights of property gives an individual
arbitrary power to dispose of the fruits and substance of an object and
to exclude others froxn it. An individual may use his property
arbitrarily, or not at all, or destroy it, or desert it. No duties were
attached to the right because of the idea that property is a relation
merely between an object and an individual. It can be remarked that
the only limit to the arbitrary use of property was found in the arbitrary
use of property by others. It was the arbitrary use of rights of each
other that were arbitrarily lim.iting the rights ol each other. If the
owner of the mine does not mine the coal, nor does the landlord cultivate
the fields, the right of property of both is secure, but their needs may
compel them to use their property and restrict the activity of each
other; but there is nothing in their right of property that obliges them
to mine the coal or cultivate the field. There are no restrictions to
assure that the ownership of property carries a public responsibility or
that its raison d'etre is not only income but service.
The social consequences of such an idea of property were felt
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because of the miseries and brutalities it caused to the majority of the
people within society. Especially is this so when such a conception of
property is applied to industry, commerce, agriculture, etc., in short
to the means of production, which are concerned with the instrument¬
alities which produce and distribute the goods needed by society to
sustain itself. At stake, is then not the satisfaction and comfort ox
a few individuals but the we^1 -being and standard of living of the society
as a whole. It is inspired by these ideals, the resentment against the
inequalities which the individualistic conception of property under laissez-
faire theory furthered, under the guise of political and legal equality,
that the protective measures were suggested. It is in this sphere ox
social organisation that dents were made in the two tier theory of
property.
Another reason why the individualistic theory of property held sway
for so long a time, was the attitude of the judicial courts who failed to
see through social changes and had not realised the incorporation of
social developments into legal institutions. President Roosevelt of the
United States, in selecting Holmes to the Bench, made a revealing
remark:
The labor decisions which have been criticized by
some of the big railroad men and other members of large
corporations, constitute to my mind a strong point in
Judge Holmes' favor. The ablest lawyers and the
greatest judges are men whose past has naturally brought
them into close relationship with the wealthiest and most
powerful clients, and I am glad when I can find a judge
who has been able to preserve his aloofness of mind so as
to keep his broad humanity of feeling and his sympathy for
the class from which he has not drawn his clients. I
think it eminently desirable that our Supreme Court snould
show in unmistakable fashion their entire sympathy with
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all proper effort to secure the most favorable possible
consideration fpg- the men who most need that
consideration.
The partial and partisan attitude of the judges in taking social
considerations into their judgements, led to resentment among the
majority in the society to whom courts were the only impartial judge of
their plight. This matter was put with candour by Lord Justice Scrutton
when he stated:
The habits you /Judges/ are trained in, the people
with whom you mix, lead to your having a certain class
of ideas of such a nature that, when you have to deal with
other ideas, you do not give as sound and accurate a
judgement as you would wish. This is one of the great
difficulties at present with labour. Labour says:
"Where are your impartial Judges? They all move in the
same circle as the employers, and they are all educated
and nursed in the same ideas as the employers. How can
a labour man or a trade unionist get impartial justice?"
It is very difficult sometimes to be sure that you have put
yourself into a thoroughly impartial position between two ^
disputants, one of your own class and one not of your class.
With such changes in thinking on the part of judges, it became easy to
incorporate the idea of social purpose and public duty as forming a part
of the idea of rights of property.
A third reason for the rise and growth of movement towards
social responsibility as forming a part of the institution of property is
found in the rise of nationalist movements towards the end of the
19th century. As Dietze states:
The decline of the individualistic concept 01 property
as such, has been attributed to the emergence of nationalism
16. Frankfurter, F., "Property and Society", Science and Social
Change, compiled by Thornton, J.E., Washington 1939, p. 446.
17. Ibid p. 448.
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with its emphasis upon community-feeling.
As the individualistic view of institutions fades before the growing
claims of the community, the latter demands a reorientation of the
relation between an individual and an object. The growing recognition
of the corporate nature of society, implying a loss of individuality, also
implies the depreciation of the hbsoiute' rights oi private property.
With these developments, the idea of private rights were mixed with
social responsibilities and thus the rights of property came to be
considered as fulfi1Ung a group function rather than an individualistic
function. The idea of duties in relation to rights of property was
conceptualised in terms of the social purpose of property. Ownership
came to be aeen as a 'three tier' relation - a relation between an
individual and other individuals with respect to the object. Such a
conception of property takes in perspective the limits which the law
%
imposes on individuals in dealing with their respective rights and duties
in the general interest. It is not only that the rights are called in
question but that the duties imposed are to serve as proper limits to the
rights. The duties imposed socialise the concept since they generate
a conception of property as related to in social context. As Chaudhari
states:
In a theory of property, as opposed to a theory of
natural science, there is a normative level of operations
in addition to what is usually called empirical or physical
or material. It is in the operational process that property
becomes more than a bundle of possible re^gtions and is
constituted as a fact of cultural existence.
18. Dietze, G., In Defense of Property, London 1971, p. 129.
Friedmann, W., World Revolution and the Future of the West,
London 1942, ch. v.
19. Chaudhari, op.cit., p. 278.
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Friedmann expresses such a change from the unlimited exercise of the
right of property to the right of property as a social responsibility when
he states:
Political and legal ideology partly prepared and
followed the general increase of public responsibility
in social and economic affairs, by putting ever greater
emphasis on social interdependence, responsibility,
discipline, and duty, rather than on individual rights and
freedom of economic competition . ... From the end of
the nineteenth century onwards legal theory, as well as
the trend of legislative and judicial development .. .
emphasized the limits of property rights, and stressed
more and more the duties of the individual towards his
fellow-citizens and the community; at the same time jurists
boldly denounced the notion of individual rights altogether
and knew notning but 'the right to do one's duty '.
The conservative idea that any interference with individual freedom
is vicious, loosened its grip and state regulations were welcomed as
21
strengthening individual liberty. Of this change Stone remarks:
20. Friedmann, W., World Revolution, op.citpp. 77-78.
21. Professor Brown asserts that regulations promote the liberty of
the individual, He cites four instances to prove that restrictions
are the integral part of liberty and preservation of human life.
He instances:
1) Restrictions upon each citizen in the interest of
the liberty of all citizens;
2) Restrictions on the actions of the few in order to
promote the liberty of the many;
3) Restrictions on the many in the interests of the
liberty of the few;
4) The liberty of the individual may be promoted by
restrictions that the state imposes upon him in his own
interest.
Ail these four types of restrictions taken together supplement
each other and show that it is only through the existence ox such
restrictions that an individual has any liberty. It is, therefore,
more rational to say that liberty is only possible through the
diminution of liberty. The negative aspect of Uberty as
immunity from governmental interference has its roots in the
positive element of governmental regulation.
Brown, \\ .J., The Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation,
London 1S12, pp. 61-63.
The Progress of Continental Law in toe Nineteenth Century,
op. cit., p. 80.
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The fallacy of supposing that a workman, living from
hand to mouth on daily labour, resents legislative protection
for his wage level and condition of labour in the same way
as a great commercial or industrial corporation resents ^
restrictions on its free bargaining, is now well recognised.
By the late 19th century the idea that rights have their social side was
strongly pressing for recognition. Ihering declared:
All rights of private law, even though primarily
having the individual as their purpose, are bound by
regard for society. There is not a single right in which
the subject can say, this I have exclusively for myself,
I am lord and master over it, the consequences of the 23
concept of right demand that society shall not limit me.
A similar idea has been expressed by Ehrlich when he states:
The entire private law ... inasmuch as it has an
organising content, is social law ... the true individual
rights are social rights ... ownership of the goods which
it concedes to^e individual is merely a result of this
social order.
25
With the realisation of the social side of property it ceases to
be purely a concern of the individual. The individual is not free to do
what he likes; society regulates the appropriation of property. The
idea that the individual will suffer if he neglects or destroys his property
is interpreted in terms of social consequences. What will happen if the
individual neglects his mine, or his house and lets it fall, or neglects
his fields? W hat will be the social consequences? To endanger the
right, even the very existence of society? Since there is no individual
22. Stone, J., The Province and Function of Law, London 1947, p. 255.
23. Ihering, R.V., Law as a Means to an End, trans. Husik, 1.,
New York 1968, p. 396.
24. Ehlrich, op.cit., pp. 53-54.
25. Ely, R.T., Property and Contract in their Relation to the
Distribution of W ealth, London 1914, vol. i, ch. vi.
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law, all law is social. No individual is an isolated being, nor does the
law Know such a being, the law always sees in man soie^ a member of
26
a society, there is no interest which is not social. There is nothing
which is absolutely private much less the property which society must
regulate to' sustain itself. A a Ihering states:
It is therefore not true that property involves in
its "idea" the absolute power of disposition. Property in
such a form society cannot tolerate and never has tolerated.
The "idea" of property cannot contain anything which is in
contradiction with the "idea" of society ... The principle
of the inviolability of property means the delivery of society
into the hands of ignorance, obstinacy and spite ... The
interests of society are really your own; and if the latter
interferes with your property and puts restrictions upon you^
it is done for your sake as much as for the sake of society."
By the idea of the 'social side of property' is not to be understood
that it is a new discovery or a new appendix to the institution of property
but rather a recognition of what was always inherent in the institution
of property itself but was merely dormant and suppressed under social,
political, and legal philosophy of different periods of human history.
The regulating of the rights of property by the state was thus fully
recognised as a part of the rights of property in modern times. But
the first development came through the imposition of restrictions on the
rights of property. In the first instance malevolence and harmful
attitude in the" use of property was restricted. As Gutteridge says:
The possibility that a legal right may be exercised
26. The suicide laws imply that an individual is not even free
to put an end to his own life - life belongs not to man alone
but to society as well. The abortion laws imply that a child
from the very moment of his conception belongs to society.
27. Ihering, op.cit., pp. 389-390.
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with impunity in the spirit of malevolence or selfishness
is one of the unsatisfactory features of our law, and
there would appeq^to be a prima facie case for reform
in this direction.
The law should prohibit the exercise of a right for a purpose which
shocks the conscience of mankind in general. The regulation of the
right of property by restrictions, ®o as not to permit injury to the right
of others, is not an accidental phenomenon but a proper part of the
right of property - when the right is inoperative without the restrictions
then the right is non-existent. It can only operate within these
restrictions since the very existence of a legally recognised right
depends upon its exercise being consistent within its boundaries; if
this were not so, the right would negate itself. The right belongs to
persons and has no independent existence, social consequences are part
of it and not merely accidental to it. But these restrictions do not
socialise the concept of property but only demonstrate the social aspect
of the right of property. The placing of limitations on the right of
property from time to time is the way the society makes the rights of
each individual consistent with each other. But this process is still
a step short of socialisation. To say that exercise of a right is limited
or not permitted, is simply saying that one may not do something that
one has not the right to do. These restrictions are only to control the
misuse of right rather than to promote some positive social purpose.
The concept of 'limitations on property' does emphasise the social
aspect of the rights of property, but in fact it may well leave to the
28. Gutteridge, H.C., "Abuse of Rights ', Camb. L.J. 1933, p. 22.
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individual the despotic and sole rights within the limitations. It is
only the means that were originated to avoid the consequences which
logically follow if the concept of property is regarded as absolute.
No doubt it narrowed the sphere of proprietary actions but limitations
fail to explain the ground of the liability of the owner to promote social
purpose. As Dugit explains:
To say that the abusive exercise of a right is not
permitted, or further, that the law does not protect one
who clearly misuses his right, is simply saying that one
may not do something that one has not the right to do, or
that the pr^j-ogatives belonging to a given right are being
exceeded.
To abuse one's right is to exceed the limits of the right, thus abusing
the right and exceeding the limits are identical. Thus the purpose of
the restrictions were to protect the rights of the individual rather than
to impose a social obligation, The limitations on the right intended
to eliminate malice, selfishness, or wilful injury lead to psychological
and ethical difficulties because it can in certain circumstances become
difficult to prove that one has a malicious intention. Complexity of
motives in performing an act will make it difficult to prove the wilfully
injurious nature of the act. An objective criterion, free from psycho¬
logical and ethical considerations, which externally manifests the
character of the act will avoid the psychological and ethical difficulties.
For example, the imposition of duty on the owner to promote social
purpose - as in the case of a law providing that an owner who neglects
his land is not worthy of being a land owner. This functional criterion
29. The Progress o Continental Law in the Nineteenth Century,
Continental Legal History Series, vol. xi, London 1918, p. 142.
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i& neither ethical nor psychological, it carries with it a social purpose,
as all organisations and institutions are formed with a view to fulfil
a social purpose. The exercise of a right must conform to the social
purpose of the institution which creates the right.
The conditions 01 the new social economy made it increasingly
clear that the growth and development of society lay in the rightful use
of natural resources and elimination of waste, which under the
individualistic philosophy was left as a matter of private concern. It
is this pressing social problem together with political and other causes
which brought the social aspect of property into predominance. The
idea that society will adjust itself by its natural mechanism (by
physical laws of Newtonian physics and biological laws of natural
selection which the individualistic philosophy applies to society because
it believes that society is a causal mechanism rather than based on
human laws of purpose) showed signs of decay and was abandoned in
favour of various social techniques designed to ensure that the economic
life of the community is a social 'mechanism' rather than a natural
'mechanism'. Social methods, by introducing planning in economic life
to avoid ruthless exploitation and waste, were introduced wnich led to
social stresses on the right of property. Not only static property was
attacked, the free use of property was restricted. Even the freedom
to acquire property was restricted. A new social conception of property
was emerging and was consciously emphasised and was carried into
practice - limiting the conception of property within the bounds of
welfare of the general public. As Kruse states that the right of property,
in the modern world, is
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the driving force in the economy of the community,
of its widely diffused economic mechanism, df the
production, distribution and credit of socie^g, with their
numerous carefully co-ordinated sections.
Because of such diffusion in the economic mechanism, Kruse favours
restricting this mechanism which otherwise exploits the economically
weaker sections of society. He cites an example of such financial
exploitation in cases of hire purchase agreements. To avert such
economic exploitation by the short sightedness of private capitalism,
Kruse suggests, not the abolition of private property nor state monopoly
but control, guidance, and regulation through legal intervention. Law
32
is an appropriate means for such regulations. Limitations and
regulations of the economic functioning of the right of property will
transform the right of property to its true subsistence function by
limiting it to the right of use rather than accumulation of wealth, as
he states:
In view of these limitations it is difficult to
describe the right of the actual holder of the estate as a
right of proper^; it would be more true to regard it as
a right of use.
With the growing emphasis on the social aspect of property, the
idea that the institution of property is a social product and its purpose
is social interest was fully established. Restrictions on the conception
30. Kruse, F.V., The Community of the Future, London 1950, p. 436.
31. Kruse, The Right of Property, translated by Philips, D., London
1953, vol. ii, pp. 21-22.
32. Kruse, The Right of Property, trans. Federspiel, P.T., London
1939, vol. i, book iii, pp. 165-238.
33. Ibid p. 245.
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of property were considered as an intrinsic part of the conception itself
i
rather than a gloss on the institution of property. The writings of
Ihering, Ely, Kruse, etc. laid stress on the social aspect of property,
that the institution of property is to serve social interests, and
advocated writing regulations into the definition of property that would
do justice to the idea that property is a social good. The idea that
property is not entitled to absolute protection but implies social duties
for the interest of the community was recognised. Such an approach
characterised by greater realism eliminated those incidents of the
right of property that led to the abuse of the right of property, and
strengthened the individual's right over his property rather than
34
weakened his right as Dietze claims. This socia1 evaluation of
property brought socialisation of property by imposing on the holder of
property social duties in the form of restrictions as to avoid waste
and destruction of property. Thus the proprietor is prohibited to use
his property to the detriment of society. It also prohibited the malicious
use of property for the purpose of injuring one's neighbour, for the
right of property is not recognised for the sake of injuring others. It
is recognised that though an injury to a neighbour is not directly
*
injurious to the public at large, there is a public interest in restraining
such injuries. Thus the social aspect of an individual's right of
property which was previously only favoured in ease of state necessity
by expropriation, under socialisation became a common feature in
respect of each individual. Now individual property stood against
34. Dietze, G., In Defense of Property, London 1971, pp. 108-115.
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individual property not as individual to individual but as a condition of
social well-being. Individual life is regarded as a coherent whole
participating in the social milieu for the furtherance of a true indi¬
viduality. It is not a case of each seeking his own interest like a hermit
irrespective of his social milieu. Socialisation is, thus, the moulding
of the concept of property with reference to social functions. For
example, under zoning laws, the state may restrict the use of property
in the area where spillover affects the health of the public. Such a
restriction reduces the value of property, indeed it may deprive the
property of its value and cause an economic loss to the owner. This
deprivation is a social reservation whereby an obligation is imposed
on the owner as a condition of his right of property. The application
o^iis right is limited by the function it performs in society. As Cohen
states:
To permit any one to do absolutely what ne likes
with his property in creating noise, smells, or danger of
fire, would be to make property in general valueless.
To be really effective, therefore, the right of property
must be supported by restrictions or posit^e duties on
the part of owners, enforced by the state.
To say that the function of the institution of property is developed
on a social basis is to assign to the institution of property a teleological
basis. There must be some social purpose which is the basis of the
function of the institution of property. As every institution in society
has a purpose which determines the main lines of its growth, so the
social purpose for the institution of property has become its function.
35. Cohen, M.B., Law and the Social Order, New York 1933, p. 57.
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As the origins of the institution presuppose some specific and intelligible
purpose for it calling the institution into being, so the functions of the
institution, however they may change and develop, are in the last resort
36
also specific - and in the case of the institution of property, the
development of the institution is set on a social basis as determining
its function.
The study of the institution of property with reference to its
function opens up the prospect of a property objective study. The new
social philosophy looks at the institution of property with the aim of
establishing an objective criterion oi social well-being. The owner is
expected and obliged to use his property for the social interest. This
does not mean collective ownership but establishing of a collective
and coherent relationship between the individual functioning and social
well-being. In discussing such an approach to the institution oi
property, which establishes an objective criterion for the functioning
of the right of property, we must realise that the development of public
policy would not have been possible without the support of jurists.
The juristic attempt came through a number of different quarters,
from Germany, France, America, etc., some of which I propose to
discuss in this chapter .
36. Cole referring to social function and social purpose states:
Social purposes are, thus, the raw material of
social functions, and social functions are social
purposes selected and placed in coherent re^tionship.
Cole, G.D.H., Social Theory, London 1920, p. 54.
297
Duguit
Duguit saw in the social changes that took place in the wake oi
industrialisation that the force of events and practical needs were
actuary creating new legal conceptions. The appearing oi new legal
conceptions is a constant and spontaneous product of events - and thus
legal conceptions are essentially social conceptions. He rejects all
37
metaphysical notions such as rights of man and freedom of will . He
states that all rights are objective and presents a legal situation in
which individuals achieve certain advantages in the performance of
certain acts. And acts derive their validity from their social character.
Thus the existence of a right is the performance of a social function
towards others, that is, no one possesses any right save that of always
38
doing his duty. Duguit states:
The individual has no rights; neither has a group
of individuals. But each member of society has a certain
function to perform, a certain task to fulfil. It is
precisely this that underlies the rule of law which is
prescribed upq^ everyone, great or small, the governing
and governed.
Each individual as a member of society has a function to perform.
The owner has a social function to perform. For example, if an owner
37. Duguit says that subjective right is a power that consists in
imposing one's will on other wills. Since man is a social
being and can only live in society, there can be no such
right as based on subjective power, but it is only objective
law which determines and gives validity to rights and not
subjective will. He excludes the human free will from the
domain of legal transactions.
38. The Progress of Continental Law in the Nineteenth Century,
Continental Legal History Series, London 1918, vol. xi, p. 71.
39. Ibid p. 73.
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leaves his land uncultivated or allows his house to fall into ruins, the
state steps in and is justified in obliging the owner to perform his social
function as a property holder. Duguit states:
The right of property exists and must exist. It is
tae indispensable condition upon which rests the prosperity
and greatness oi society . .. But property is not a right;
it is a social function. The owner, that is to say the
possessor of wealth, by the^act of his possession, has a
social function to perform.
In ajsociety where each is to function, the principle of social inter¬
dependence is the basis of Duguit's theory. Social interdependence is
not a conjecture but an existing fact, it is not a sentiment, not even
a principle of conduct; it is a fact of the social structure itself. All
acts and institutions are to be judged and protected according to how
41
they contribute to the fact of social solidarity. This realistic and
socia1 basis is the specific rule of law or 'objective law', for preserving
a cohesion between the different elements that compose society through
the accomplishment of the social functions.
Duguit's approach rejects all individual rights - an individual as
such has no rights, powers and liberties; instead he performs duties
and obligations. Under social solidarity, liberty is not a subjective
40. Ibid p. 74.
41. Duguit attacks all those conceptions of state and sovereignty
which personify the state. He is not against organised
associations butdascribes the movement towards decentralisation -
all associations are working towards social solidarity. If all
associations including state are working for social solidarity
then how is the state different from other associations? All
organisations nave a duty to fulfil, a social function - to
organise public service, which represents collective purposes,
to assure their continuity and control their operations. Once
they cease to promote social solidarity, a duty to revolt against
them arises.
right but a result of the obligation resting upon each one to develop his
individuality, that is to say, his physical, moral, and intellectual
activities as fully as possibly in order to co-operate with all his forces
towards social solidarity. Duguit justifes factory legislation because
it is to protect the individual from all dangerous situations involved in
factory work, and thus for the safety and health of the community. It
is useless to oppose factory legislation on the basis that it interferes
with the liberty of the individual. By imposing measures of safety,
the legislator protects human life as a social asset.
Duguit advocates that property should meet what he regards as
economic needs. In modern communities the road to meeting economic
needs is ever-stricter interdependence of the various elements. In
this way property is socialised. That does not mean it is becoming
collective in the economic sense, but as he states:
It means two things: first, that private ownership
is ceasing to be a private right and becoming a social
function; and second, that those instances of the applica¬
tion of wealth to collective uses which should be leg^y
protected, are becoming more and more numerous.
The institution of private property, in so far as it survived, could only
be justified as a means of applying wealth to the differentiated purposes
required in an economical^ complex society. Duguit states;
Today ... if the application of w ealth to
individual uses is protected, it is above all because it
benefits society . .. Law no longer protects the so-
called subjective right of the owner. It guarantees to
the possessor of wealth the liberty to fulfil the socia"!
42. Supra note 9, pp. 129-130.
taste incumbent upon him by reason of his wealth.
Duguit does not advocate the abolition of private property but
maintains that by performing social functions, private property will
attract greater protection. The movement of law is towards collective
and coherent action in fulfilling social purposes. Society will protect
actions if the owner's action is in performance of social duties.
Duguit advances reasons why the individualistic system of
property is breaking down. He says that the individual is not an end in
himself but only a means. He is a wheel in a huge social body, and
his only reason for existence is performance of his part in the labour of
society. The individual system of property is vanishing because its
only purpose was to protect the application of wealth to individuals'
interests. Duguit rejects the classical conception of property. He
believes that all interests are social, and advocates the imposition of
high taxes on the rising value of land brought about by collective aciiieve
ments of society. This is justi-ied because mis increment is not due
44
to any act of the owner.
43. Ibid. p. 134.
Similarly Tawney states:
Society should be organized primarily for the
performance of duties, not for the m aintenance of rights,
and ... the rights which it protects should be those
which are necessary to the discharge of social obliga¬
tions. But duties, unlike rights, are relative to some
end or purpose, for the sake of which they are imposed
. .. The former are a principle of union; they lead
men to co-operate. The essential thing, therefore, is
that men should fix their minds upon the idea of purpose.
Tawney, P.H., The Acquisitive Society, London 1921, p. 96.
44. Ibid pp. 136-138.
A similar view has been expressed by Hobson who believes that
all values are the results of social manifestations.
Hobson, J.A., The Social Problem, London 1901, ch. vi.
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R enner
Renaer analyses the decisive change in the course of the develop¬
ment of the institution of property, the economic function of which in a
capitalist economy has become entirely divorced from its legal meaning.
This break up of the unity of ownership is posing a nindrance to the
socialisation of property because effective economic ownership and
legal ownership are under separated control. The break up of the
unity of ownership has diverted property from its purpose, the satis¬
faction of the economic needs of each individual, and thus has led to the
abuse of the right of property and made it anti-social. Property, in
modern times, he states, is not a mere order of goods, it has become
4 D
a dominium over persons, an imperium. While in former conditions,
of simple commodity production, ownership meant, on the whole, unity
of control, work, and enjoyment; the capitalist economiy hats separated
these functions. The capitalist industrialist can command the
services of wage-labourers who are, in law, his equals, who bind
themselves by contract of mutual obligations, but who are, in fact,
subject to the disciplinary power of the capitalist. Property has
become personal power. Renner, quoting Marx, states:
It is not because he is a leader of industry that a
man is a capitalist; on the contrary, he is a leader of
industry because he is a capitalist^,, The leadership of
industry is an attribute of capital. °
45. Renner states that this development of the institution of property
has become so organised that it has become similar to the state.
It has become a power to issue commands and enforce them.
He, in fact, gives a warning against this new role of the institution
of property.
46. Renner, K. , The Institutions of Private Law and their Social
Functions, trans. A. Schwarzschild, ed. O. Kahn-Freund,
London 1949, p. 107.
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AH institutions are entrusted to perform a specific purpose,
and the obligations on the members of society are imposed with the idea
to carry out that purpose. Renner insists that the institution of
property is entrusted with the function of performing economic functions
and it is an obligation of the members of society to fulfil their economic
needs through the institution of property. But under the capitalist system
if a member of society does not exercise his right of property with
respect to a res, that is, if he does not make the economic use of his
property, for example, does not cultivate his land but teases it to
someone, he is still the owner of land. He is the owner of his land
not because of the economic use of the land but because of his legal
rights. Thus a simple economic category is equivalent to a combina¬
tion of various legal categories, there is no point to point correspond¬
ence. A number of distinct legal institutions serves a single economic
process. There is thus a clear divergence between the economic
aspect of property and the legal contents of it. Renner's main theme
is the adjustment of legal contents to the economic contents, and by
economic contents, he means, the detention of a res for one's
appropriation.
All this explains the relative lack of purpose to carry out the
obligation by the owner because in the present legal context he remains
an owner without the economic detention of the res. But by virtue of
his legal ownership, he wields power over those who enjoy the economic
detention of the res. This places the legal owner in a position through
the abstract control of res to the actual control of human beings who
derive the economic control through his legal title. Renner states:
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In the eyes of the 'aw, the property-subject is
related to the object only, controlling matter alone. But
what is control of property in law, becomes in fact man's
control of human beings, of the wage-labourers, as soon
as property has developed into capital. The individual
called owner sets the tasks to others, he makes them subject
to his commands . .. The owner of a res imposes his will
upon^rsonae, autonomy is converted into heteronomy of
will.
The right of ownership thus departs from being an economic
satisfaction of an individual and assumes a new social function of issuing
commands similar to the state. This power of control over human
beings in carrying out the functions of production and distribution,
48
which is a social necessity, becomes a rule not for the purpose of
protection but for exploitation and profit to the owner. These develop¬
ments show that the institution of property has been subverted from
being an order of things. It merely protects him who has possession
by virtue of an unassailable title, but it does not distribute goods accord¬
ing to a plan. This divergence between legal property and economic
property has led to the abuse of the institution of property and thus the
47. Ibid p. 106.
48. In explaining the need for power of control as a social necessity,
Tawney states:
No one complains that captains give orders and that
the crews obey them, or that engine-drivers must
work to a timetable laid down by railway-managers.
For, if captains and managers command, they do so
by virtue of their office, and it is by virtue of their
office that their instructions are obeyed. They are
not the masters, but the fellow-servants, of those
whose work they direct. Their power is not conferred
upon them by birth or wealth, but by the position which
they occupy in the productive system, and, though
their subordinates may grumble at its abuses, they do
not dispute the need for its existence.
Tawney, R.H., Equality, Open University edition, London 1964,
p. 113.
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functioning of the institution of property has become anti-social in its
49
essence.
Renner asks how this development where the owner, as at
present, is far removed from the process of production can be remedied.
How can the institution of property be restored to its real position where
there is unity of legal property and economic property? Renner does
not advocate the abolition of the institution of property, which he believes
50
can never be abolished, but suggests that the anti-social activities
which have crept into the institution of property can be remedied by
51
control, guidance and a regulatory legal order. It is the legal order
itself that can make the legal ownership correspond to economic owner¬
ship. The present chaos within the institution of property is because
of the fact that the norm of the institution of property has remained
49. Renner, op.cit., p. 279.
50. Renner, op.cit., pp. 278-279.
51. Renner states:
All property is conferred by the law, ... with the
power of disposal over corporeal things; but now the
corporeal object controls the individuals, labour-
power, even society itself ...
The norm is the result of free action on the part
of a society that has become conscious of its own
existence. The society of simple commodity producers
attempts to stabilise its own conditions of existence,
the substratum of its existence, by means of the norm.
But in spite of the norm, the substratum changes, yet
this change of the substratum takes place within the
forms of the law; the legal institutions automatically
change their functions which turn into their very
opposite, yet this change is scarcely noticed and is not
understood. In view of all this the problem arises
whether society is bound to change the norm as soon as
it has become conscious of the change in its function.
Renner, op.cit., p. 293.
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constant while the substratum has changed. The legal institution
reverses its original function without any active participation ol the law
itself as soon as there is a change of the actual substratum of the legal
institution. In the case of the institution of property, Renner states:
Norm and substratum have become so dissimilar,
so incommensurable, that the working of property, the
way in which it functions, is no longer explained and made
intelligible by the property-norm; to-day wg^nust look to
the complementary institutions of property.
Renner's analysis shows that the legal institution of property
in fact has ceased to function by losing its independence and self-
sufficiency. It is only by constantly working in association with other
legal institutions that ownership can now fulfil its function. Since the
social function of property is not now relevant to the right of property,
and it is society that is to determine the function of her institutions,
there is a growing tendency towards a new social recognition that
capital must be brought under control of society. Regarding recent
developments, Renner states that public duties have been imposed on
the property holders, though these have not made property public. I he
landowner must cultivate his land or some other person seizes it xor
cultivation, he must sell, he must charge the controlled price instead
of the market price, he must dispatch his corn to the railway or mill,
53 . .
and so forth. These developments have not socialised property
because the control of things has remained in the will of private
individuals. Renner states:
52. Ibid p. 290.
53. Renner, op.cit., pp. 120 Si loo.
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The function of the right in rem is not revealed by
persons or res alone, nor by the legal power of the persona
over the res, which is merely freedom of action granted
by the law. Its function is revealed in the active use of the
right, in the manner of exercijSjp; which in most cases lies
outside the sphere of the law.
Restrictions on the right of property still leave the individual as a
de jure controller over the object, for these do not establish the way
for the relations among men and nature to be such that every person
and every object may have its functions openly established and may
fulfil them in a straightforward manner. This task can only be achieved
when all complementary and supplementary institutions appended to the
55
institution of property will cease to be the 'hand maidens of property'.
The socialisation of property, is fully realised, according to Renner, when
the res, if it is made fully available for the use of mental or manual
labour, and if it is a means of consumption, is given over to the use of
the consumer. If the owner cannot use a machine or a landowner
cannot cultivate the land he must give up detention in order to put the
object at the service of society. This will deprive the owner from
making the technical use of property by act-in-the-law, if he does not
know the economic use of it. Renner states:
The legal system must make provision for giving the
things into the detention of those who have the technical
means of^gontrolling them, otherwise society would cease
to exist.
54. Renner, op.cit., p. 267.
55. Renner, op.cit., p. 298.
56. Renner, op.cit., p. 268.
A similar argument is advanced by Aristotle when he says that the
instruments should go to those who can use them and know the use
of them, and not according to any superiority of birth.
Aristotle, Politics, book iii, ch. xii.
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In establishing such a legal order, the complementary and supplementary
institutions will become the principal institutions and the institution of
property which is playing a major part will be abolished without any
57
disturbance to the economic process.
Berle and Means
Berle and Means suggest the socialisation of the power of the
corporation for the interest of the society. They emphasise that the
growing power of corporations is to be controlled since it is trying to
58
compete with the power of state. The concentration of economic
power in the hands of the corporation thus needs to be checked by
imposing social duties, so that the passive rights of corporation must
yield to the larger interests of society. They hold that this change can
be brought by introducing a wholly new concept of corporate activity,
and they stated:
Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control
can stand against the paramount interests of the commun¬
ity ... It remains only for the claims of the community
57. Renner states that modern legislation relating to normal
working hours, factory inspection, protection of women and
children, insurance against sickness, accident, and old age,
public labour exchange, etc. are replacing the complementary
institutions of property. And keeping these in view, he states:
Should we not com e to the conclusion that the process
of change towards a new legal order has already begun,
that the complementary institutions already pre-shaped
in the framework of the old order will become the
principal institutions so that the institution which has
previously played the principal part can be abolished,
without any disturbance of the economic process, in
so far as it no longer serves a useful social purpose?
Renner, op.cit., p. 295.
58. Berle, A.A. and Means, G.C., The Modern Corporation and
Private Property, New York 1967, p. 313.
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to be put forward with clarity and force. Rigid enforce¬
ment of property rights as a temporary protection against
plundering by control would not stand in the way of the
modification of these rights in the interest oi other groups.
When a convincing system of community obligations is worked
out and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive
property ri^it of today must yield before the large interests
of society.
In their analysis of modern corporations, they revealed the
separation of ownership from control and assigned the respective
position of ownership and control while stating:
Power over industrial property has been cut off
from the beneficial ownership of this property ... Control
of physical assets has passed from the individual owner to
those who direct the quasi-pubUc insitutions, while the
owner retains an interest in their product and increase.
Aid they further stated:
The owner is practically powerless through his own
efforts to affect the ... property ...
Finally, in the corporate system, the "owner" of
industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership
while the power, the responsibility and the substance
which have been an integral part of ownership in the past
are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands
lies control.
And the logical outcome of this separation is the
Ownership of wealth without appreciable contro^
and control of wealth without appreciable ownership.
They show how with the economic changes and the development
of market economy, the control previously carried with the ownership
has now largely passed to those who, without being owners, can control
and direct the enterprise. Under these conditions it is no longer
guaranteed that the corporation will run in the interest of the property
59. Ibid, p. 312.
60. Ibid, p. 8.
61. Ibid, pp. 64-65.
62. Ibid, p. 66.
holders. This has destroyed the unity of ownership and has divided
ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it.
The property owner has thus become a mere recipient of dividends or
64
recipient of the wages of capita1.
Economically both control and management are wedded to the
physical property. Under corporate ownership the owner has neither
direct personal relationship nor responsibility towards it. As they
state:
Most fundamental of all, the position of ownership
has changed from that of an active to that of a passive
agent. In place of actua1 physical properties over which
the owner could exercise direction and for which he was
responsible, the owner now holds a piece of paper
representing a se^x>f rights and expectations with respect
to an enterprise.
They, however, reject the total abolition of private property
in the means of production and advocate that by protecting the rights
of property in the mans of production, the acquisitive interests of man
could thus be more effectively harnessed to the benefit of the community.
But ownership in the means of production must carry with it social
obligations as over-riding individual interests. This is possible only
if social obligations as comprising fair wages, security of employees,
reasonable service to the public, and stabilisation of business, etc.
form a charge over the passive interests of owners. As they state








cupidity '. Thus their plea is not for abolition of private property
but for the maintaining of social purpose as the basis of the rights ox
property.
Conclusion on the Socialisation of Property
The institution of property is socialised by imposing social
duties on the individual in the general interest. The individual is to
dispose of his property so as to further social interests. The old
doctrines that an individual may so use his property as not to injure
his neighbour maintain,not the general interest in view, but the indi¬
vidual's self interest as its end. The owner is already restricted
fron acting entirely in accordance with his own desires as that would
lead to chaos in the life of the community. The legal order that
controls economic activities and furthers social interests is thought
the only alternative to laissez-faire. That involves the transformation
of individual rights of property into a social function by attaching the
idea of social duties to the idea of property. Society and the social
interests are interposed between the owner and the object. The right
of property no longer concerns solely the individual and the object,
but also the social surroundings from which it takes its existence.
Society concerns itself with the influence exercised on the social
environment by the relationship between the individual and the object.
The absolute and subjective right has become a right which is no longer
absolute but is limited by social constraints. Under socialisation the
contents of property have been gradually extended to include tne
66. Ibid, p. 313.
concept of a social Junction, with the inevitable effect of bringing it
closer to public law. The process of modification of property displays
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three special features according to Katzarov:
1) the introduction of a social function into the content
of property;
2) the division, or fragmentation", of property into a
number of categories with differing contents and enjoying
differing protection (such as personal, private, cooperative
and collective property); and
3) the incipient elaboration of the concept of "community
property ', people's property" or "socialist property '.
The changed structure of the institution of property of which
the dominant idea is that all property has a social function leads to the
idea that property is restricted to and'limited by the needs of society.
In modern legal systems the idea of social purpose is increasingly
occupying a dominant role behind judicial interpretations. For example,
in case of bankruptcy, the exemption of the debtor's house, clothes,
his tools for work, part of his earning necessary for his living, etc.
from attachment is the result of the social purpose ascribed to the idea
of property. The debtor's personal obligations were abolished under
humanitarian considerations, and now his useable assets necessary for
his living as a source of his subsistence are exempted from debt obliga¬
tions on grounds of the social function of property. The leniency and
favourable attitude of the courts towards squatters gives credence to
the idea that judges are corning to recognise the socia1 function of
67. Katzarov, K., The Theory of Nationalisation, The Hague 1964, p. 116.
property. Under the stress of socialisation of law, the Supren e Court
6b
oi India ruled out the possibility 01 waiver of iundamental rights
granted under the constitution. The rights granted to the individual
are regarded as serving not onTy his well-being but also the wider and
general interest of the society. Similarly in cases of expropriation
of property by th« state for public purposes, the full compensation is
not mandatory ; whatever compensation is fixed by the state, its
69
adequacy is not justiciable in the court oi law. The most evident
proof of the public interest in property becomes clear when compensa¬
tion is fixed not only in the interest of the proprietor but also those of
society. The idea behind such a provision is that the property subject
to acquisition or requisition is recognised to have a social function
and the compensation is to be given on the basis of the importance of
the element of social function. Compensation which taxes account of
the social function of property and the general interest ox the community
(there is every reason to think) can not be based on the principle in
favour of the owner's right to 'full compensation'.
The admission and recognition in contemporary law of the social
character and function of property is an accomplished fact. This
means that the socialisation of institutions is determined by the needs
of society as perceived by those who control legal systems. Every
legal institution as a part of the social function, thus, represents a
part of the organised lega1 order and does not represent separate
68. The Constitution oi India, article 13.
69. The Constitution of India, article 31(2).
departments oi individual and social activities as was believed in the
individualistic period. Benner states:
If we correlate an specific effects of a legal
institution upon society as a whole, the individual paj^al
functions become fused into a single social function.
Socialisation does not mean collectivism nor does it mean the
abolition of private property. It, as indicated earlier, only means
attaching of distinct social functions to the rights, and in this essay,
refers to the rights of property. It needs to be differentiated from
nationalisation which is also a form oi socialisation, but is a specia1
type of socialisation. In the case of 'socialisation' as used here,
property remains private, but the owner is burdened with social duties
to further social ends. He cultivates or is forced to cultivate land not
because he needs it for his own profit, but because the presumed social
interest demands that land should not lie uncultivated or deserted. In
the case of nationalisation, private property changes its nature. It
becomes public or state property. It vests in the state - though the
end of public property remains the same, namely a presumed social
purpose. The objective criterion which justifies the functioning of the
rights of property does not change. It is the legal person that changes.
One can describe nationalisation as a process of depersonalisation of
property.
The fundamental tendency of nationalisation is the transfer of
certain categories of property and economic activity to the state and
their utilisation in what is conceived as the collective interest. The
70 Penner, op.cit., p. 75.
transfer tends to orient legal relations towards co^ective ownership
and collective interests. In such a system a1! production is cooperative,
each individual participates with the other, so that each is in turn a
member of every other. Katzarov explains the co^ective element
and general interest in nationalisation when he states:
One of the most important social and political
elements which influence the process of nationalisation is
not merely the desire to withdraw an activity or a class
of property from the private domain and to confer it on
the community, but is actuaHy a different attitude towards
economic affairs as a whole. This new attitude finds
expression when it is stated as a ground for nationalisation
that an undertaking being nationalised 'has not hitherto
been operated as it should have been in favour of the
community", or, less strongly, that it "wou^be better
operated if it were in communal ownership".
It is with a view to the preservation of natural resources and
the avoidance of waste, the distribution of production and income with
a view to reducing disparities of wealth between soma1 classes that
nationalisation is devised as an alternative to private property in the
means of production. It is economic growth, coupled with concern for
the general interest of the community, that is the basis of nationalisa¬
tion - for growth alone may leave behind pockets of poverty and disrupt
the life patterns of the majority of people. The notion of expansion of
the economy is made to harmonise with the idea of social welfare.
It is based on the idea that it is an obligation of the state to secure each
person's 'right to work' since the idea of the state as an institution
which has its basis on the idea of justice is getting greater and greater
significance in modern times. To meet such obligations the state
71. Katzarov, op.cit., p. 171.
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resorts to nationalisation in the hope oi' making the economic life of the
community be geared towards common interests.
Nationalisation is devised as a means oi socialisation, solely
relating to economic interests. The state, wholly or partially, with-
draws from private ownership certain economic assets which are thought
to be essential for collective utilisation - the idea is that certain
resources and certain economic activities cannot and should not be the
object of private ownership or the object of private interest. The
object of nationalisation is thus the utilisation of a given economic asset
in the general interest. It results from a conception of property which
has evolved appreciably, according to which ownership is no longer
limited to a bilateral relationship between the proprietor and the
subject-matter of the property, but constitutes a trilateral relation
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between the proprietor, the subject-matter and society. The reason
for the movement towards nationalisation is found in the growing
consciousness of the economic basis of legal problems and the role of
economics in human life. Social well-being is seen as the basis of the
right of property and the specific means of securing this end, tfihough
necessary, have become of secondary importance. Katzarov, keeping
this in view, states:
Basically, the transfer of property to the state by
nationalisation is of secondary importance only, since it
is merely a means of attaining the desired end, namely
the organisation of production and exchange on^jpcialist
principles in the exclusive interest of society.
72. Katzarov, op.cit., p. 159.




It is difficult to come to conclusions on a subject like ownership
since with both material and intellectual productions the process of
development never comes to an end. The main point to be made in
these concluding remarks is that every successive 'phase' of social
development which we may identify is in fact inseparably connected with
its precursors and successors, and that in any such 'phase' the institu¬
tion of property, is made to serve individual needs. Whatever be the
developments of the institution of property, the basic and most funda¬
mental idea, that each individual should have sufficient goods to meet
his needs, cannot be lost sight of, if the institution of property is to be
preserved and continued. With all developments, from primitive to
mediaeval to modern, we have found changing conceptions of property
shaped by differing social, economic, and political forces. But the
predominant function of the institution of property has always been and will
always be to fulfill economic needs or demands asserted by persons in
society. Whether one or the other development of the institution of
property is more consistent with the idea of liberty or to what degree
human society needs an institution of property, the economic function
of the institution of property has always remained basic to it. Whether
the legal order working under a given political system has been made to
serve the needs of each individual or a small section of the society is
a different question - the survival of the institution of property is
marked by its function in fulfilling economic needs, and this is essential
under all legal systems.
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If one were to speculate about the first steps of human history,
one would certainly infer the need of appropriating out of nature, the
material which was most basic to human survival. It is the appropria¬
tion of this material that is necessary for the survival of the human race
that constitutes the idea of property. Similarly the successive develop¬
ments in appropriating the means of production, like land, in whatever
vague form, out of which the specific form later developed, is the
beginning of the idea of property. Thus property is the 'thing'
capable of serving human interests if he is to survive. Sumner states:
Property is 'sacred' ... becauee it is the actual
and indispensable basis of the existence of men in
society ...
Men live in order to live, and property is the
support of ^xistence ... To assail it is to assail
existence.
The different types of 'things' that constituted property in the course of
the development of the institution of property have this characteristic
of being means to fulfil individual needs; and its various forms
depended upon the life-conditions of the given society. As the life
conditions change, the different variations in the institution of property
became apparent. But despite all its variations, and despite all its
new additions and subtractions to the category of 'things' from the
contents of ownership, the basic idea of the institution of property as
serving individual needs remained constant and firm - since it is the
life essence for the survival and continuation of the institution of
property.
1. Sumner, The Science of Society, London 1927, vol. i, p. 349.
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The making of provision to support life is in some sense the
reason for which the institution of property came into existence and is
surviving. The life of labour, the drawing of subsistence for individual
needs, are all elements of the institution of property. The only
universalisable -£nd which can be ascribed to the institution of property is that
of fulfilling the needs of each individual. The right of property is a
guarantee to each individual for his survival so that he can get the
necessities of life; and the kind of property which excludes others, as
from the means of production, when everybody is equally entitled to it,
is unjust. There have come into existence various kinds of property
i
which are far removed from the basic idea of providing subsistence to
each individual and have made him depend on others for his necessities
of life. Asa result the freedom of individual, that is necessary to
individual life, which comes through the control over things to meet
the necessities of life, lost ground to the institution of property itself
through its various developments. The juristic development of the
idea of property has perverted it from the basic (and innocent) idea of
providing to each the means of his subsistence free from the control
of others. Thus the kind of property which deprived the majority of
the people of their subsistence, and thus of their freedom as well, is
against the very idea of the institution of property which established
individual control over things for each person's own use. Bentham's
savage in a cave who by the introduction of the institution of property
became free from being robbed of his dead deer, in reality lost all his
freedom as well as right to subsistence with the juristic developments
of the institution of property.
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When the liberty of each individual is considered necessary to the
development of his personality, and property is conceived as an extension
of personality over externa] objects, the confusion between the two,
property and liberty, reaches a point where liberty merges into property
through the notion of freedom of contract, and the perceived distinction
between the two effectively vanishes. As a result of this development
the institution of property (though still characterised as serving the
economic needs of all) became an instrument of oppression in the hands
of those who acquired more wealth than their needs required. The
institution of property came to serve the economic needs of a minority
at the cost of the majority. It is not that for the majority it ceased to
exist, but it ceased to function directly. The owner of wealth stood
midway between production and consumption, with power to direct
both production and consumption. The normal role of property was
in abeyance only for that intermediate stage. But its real function
of distributing goods for consumption did not stop - such a stoppage
would mark the end of the institution of property. Liberty is destroyed
in an actual sense, since a mere formal presence of abilities to acquire
and transfer property may be of little or no worth to the great mass
of the poor. (If the institution of property is presumed to merge in
the idea of liberty, and liberty gains as much strength as ia gained by
the institution of property the result will be total chaos.) The
important thing is to realise a system of property in which ownership
is a means of serving the persona1 economic needs of an individual
rather than for giving him power over others. Property so conceived
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can preserve its independence as an institution even under the variability
of circumstances. Thus what is necessary to continue the existence
of the institution of property is maintaining a sense that the institution
of property serves a legitimate purpose, that is, fulfilment of the
economic needs of each individual under all variable circumstances.
The justification of the institution of property is to be found in this
purpose or functional activity where it serves the economic needs of
each individual rather than in an activity where the institution serves
a section of the community and leaves the majority to depend on that
section, rather than on possession of sufficient property of their own
to serve their economic needs. Thus what is necessary to preserve
the institution of property is its capacity to fulfil each person's
economic needs under variable circumstances - in any system whatso¬
ever. But such a recognition and realisation is possible only if we
first realise that the institution of property which does not fulfil these
economic functions is not a wise and inevitable system but one guaranteed
to subvert the institution of property itself. We shall not grow wiser
unless we learn that much that we have done was very foolish. Only
such a realisation would establish the intrinsic value of property and
lead to a condition in which no one would dare to say:
Wealth is drawn up by ropes of wealth, thus money
bringeth money ... O vanity of vanities, yet no more
vain than insane. The church is resplendent in her
walls, beggarly in her poor. Sip clothes her stones in
gold, and leaves her son naked.
It is not intended to denigrate the importance to each individual of
2. From a letter of St. Bernard, c. 1125 quoted by Tawney, R.H.,
Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, London 1326, p. 29.
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fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion,
etc., but it is unlikely that a hungry man would be particularly excited
3
about his freedom. The important thing is to realise a system of
ownership in which property as a personal asset, a source of freedom,
can preserve its independence in its sphere of its persona"! use rather
than becoming a subversive element in the social order as a source of
authority over men.
Individualistic philosophy tends to justify property in conformity with
its basic tenets that man is by nature an isolated being and his gregarious
instincts are the results of social and physical compulsions. With this
view the idea that the good of each man will lead to the good of society
as a whole became the spring-board for individualistic doctrines. When
this philosophy was applied in relation to the institution of property,
the individual was allowed to enjoy an entirely free hand in his economic
affairs. Man by his ingenuity invented such uses of his property as
loan, lease, etc., that superior wealth became a form of superior
power. Economic power became a ladder to political power and thereby
made these inventions property themselves. With the growing
complexities of society by new inventions in industry, the individualistic
philosophy turned against individuals and a major section of society was
deprived of the individual freedom, which was so dear to the protagonists
of individualist philosophy. The old restrictions on the individual's
free movement and economic bondage were replaced by freedom (which
proved an empty frame), yet this made no substantial change in
3. Rawls, J.A., A Theory of Justice, London 1973, paperback, p. 204.
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opportunities of real self development. He could not avail himself oi
or realise the worth of freedom because the change was a change within
the forms of socio-legal systems rather than a change of substance.
The individual's plight under the freedom of property and freedom of
contract, the two main elements in capitalist economic activity, did not
make a fresh start for the majority because the majority was not given
property enough to make a fresh start. Those who speak of an unbroken
line of development so far as the substance of the right of property is
concerned have therefore a good deal of truth on their side. There
was a break but an attempt to make a fresh start with rights of
property failed. Instead, a consequence of this change was the develop¬
ment of the complete supremacy of the rights of property.
The advocacy of freedom of property coupled with the idea of liberty
came under attack when increasing national wealth through industrialisa¬
tion failed to show a parallel rise in the general welfare of the people.
Social minded jurists, lawyers, and economists, though defenders of
the institution of property, attacked the neglect of general welfare which
marked the capitalist economic system. The depreciation of property
that took place in the wake of such a social movement sowed the seed
for the imposition of social duties on the ownership of property. The
idea that the institution of property is to serve the economic needs (any
generation's conception of needs is shaped by the urgencies of life and
therefore each generation has to undertake anew this task of reinter-
pretation if it wishes to uphold its claim to share in the constant
renewal of civilised values) and therefore is the basis of subsistence
became a scientific, political, and legal notion involving the problems
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of health, education, housing, pensions, etc. The origin and strength
of these claims through the institution of property represented a social
revolution. However distastefu1 such an admission may be, we must
"recognise that the rule of law is a dynamic concept for the expansion
and fulfilment of ... not only . .. civil and political rights of the individual
in a free society, but also to establish social, economic, educational,
and cultural conditions under which his legitimate aspirations and
4
dignity may be realised. " Within this intellectual framework a variety
of social experiments were conceived during the last century, out of
which the present movement of the 20th century has stemmed.
The ideal of liberty which the classical writers like Locke purported
to support is basically unsuited to their conception of property guided
by a market economy. As a matter of fact Locke started with the
conception of property which was based on use-value - the exclusive
use of a thing for an individual so long as he needs it for the satisfaction
of his needs and no more - since it was not an unlimited control of a
thing. This was the actual assumption from which Locke started. But
he later abandoned this position by introducing the ideas of money and of
labour as property, the capacities of one's body, in order to support
and preserve the capitalistic market economy. His initial assumption
was based on use-value and thus excludes the accumulation which is
essential for accumulation of capital and thus to support the capitalist
market economy. Thus Locke's basic natural law assumptions do not
warrant unlimited individual ownership and control of the conditions
4. Nkrumah, K., "Law in Africa", J.A.L. 1962, pp. 107-108.
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of labour as is clear when he states:
God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath
also given them reason to make use of it to the best
advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all
that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfox't
of their being. And tho' all the fruits it naturally produces,
and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they
are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body
has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of
mankind.
Similarly other classical writers like Hume and Bentham believed
that the idea of security led to the maintenance of the unlimited control
of property. Their idea of an unlimited control of an object includes
all the intensivity and extensivity of ownership - the idea of benefiting
from all types of uses of an object. While Hume believes that all
institutions are based on utilitarian considerations to serve useful
purposes, yet he is wrong in concluding that the institution of property
arises out of scarcity of natural resources and unlimited human needs.
Again he argues that the institution of property is the result of
usurpation and not of social contract. But this reflects his idea that
before such a usurpation, which brought the disparity of wealth and
made a person to serve under another person who amassed excess of
wealth, there was a social system in which there were no such servile
classes and each individual enjoy freedom and fulfilled his needs by
appropriating from nature. But if this were so, this primitive
appropriation was property which served no greater purpose than to
serve the needs of individuals. Getting together both these ideas, one
can conclude that Hume like Locke was very truthful in finding the
5. Locke, J., The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter
Concerning Toleration, edited by Gough, J.W. Oxford 1946, p. 15.
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idea of fulfilling individual needs as basic to the institution of property.
In fact he was busy in advancing arguments to accept as just that which
was unjust, in order to support the capitalist system under the guise
of maintenance of security. True to his convictions, he, as a matter
of fact, believes that the essence of the institution of property lies in the
personal use of property to fulfil one's needs and not in the unlimited
control of things. But like his predecessors - and in this he anticipates
his successors - he supported a capitalist economy guided by market
forces rather than an economy aimed directly at the fulfilment of the
needs of each individual. The mere belief, the solace to the poor
offered by Hume and Bentham, that they should wait for the chance to
come for their becoming rich is not enough for a man who would wait
and see his generation dying before his eyes. Such a false hope is like
the crowing of a cock who believes that his crowing before sunrise causes
the sun to rise.
It is on the basis of these theories of the classical writers that
/ 6
Professor Honore constructed a liberal analysis of ownership while
ignoring 'the personal exclusive use of an object' as the basis and purpose
of the right of ownership which in modern times is becoming the para¬
mount interest in legal systems. His analysis reflects the social and
political incidents of control over things rather than suggesting a viable
criterion which holds good under all .variable conditions. To regard
possession as the basis of ownership in the sense of right to use except
for harmful uses is correctly to identify the basis of ownership. But
6. Honore', A.M. "Ownership1, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence,
edited by Guest, A.G., London 1961, pp. 107-128.
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to add the right to derive income, etc., aa equally central is to
disregard the idea of possession for personal use to meet individual
needs. It is to admit the unlimited right of ownership. But possession
is an economic notion whidh gives the possessor the use of a thing to
meet his needs from the thing. Thus to regard possession as the
basis of ownership and to admit within its ambit the idea of non-
possession is to revolt against the very basis of ownership. For
example, a landlord derives a rent from the land while the tenant has
the actual possession which is the economic use of the land. While the
landlord's income to satisfy his needs is derived from his land and is
a right to use land, it is not a direct use of the land found in the idea of
possession which is the basis of ownership, implying the personal use
of a thing. Since we can imagine a society in which such partial aliena¬
tion is not allowed, we may conclude that such incidents are not
essential to ownership. Thus to regard ownership as not based on the
personal economic use of a thing is to admit that ownership is not to
satisfy economic needs of individuals. This will lead to the conclusion
that the concept of ownership is formulated, in part at least, by conse-
quences other than economic, and that the law disregards economic
order, which takes form and shape in possession, but recognises only
the order of ownership and other real rights. A person can thus own
property or be vested with the control over objects, which may affect
the needs of others but which may have no relation at a^l to the needs of
the owner. As a result of such a notion the social significance of
■ ownership as a means to meet the economic needs of each individual
has no relation to the legal analysis of the institution of ownership. The
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eventual significance of this is that in the case of property as an
exchange value, the propertyleas man has got no significance in relation
to right of property per se but is only an instrument in the production
of further property for the owner. The worker is reduced to a mere
factor in production, to an economic chattel because the capitalistic
conception of property regards labour as a commodity which can be
bought and sold. It makes, as Marx says, the private owner a
commander.'
The concept of property as a right to an exclusive control over an
object gives the notion of property-objects as essentially comprising
objects of purely individual or personal use. The variability of
incidents like the power of alienation, and others of the incidents
identified by Honore within different legal systems, show that it is
only the right to exclusive control of a thing, which is essential to
ownership since it does not vary. But with the development of the
market economy the idea of use value was extended to use-value through
exchange value. This was an extension of a simple use-value of a
thing to a complex economic exchange of things. As a result of the
introduction of exchange value into the system of property, there came
into existence a number of norms, for example lease, mortgage, etc.,
with the result that the balance between the norm of property as
exclusive control and other proprietary norms turned into an imbalance.
The use value fragmented into a number of exchange values. The unity
of ownership as a single right became obscured by the bundle of
7. Marx, K., Capital, London 1974, vol. i, p. 314.
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associated rights. A new conception of ownership as a bundle of rights
is the result of the development of the market economy. In this
development the essence of ownership as bestowing control over a use-
value for personal use, lost ground to incidents focused on the exchange
value of an object.
Because of the shift from use value to exchange value, the idea that
dominated the classical writers concerning the economic progress of
society is based on ego-centric notion of providing incentive to
workers in terms of money. These classical writers did not think of
incentive in terms of granting some sort of recognition of the services
of the workers. But it has been shown that acceptance of money value
as the sole criterion of property is inadequate and there is a growing
recognition of the need for its revision. Again the idea of exchange
value does not submit of either objective or subjective test. There
can be an exchange of corporeal things as based on monetary value, but
how can refined values of life, like one's skill to play the piano, be
exchanged? Again the exchange of a thing does not depend on its
S
equivalent but on the value which different people attach to different
things. For example, for a savage a beautiful painting has no exchange
value. Nor, as stated by both classical writers and socialist thinkers,
is labour as determining the exchange value of a thing a sufficient
criterion, for there are differences in labour. One labourer working
in a coal mine which is more productive produces more coal in his
labour time than the other labourer who is working in a coal mine with
a difficult coal seam. Or one labourer who is physically weak may
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produce less in his labour time even with his best efforts than a
stronger but less hard working labourer. None of these criteria can
be the basis for the distribution of property. Why should either the
natural abilities or the external physical conditions be the criterion
for distribution of property? Why is it that the institution of property
which is created to meet the needs of each individual be influenced by
extraneous circumstances? The institition of property is created to
meet the needs of each individual, and for both human survival and the
survival of such an institution which facilitates distribution of goods
for human living, the basis must be found in order to co-ordinate the
means for the production of goods and the function of fulfilling the needs
of each individual.
Such an idea of property as is stressed in modern socialist
literature that property is a means of subsistence and therefore for
personal use, represents a reversion to the real purpose of property
as identified by the classical writers themselves before they switched
over to their theories of a capitalist market economy; by that switch
they in effect deprived man both of his personality and personalty.
This is what Marx calls a systematic robbery of what is necessary for
the life of the workman. The theory implicit in our modern law is
that the satisfaction of individual needs makes the institution of property
necessary in one form or the other. And a growing tendency is
towards increasing recognition of the social interests in individual needs
and their satisfaction rather than the abrogation of the rights of property.
The right to subsistence is now recognised as a fundamental right.
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Growing recognition of the necessity of this regulation of the function
and use of the institution of property has led to more permanent
changes in the relation of property and individuals in the establishment
8
of socialised legal systems. With changes in economic and social
conditions, at present the ambition is to assist and readjust the property
relations that humanity may not be held ies3 deserving of conservation
than property. And the tendency of all legislation like Factory Laws,
Compensation Acts, Succession Acts, etc., points in this direction.
The idea of law has changed from a system of negative control (hands
off) while individuals assert themselves freely, to a positive system
of social institutions directed positively at social ends - there has been
a change in terms of social life rather than in abstract individual wills.
A great deal of old philosophy is still with us but this philosophy is
increasingly encountered by growing emphasis on the responsibility
of the society for the welfare of the individual.
The general point which I am trying to stress is this: that capital
is not a form of personality and consequently in a distribution among
men it is not morally entitled to receive anything. We should let it
perform the function of production for the needs of each individual and
let the society conserve it for that purpose. Capital needs labour and
vice versa; but both capital and labour can be reconciled if capital is
socialised in the same way as production through capital is a socialised
production. Such a development in the notion of property is more in
8. For example, such offences against property as waste and
unauthorised use of precious resources have been made criminal
offences regardless of ownership.
harmony with the constantly changing demands that modern society
makes upon it. Parallel to the growing tendency towards socialisation
of property is the demand to set the institution of property on a march
to meet the needs of each individual in a society. With this realisation
the notion that property is an essential condition of human freedom is
accepted. This idea has been gaining greater practical recognition
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